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Abstract 
Loss of social prestige and respect from one’s community represents a 
fundamental threat to the social self. Additionally, low-status individuals are frequently 
exposed to social stressors and unprovoked hostility in their daily lives. The current 
research examines how social status affects the processing of threatening faces. Nine 
studies, in which status was experimentally manipulated, test the hypothesis that low 
sense of perceived status leads to enhanced processing of social threat. Study 1 
provided preliminary support for this hypothesis with low-status participants showing 
heightened accessibility for social-threat words in a lexical-decision task. Building 
from that, Study 2 found that low-status participants were quicker at recognising target 
faces that were embedded in a social-threat context. Study 3 utilised a modified Stroop 
paradigm to examine interference from irrelevant emotional face background. Study 4 
investigated motivated processing effort in a facial expression identification task. 
Studies 5 and 6 used a dot-probe task to examine the time-course and selective 
attentional biases to angry and happy faces. Study 7 further examined the bias to 
perceive social-threat cues using a change emotion detection task in which an angry 
face morphed into a neutral face. It also examined the role of social interaction. These 
studies consistently showed that low-status enhanced the readiness to deploy processing 
effort and focus attention toward facial expressions of anger. It highlights the 
heightened awareness of overt social threat cues in low-status participants. Studies 8 
and 9 investigated the ability to detect subtle cues of social threat in non-Duchenne 
smiles. Whilst low-status participants showed a decrease in their preference to work 
with targets displaying non-Duchenne smiles, high- and low-status participants did not 
differ in the ability to explicitly discriminate between Duchenne and non-Duchenne 
smiles. The implications of these findings for the links between status, attention and 
social relations are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
 
1.1 Preface 
Hierarchy is one of the most common forms of social organisation (Brown, 
1991; Mazur, 1985; Murdock, 1949). Indeed, human and non-human primate societies 
alike are organised in a stratified structure with more members at the bottom than at the 
top.  
As social creatures, most of our interaction with the environment revolves 
around relationships with other people. The social structure in which such interactions 
take place is built upon social asymmetries in terms of status, power or both (Farley, 
1982). Hierarchical differences along these dimensions among individuals often dictate 
patterns of conflict, resource allocation, and mating (Báles, 1950; Berger, Rosenholtz, 
& Zelditch, 1980; de Kwaadsteniet & van Dijk, 2010; Ellis, 1995; Fried, 1967; Ronay, 
Greenaway, Anicich, & Galinsky, 2012). Even when effort is made to minimise 
hierarchy by employing different models of social organisation (Fiske, 1992), it 
inevitably emerges both between and within groups (Leavitt, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). The pervasiveness of hierarchy suggests that there are a number of factors not 
just in groups, but also within and between individuals, that create, shape and sustain it 
across myriad settings.  
Faces, in particular, have often been referred to as one of the most salient and 
relevant social stimuli to social interactions (Bruce & Young, 1986; Bonner, Burton, & 
Bruce, 2003). Faces lie at the heart of social cognition (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010) 
because the ability to successfully encode faces contributes substantially towards the 
creation and maintenance of functional social interactions (Yardley, McDermott, 
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Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2008). Based on existing evidence on top-down 
influences in face processing, the current research investigates how subjective sense of 
status influences face memory, emotional face recognition, and basic attentional 
processes that underlies emotional face perception. Building from previous work 
showing that face perception varies as function of motives, I argue that loss of status 
triggers the motivation to be vigilant towards facial cues indicative of social threat, and 
that these top-down motivational influences feed into lower order processes in face 
perception.  
More specifically, building from evidence suggesting that face perception is 
driven by the functional relevance a particular target was to the perceiver (e.g., Becker, 
Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2005; Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010), I 
propose that threatening facial expressions are perceived to be of high subjective value 
and relevance to a low-status individual. Therefore these faces will elicit more selective 
visual attention, superior face processing style, and greater recognition ability.  
In relation to that, group membership and social status position often constrains 
how an individual thinks, feels and behaves (Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000). Empirical 
studies investigating the links between status, group processes and social cognition 
have primarily focused on overt consequences of status such as inter- and intra-group 
behaviour and the individuals’ perception of different social status groups. For 
example, the system justification theory proposes increased self-esteem and out-groups 
devaluation for members of high-status groups and decreased self-esteem and in-group 
favouritism for members of low-status groups (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Much less is 
known about more basic social perception processes that are likely to contribute to the 
proposed higher-order cognition and action.  
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To that end, the current research aimed to investigate how perceivers’ sense of 
their own status affects their subsequent perception of their social surroundings. It also 
aimed to provide converging evidence that status can be conceived not only as a 
building block of our social structure, but also as a psychological factor that moderates 
the way we perceive and interact with the social environment. In particular, the current 
research examined how status triggers functionally specific motivations, which then 
exerts top-down influence on the processing of social threat information (Chapter 2) 
and facial cues indicative of both overt (Chapter 3) and subtle threat (Chapter 4).  
People tend to pay close attention to facial expressions of others in order to 
determine their intentions (Fridlund, 1994, 1997). Given that low-status individuals 
experience more hostility and social challenges in their daily lives, they should be 
particularly preoccupied with discerning threatening facial expressions of others. The 
current research examines threat-related facial cues in angry emotional expressions, 
which signals direct social threat; and non-Duchenne smiles that conveys 
untrustworthiness. I propose that loss of social prestige automatically heightens 
accessibility of social threat signals. Thereby low-status individuals should be more 
motivated to process facial expression indicative of social threat. In addition, I propose 
that this heightened sensitivity to facial expressions of threat reflects an increased 
awareness of social threat. I posit that low-status individuals are motivated to be 
vigilant towards social threat cues instead of affiliative cues because they prioritise the 
detection and subsequent avoidance of threatening targets. I also propose that the 
attentional vigilance towards static angry facial expression would be evident in 
dynamic facial expression of anger. I also investigated the role of the relationship 
between the target and the perceiver. Specifically, whether expecting an interaction 
with the target influences the perception of their dynamic angry expression. I suggest 
  13
that low-status individuals would be biased in the perception of anger emotion offset in 
ambiguous facial expression in the faces of interaction partners and not in targets in 
which no interaction is expected. Finally, I propose that low-status individuals would 
also be sensitive to untrustworthiness cues present in non-Duchenne smiling faces. I 
suggest that low-status individuals would be able to discriminate between Duchenne 
and non-Duchenne smiles, as they are motivated to avoid threatening targets. 
Conversely, I do not expect high-status individuals to demonstrate this pattern of 
response. 
In the next chapter, I will first define some of the core concepts in social 
hierarchy that informed the development of the rationale behind the current research’s 
hypotheses. Next, I will review the links between the stigma associated with belonging 
to a low socioeconomic status group and aggression, followed by a consideration of the 
impact that social status has on threat sensitivity. Then, I will give a broad overview of 
the social cognitive literature on social status, with the goal of demonstrating how the 
loss of status leads to differential social cognitive tendencies. Finally, I will discuss the 
emerging evidence on the motivated basis of face perception. Integrating these lines of 
research gives us compelling reason to believe that the chronic exposure to social 
hostility and social challenges should trigger the motivation to be more sensitive to 
social threat cues in low-status individuals.   
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1.2 Concepts 
Given the dynamic nature of social hierarchy, I will first introduce the relevant 
concepts that are highly intertwined yet conceptually distinct and conjointly sum up the 
complexities of social hierarchy.   
1.2.1 Social hierarchy 
Social hierarchy refers to the “implicit or explicit rank order of individuals or 
groups on a valued social dimension” (Magee & Galinsky, 2008, p. 354). One possible 
implication from this definition is that the valued social dimension is subjective to the 
individual or groups, and that the context will determine which dimension(s) is most 
relevant for differentially ranking individuals or groups at any given moment.  
The current research focuses on social status, which alongside social power has 
been proposed to be one of the two most important bases of social hierarchy (Blau, 
1964; Mannix & Sauer, 2006; Thye, 2000). The following subsection will firstly give a 
general definition of how I conceptualised social status and differentiated it from social 
power. Then, I will briefly define other constructs closely related to social status, 
namely, social class and socioeconomic status (SES). These constructs are important as 
they contribute directly to the rationale underlying the current core research questions. 
It should be noted that status differences frequently manifest between groups that differ 
in terms of social categories. I will briefly mention some supporting evidence from 
those literature areas in the later parts of this introduction. However, in this particular 
subsection, I will only focus on social class and SES. This is because the current 
research intended to diverge from past research, which has focused mainly on concrete 
social categories such as ethnicity and gender. Specifically, I was interested in 
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providing novel empirical evidence on how abstract social environmental cues such as 
prestige and respect influences basic cognitive processes.   
1.2.2 Social status 
Status has been referred to as the underlying dimension in social structure and 
in people’s understanding of behaviour (for related definitions, see Lonner, 1980). A 
hierarchical relation between individuals is one of the basic forms of social relations 
(Fiske, 1992). Furthermore, relationships of status permeate everyday interpersonal 
experiences, because every person one encounters is either higher, lower or equal status 
relative to the self (Russell & Fiske, 2008). High-status individuals are seen as more 
worthy and are given more respect than others; therefore their recognition is more 
highly valued (Raven & Kruglanski, 1970). High-status also confers the ability to resist 
social controls on behaviours as imposed by others or situational forces (Hollander, 
1958). As such, status is often conceived as a property of social relationships, which 
have important implications at multiple levels, ranging from psychological, cognitive, 
and affective to behavioural (Bugental, 2000).  
Broadly, status is defined as the position of prestige and respect one holds in the 
social hierarchy and in the eyes of others (Ridgeway & Walker, 1995). It is important 
to note that unlike power hierarchies that are defined by the amount of objective control 
one has over valued resources (Fiske & Dépret & Fiske, 1996; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003), status hierarchies are primarily subjective (Blau, 1964; Foa, 1971; 
Goldhamer & Shils, 1939; Hollander, 1958; Podolny, 1993). Furthermore, power is 
based upon resources that belong to an actor, whereas status is based upon the social 
resources that are conferred upon the actor by others. In other words, status, unlike 
power which is a property of the actor, is a property of co-actors around the actor 
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(Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Finally, while a high-ranking position can be obtained 
through power, dominance, and ability to influence through coercive methods; status is 
more commonly conferred to those who are well respected and relates to positive social 
attention and acceptance (de Waal, 1989; Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert & Trower, 1990). 
There are three constructs that are closely related to social status, namely, 
socioeconomic status (SES), social rank and social class. SES is a multidimensional 
phenomenon that takes into account a combination of variables in terms of financial, 
occupational and educational influences (Green, 1970; Hollingshead, 1975; Mueller & 
Parcel, 1981). The most common account of SES considers SES as encompassing three 
types of capital (Coleman, 1988): financial capital (income/material assets), human 
capital (non-material resources such as education), and social capital (non-material 
resources achieved through occupation or social connections), which influence 
processes that have an direct effect of well-being (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002). 
Additionally, there is also general consensus that the combination of income, education, 
and occupation represent SES better than any of these alone (White, 1982).  
Social rank is commonly operationalised in terms of one’s ability to influence 
others’ behaviours, thoughts, and feelings (Báles, Strodtbeck, Mills, & Roseborough, 
1951; French & Raven, 1959; Mazur, 1973) and the attention that one receives from 
others (Anderson & Shirako, 2008; Fiske, 1993; Hold, 1976; see Anderson, John, 
Keltner, & Kring, 2001). Indeed, high- and low-ranking individuals differ in terms of 
their influence within a group, such as resource allocation and group decisions (Berger, 
Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980). Consequently, there is a strong link between social rank 
and well-being, across species (e.g., Barkow, 1975; Betzig, 1986; Cowlishaw & 
Dunbar, 1991; Hill, 1984b; Hill & Hurtado, 1989; von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 
2011).  
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A construct closely related to social status is social class. Social class is 
commonly based on both objective measures of material resources (income, education; 
Oakes & Rossi, 2003) and the concept of subjective sense of status rank vis-à-vis others 
in society (subjective status; Adler et al., 2000). Importantly, social class identity 
defines an individual’s physical and psychological life circumstances in ways highly 
similar to other social identity constructs (e.g., ethnicity, nationality). In particular, 
social class identity has been proposed to be a source of social stigma among lower 
class individuals (Croizet & Clare, 1998) and it directly affects the dynamics during 
social interactions because of the stigma associated with their social class (Blascovich, 
Mender, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001).  
It is worth noting again that, throughout this chapter, the term social status 
would refer to status from the perspectives of socioeconomic status (SES), social rank, 
and social class interchangeably. Notwithstanding the additional considerations with 
each specific construct such as material wealth in SES, and ability to influence others in 
social rank, these constructs are highly intertwined.  Therefore these constructs would 
provide a comprehensive background for the rationale underlying the current research 
questions, which is based solely on subjective sense of status, specifically in the 
domains of respect and prestige. 
The next section aimed to set the background framework for the overarching 
aim in the current research, which is to investigate how social status affects the 
processing of threatening faces. Firstly, I will discuss the relationship between 
socioeconomic status, stigma and hostility.  I will highlight the role of 
psychological/social stressors in contributing to the disparities between high and low-
status individuals. Then, I will outline the physiological consequence of social status, 
with an emphasis on differential experiences and expression of aggression as a result of 
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one’s status position. I will also attempt to illustrate how the stigma associated with low 
social-status contributed to the phenomenon hypothesised by the current research. 
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1.3 Social status, stigma and hostility 
In many species, reproductive success is often associated with those who hold 
dominant positions in the social hierarchy. One proposition is that those with higher 
status have a greater chance of survival and are better able to provide and protect for 
their offspring (Clutton-Brock, 1988; Clutton- Brock & Harvey, 1976; Dewsbury, 
1982; Ellis, 1995). Not surprisingly, people place great importance in fulfilling 
expectations of their hierarchical ranking; to move up to higher positions and to avoid 
being demoted to lower positions (Brown, 1985; King, 1995). 
In other words, natural selection favours those in high-status positions. 
Accordingly, it is plausible that our physiological system and cognitive functioning 
should have evolved such that a loss or gain in status triggers an alarm signal that 
impacts both our bodily response and social cognitive processes. For the remainder of 
this section, in light of the aims of the current research, which is to demonstrate that 
status triggers functionally distinct motivations that then has a top-down influence on 
social cognitive process, I will discuss how one’s socioeconomic status leads to 
differential physiological changes and social stresses. I will elaborate on how these 
factors have been proposed to account for the health disparities between individuals 
from high and low socioeconomic status background. Next, to further explain why 
one’s physiology and stress-response varies as a function of their status, I will outline 
how status influences ones’ experiences and expressions of aggression.  
1.3.1 Status and health: The role of physiological changes 
Socioeconomic factors are of great interest in psychological research, health 
practice, education and policy because they play a crucial role in human functioning 
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across the life span, including development, well-being, and physical and mental health 
(APA, 2007).  
In the recent report by the American Psychological Association (APA) task 
force on SES, Saegert and colleagues highlighted the relationship between lower social 
standing and increased exposure to violence and other debilitating stressors and threats 
(APA, 2007). High SES is typically associated with relatively greater health 
advantages. However, it should be noted that disparities are most striking at the lower 
ranking positions (Gallo, Smith, Cox, 2006), and elevated stress and negative emotions 
have been proposed to contribute to the relative health disadvantages.  
A number of studies indicate that naturally occurring status differences affect 
stress related physiology. Research focusing on the links between SES and health has 
found higher health risks and earlier mortality from all causes in low-status individuals 
compared to high-status individuals (Saplosky, 2004, 2005; Marmot, Rose, Shipley, & 
Hamilton, 1978). For example, in their longitudinal Whitehall studies, Marmot, Davey, 
Smith, and Stansfield, (1991) investigated the links between hierarchical position at 
work, stress and health in 28,308 civil servants over the period of 10 years. These 
studies found that those at the bottom of the hierarchy (e.g., messengers, doorkeepers) 
had a greater likelihood to suffer from heart and chronic respiratory disease, some 
cancers, and higher mortality compared to those at the top (e.g., administrators). The 
differences were associated with increased cortisol awakening response (the difference 
between cortisol levels upon awakening and thirty minutes later) in those in the lower 
ranks, and remained after controlling for lifestyle differences. The stress response that 
comes with a low-status position at work is also associated with decreased perceived 
control and autonomy (Steptoe & Kivimäki, 2012).  
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Converging evidence shows that in response to the challenge of losing status, 
the brain activates the autonomic nervous system, which in turn stimulates the release 
of the hormones cortisol and adrenaline (Cummins, 2005). In addition, there is also a 
direct correlation between androgen and serotonin levels in higher-status primates 
(Ellis, 1995; Sapolsky, 1990; Sapolsky & Ray, 1989). Serotonin levels increase in 
lower-status subordinates who improve their social position and winners’ exhibit an 
increase in androgen levels (Sapolsky, 1990, 1999; Sapolsky & Ray, 1989; Niehoff, 
1999). In order to establish causality rather than correlation of this effect, past studies 
have manipulated social position in the hierarchy and consistently showed acute effects 
of lowered social status. In particular, losing one’s dominant position leads to an 
increase in cortisol levels (Shively et al., 1997) and an animal that has been defeated in 
an antagonistic encounter also show greater cortisol activity compared to the victor 
(e.g., Kollack-Walker, Watson, & Akil, 1997). In sum, these studies suggest that acute 
or chronic threats to one’s social status lead to an increase in cortisol activity, this effect 
are augmented when conditions are perceived as uncontrollable. 
Recent evidence shows that adults and children from low SES backgrounds 
typically have higher cortisol levels than those of higher SES (Kapuku, Treiber, & 
Davis, 2002; Lupien, King, Meaney, & McEwen, 2001) and this occurs above and 
beyond differences in access to health-care, or other objective factors. Importantly, 
these results highlight the role of perceived status vis a vis others (Adler, Boyce, 
Chesney, Cohen, Folkman, Kahn, & Syme, 1994; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, Folkman, & 
Syme, 1993; McEwen & Wingfield, 2002). For example, even within a household, 
perceptions of spousal dominance correlates with blood pressure reactivity during 
interactions between married couples (Brown, Smith, & Benjamin, 1998). Therefore, 
instead of looking at the objective measures of status such as SES, ranking or 
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differences between social groups, the current research aimed to provide novel 
evidence in investigating how perceived status vis a vis others influences basic social 
cognitive and attentional processes in the perception of social threat related cues in 
faces. Additionally, threat, as a construct, has gained the reputation in empirical 
research as a difficult construct to assess directly. As a result, past studies have often 
looked at threat as a general construct instead of distinguishing between the physical 
threat and social threat components. In the current research, I aimed to focus 
specifically on social threat. Specifically, I aimed to demonstrate the bidirectional 
relationship between social threats and status. Specifically, I tested the notion that loss 
of status is both associated with increased exposure to both physical and social threats, 
which in turn motivates enhanced processing and attentional vigilance towards social 
threat cues in the environment.  To that end, the next subsection will outline the 
relationship between social stressors as a form of social threat and social stats.  
1.3.2 Status and social stressors 
Stress is often the result of the perception that one’s environment contains the 
risk for threat, loss, or harm (Carver, 2007). That is, an individual may experience 
stress when the threat from a threatening situation exceeds the individual’s available 
resources and perceived ability for coping (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988). Importantly, 
this pertains to threat in both the physical and psychological environment. Recent 
evidence demonstrates that social-evaluative threats to the social self (Grunewald, 
Kemedny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004) such as rejection and criticism are especially powerful 
stressors (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Stroud, Tanofsky-Kraff, Wilfley, & Salovey, 
2000). For example, the anticipation of being a target of prejudice or discrimination has 
been shown to activate the stress-response system (i.e., mobilising bodily resources to 
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meet the demands of the threatening situation) (Sawyer, Major, Casad, Townsend, & 
Mendes, 2012). Specifically, anticipating prejudice or discrimination because of one’s 
social identity leads to vigilance for cues of biased treatment (Inzlicht, Aronson, & 
Mendoza-Denton, 2009) and hyperawareness for signs of the expected discriminatory 
treatment. In addition, chronic vigilance, often coupled with rumination and worry, 
further worsens the negative effects of stress in physical and mental health (Brosschot, 
Gerin, & Thayer, 2006). 
Stresses associated with uncertainty about one’s personal identity and values 
(McGregor & Marrigold, 2003; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes & Spencer, 2001) also 
represents a significant form of social threat that may trigger salient coping strategies 
such as fight-or-flight, and/or tend-and-befriend (Taylor, 2006). However, considering 
the vulnerable position that low-status individuals are in, the question remains as to 
which threat-alleviating strategy they would adopt. Given that social resources such as 
social support have been shown to be effective in reducing psychological stress 
(Taylor, 2007), and helping in coping with feelings of anxiety (Kirkpatrick & 
Navarrete, 2006), it is plausible that being in a low-status position would trigger the 
urgency and necessity of identifying reliable social support. 
In relation to that, Piff, Stancato, Martinez, Kraus, and Keltner (2012) proposed 
that people’s strategies for defending against the threats from the perception of chaos 
are significantly influenced by their social status (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 
2000; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2011; Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & 
Keltner, 2012). Chaos in this context refers to perceptions that threaten the social self as 
it acts against people’s core need to view the world as stable and structured (see 
Gaucher & Galinsky, 2009). This perception of chaos is psychologically threatening 
and deleterious to well-being (e.g., Haidt & Rodin, 1999; Pennebaker & Stone, 2004). 
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Therefore, people are often motivated to adopt strategies to manage this threat (Kay, 
Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010). In particular, individuals from high SES backgrounds 
(e.g., high annual household income) are often buffered against psychological stresses. 
This is because material resources affords an individual a sense of control (Lachman & 
Weaver, 1998) in so far as material resources can be used to achieve desired goals and 
outcomes (Lea & Webley, 2006). Indeed, it has been shown that material resources 
alleviates psychological distress and diminishes physical pain in situations of threat 
(Johnson & Krueger, 2006; Zhou, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009).  
Indeed, health disparities between different social groups are often attributed to 
the higher stress levels among low-status groups/minorities caused by chronic exposure 
to prejudice and discrimination (Pascoe, Smart Richmond, 2009). More specifically, 
lower SES is often associated with greater exposure to acute stress as well as greater 
chronic stress. This greater exposure to stress directly translates to the perception of a 
more threatening social environment, which in turn affords fewer opportunities for 
control (Lachman & Weaver, 1998) and ultimately contributes to the development of 
negative affective responses such as hopelessness, hostility and anger (Gallo & 
Matthews, 2003).  
1.3.3 Experiences and expressions of aggression 
Status alters the relationship individuals have with the social environment, their 
emotional experiences, and their propensity to aggress. Nonhuman low-ranking 
primates have fewer resources compared to their high-ranking conspecifics. For 
example, subordinate animals have less access to food and sexual partners (Boehm & 
Flack, 2010), have fewer means of social support, such as grooming, and have fewer 
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opportunities to displace aggression (less lower rank animals to aggress against) than 
their higher rank counterparts (Sapolsky, 2004).  
The links between status and aggressive behaviour are multifaceted. First, status 
may affect the emotional experience of anger. Even though low-status individuals often 
experience frustration and hostility (Chow, Tiedens, & Govan, 2008; Gallo & 
Matthews, 2003), the emotion of anger is more frequently associated with the perceived 
entitlement that comes with being in a high-status position (Tiedens, 2001). Secondly, 
status may affect the expression of hostility. For example, high-status individuals have 
a greater ability to act on their anger (Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008; see also 
Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). Finally, high-status individuals may have more social 
outlets to express their aggression than low-status individuals. The remainder of this 
subsection will elaborate each of the abovementioned links in greater detail.  
Status seems to affect the type of emotions that people experience. It has been 
proposed that when the self is strong, such as when individuals have social support and 
respect from others, the self is more likely to experience irritation and anger. However, 
when the self is weak it is more likely to experience anxiety and fear (Mackie, Devos, 
& Smith, 2000). In a series of studies, Mackie et al. found that having social admiration 
and support lead to irritation and anger in the face of negative events, as well as the 
endorsement of offensive action tendencies. Brown and Levinson (1987) showed that 
high-status individuals are less concerned about dealing with the threatening 
consequences of their actions, and therefore are more likely to tease their low-status 
counterparts in a more hostile manner. For example, analyses of interactions in the 
medical settings found that doctors tended to tease more often than midwives, who 
were more likely to make jokes at the expense of nurses. Similarly, Keltner, Young, 
Heerey, Oemig, and Monarch (1998) found that high-status individuals teased in more 
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hostile ways. Furthermore, their teasing involved more aggressive provocation, and 
lacked positive politeness tactics, such as praise or expression and approval, and 
negative politeness tactics, such as apologies or deferential displays (Brown & 
Levinson, 1987). The same pattern of downward displacement of hostility was also 
observed with children at an observational summer camp (Savin-Williams, 1987). 
Experimental research converges to show that the membership in a high-status 
group increases the propensity to socially discriminate, especially against low-status 
group members (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). For instance, in minimal intergroup 
contexts (see Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), participants assigned to a high-
status position discriminated more against outgroup members than did low-status 
participants (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984, 1991). Conversely, low-status group members 
were generally more concerned with parity.  
Members of stigmatised and devalued groups have less access to opportunities 
and financial means. For example, they attain less prestigious job positions, and have 
lower pay (APA, 2007). Importantly, the reduced opportunities that low-status 
individuals have at their disposal could contribute to a sense of unfairness and social 
discrimination, and heightened awareness of hostility. However, even though low-
status individuals often experience negative emotions and threat (Page-Gould, 
Mendoza-Denton, & Tropp, 2008), they tend to accept the status quo and are generally 
less likely to aggress (see Jost & Burgess, 2000). Instead, low-status individuals often 
experience more embarrassment, an emotion that signals submissiveness and 
appeasement intentions (Keltner, 1995). 
The ability to aggress against other individuals is an important coping outlet 
when experiencing frustration or stressful life events (Sapolsky, 2004; Wills, 1981). 
The displacement of aggression occurs generally towards safe targets, usually of less or 
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equal ranking. Therefore, in human and nonhuman primates, the higher the actors’ 
status, the more targets they have at their disposal to displace unprovoked aggression 
(Miller & Bugleski, 1948; Olweus, 1995; Wills, 1981; for a review see Gibbons et al., 
2002). In his downward comparison theory, Wills (1981) posits that people can 
increase their wellbeing by comparing themselves to less fortunate others, and that this 
comparison often takes the form of active hostility directed at lower-status others. For 
example, in a study by Cadinu and Reggiori (2002) psychology students received 
positive or negative feedback from medical doctors regarding clinical psychologists, or 
were in a control condition. Subsequently, compared to other students, students who 
had received negative feedback discriminated more against social workers (i.e., made 
more negative trait evaluations), a low-status outgroup, but not against medical doctors 
(a high-status outgroup). Mendes, Blaskovich, Major, and Seery (2001) found that 
downward comparisons with a lower-status partner decreased cardiovascular threat 
responses and increased wellbeing. Importantly, this coping strategy is less available to 
low-status individuals. More generally, compared to low-status individuals, high-status 
individuals have more opportunities, resources, and are the recipients of more social 
rewards, such as praise (Sweetman, Spears, Livingstone, & Manstead, 2013). As a 
result, high-status individuals, may be more motivated to attend to social rewards. At 
the same time high-status individuals may disdain low-status conspecifics, and often 
behave in a hostile manner towards them. 
Research focusing on SES has demonstrated that individuals from low SES 
backgrounds are exposed to more severe violence compared to individuals from high 
SES backgrounds. For example, women who occupied households within the annual 
income level bracket of less than $10,000 were at 4-times greater risk of experiencing 
violence, including physical and sexual assault than women in wealthier households 
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(Bassuk et al., 1996; Browne, Salomon, & Bassuk, 1999). Similarly, low-status racial 
minorities suffer disproportionate hostility. For example, in the US, from 2007 to 2011 
an average of 259.7 nonfatal biased victimisations against low-status group members 
occurred per year (National Crime Victimization Survey, 2011). In the UK Equality 
and Human Rights Committee reported that Black citizens are 7 times, and Asian 
citizens twice, more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than white citizens.  
Despite the more subtle dynamics of status and aggression in humans compared 
to nonhumans, it remains true that compared to high-status individuals, low-status 
individuals are more often the target of discrimination and unprovoked aggression from 
different social sources. Therefore, it is possible that the hostile social environment that 
low-status individuals experience heightens the need for self-protection. In particular, it 
is plausible that being in a low-status position motivates an individual to identify and 
process signals of social threat in others more so than high-status individuals as this 
enhanced ability to detect hostile intentions in others would enable low-status 
individuals to protect themselves against any further maltreatment and social 
devaluation.  
Being in a low-status position may be psychologically stressful because of the 
high levels of uncertainty about one’s identity and values. In line with that, Dandeneau 
and colleagues (Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007) 
proposed that early-stage attentional processes influences the perception of social threat 
and this has a significant impact on the subsequent stress response. According to the 
authors, past research on psychological factors involved in the stress response has 
focused on late-stage cognitive appraisal processes such as judgements, self-evaluations 
and other means through which an individual appraises the situation as exceeding their 
coping resources (Gross, 2002). Much less is known about the role of early-stage 
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attentional processes which play a vital role in the perception of the potentially 
threatening cues that an individual may choose to attend to for further processing or 
ignore (Compton, 2003; Gross, 2002; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 
2004; Robinson, 1998). Extending from this line of research, I propose that loss of 
social status threatens the social-self and therefore acts as a powerful stressor, which 
then influences attentional processes involved in perception of social threat.  
To sum up, this section attempted to provide supporting background evidence 
for the underlying rationale behind the current research’s hypotheses by illustrating the 
effects of status on stress responses on a physiological level, the role of social threats, 
and the possible effects of differential experiences of aggression and hostility. To 
further justify the specific predictions in the current research with regards to the 
measures used, the next section will review recent evidence on how socio-cognitive 
tendencies are influenced by social status.  Specifically, the next section will attempt to 
justify why low social-status might lead to heightened threat sensitivity from a social 
cognitive perspective.  
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1.4 Low social status and threat sensitivity.  
Several lines of research suggest that being in the bottom position of the status 
hierarchy enhances individuals’ threat reactivity (Sapolsky & Ray, 1989; Williams, 
2007). Members of low-status groups are generally aware of the society’s low regard 
for them and of the negative stereotypes associated with their group (Crocker, Major, & 
Steele, 1998; Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl, & Hull, 2000). Such awareness contributes to a 
self-fulfilling prophecy (Steele & Aronson, 1995). As a result, these individuals not 
only expect more hostile reactions from others, they also tend to experience increased 
anger and respond with increased antisocial behaviour relative to high-status 
counterparts (Page-Gould et al., 2008).  
Similarly, correlational studies have found a relationship between objective 
measures of low SES (e.g., lower education and income), measures of cynicism toward 
others and physiological measures of increased threat sensitivity. For example, children 
from lower SES backgrounds reacted to both threatening and ambiguous written social 
scenarios with increased heart rate and blood pressure (Chen & Matthews, 2001). 
Furthermore, mothers from similar backgrounds also tended to experience more hostile 
emotions in response to hypothetical stories of their child’s anger (Martini, Root, & 
Jenkins, 2004). In addition to that, such heightened threat sensitivity also fosters 
behavioural responses such as chronic vigilance and cynicism in intent of others, which 
will only further increase conflict and stress in social relations (Chen & Matthews, 
2003).  
Cynical hostility, or cynical mistrust, is characterised by the tendency to view 
the world with negative attitudes, general suspiciousness, and to interpret others’ 
actions as reflecting selfish intent (Smith, 1992). Cynical hostility has been associated 
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with cardiovascular morbidity and mortality in healthy individuals (Barefoot, Larsen, 
von der Lieth, & Schroll, 1995). Notwithstanding the physiological impact hostility has 
on an individual such as stress-induced cardiovascular and health risk behaviours 
(Everson et al., 1997) hostile individuals also suffer from a variety of psychosocial 
adversities, such as low-level of social support and a high level of interpersonal 
conflicts (Kivimäki et al., 2003). Recently it has been suggested that hostility could 
simply be a manifestation of one’s SES or play a role in the process in which SES 
influences cardiovascular risk (Pulkki, Kivimäki, Elovainio, Viikari, & Keltikangas-
Järvinen, 2003). This proposition is supported by evidence in the literature, which show 
a significant correlation between low SES in childhood and adulthood, and high levels 
of cynical mistrust and hopelessness in adulthood (Harper et al., 2002).  
Children and adults from low status backgrounds have disproportionately 
greater direct and/or indirect experiences of social rejection (e.g., prejudice and 
discrimination) compared to their high status counterparts. These repeated experiences 
contribute to the development of memory and mental representations that may fuel the 
expectation and tendency to interpret hostility in situations of benign or ambiguous 
intent. Furthermore, Ostrove (2003) found that women from lower and middle-class 
backgrounds reported feeling less belonging during their time spent at an elite college. 
In addition, the increased exposure to hostility may also lead to selective attention to 
threat cues, greater accessibility to threat-related constructs and as a result low-status 
individuals may be more likely to interpret ambiguous social cues as hostile compared 
to their high-status counterparts. Despite the significant role vigilance and cynicism 
plays in maintenance of this vicious cycle of threat hypersensitivity, research has rarely 
examined at which stage vigilance effects take place and the specificity of the cues 
which vulnerable targets are sensitive to. 
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In the context of the current research, a low-status individual’s exposure to 
provoked or unprovoked hostility and aggression could cause increased expectation of 
hostile intent and aggressive behaviours from others in ambiguous social scenarios. It 
has also been suggested that socio-cultural and relational factors such as social rejection 
(Coie & Dodge, 1988) and exposure to neighbourhood violence (Guerra, Huesmann, 
Tolan, Van Acker, & Eron, 1995) may contribute to the development of a hostile 
attribution bias and lead to selection attention to hostile cues (e.g., Crick & Dodge, 
1994), increased accessibility of aggressive constructs (Burks, Laird, Dodge, Pettit, & 
Bates, 1999) and a disproportionate expectancy for hostility in social interactions (Coie, 
Dodge, & Kupersmidt, 1990).  
In conclusion, there is abundant evidence showing that status positions 
influence social and emotional experiences. High-status individuals are perceived as 
more competent (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), enjoy greater social support and 
experience more pride and anger compared to low-status individuals (Tiedens, 
Ellworth, & Mesquita, 2000; Fiske et al., 2002). The former experience less instances 
of social discrimination and unprovoked aggression compared to the latter (Sachdev & 
Bourhis, 1991; Sapolsky, 2005). High-status humans and nonhumans tend to reassert 
their superiority and dominance over low-status conspecifics, often in aggressive ways, 
in order to maintain their position in the social hierarchy (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 
1996; Sapolsky, 2005). To deal with their increased challenge, low-status individuals 
pay closer attention to conspecifics and superiors, and develop more complex social 
representations about their surroundings than their high-status counterparts (Anderson, 
John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Fiske, 2010; Guinote, 2001; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; 
Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly, & Stewart, 1995). In doing so, low-status individuals are in a 
better position to detect valuable social information and to take necessary actions to 
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protect themselves against further social threats. Moreover, a recent study by Kraus and 
colleague has shown that perceptions of one’s low-status triggers greater sensitivity to 
the social context and the adoption of a more other-focused social orientation. It was 
reasoned that the relative unpredictability and challenges faced by low-status 
individuals in their social environments gives rise to these adaptive social-cognitive 
tendencies. That is, low-status individuals’ life outcomes are more dependent upon 
external forces in their social context relative to high-status individuals (Kraus & 
Keltner, 2009). Due to this increased external context dependence, low-status 
individuals focus a disproportionate amount of attention to their social surroundings. In 
other words, being in a low-status position triggers the motivation to pay attention to 
others (Fiske, 1993; Kraus & Keltner, 2009), especially to superiors in order to reduce 
uncertainty about their future (Fiske, 2010). In spite of this evidence, the links between 
status and social perception remain poorly understood.  
For the remainder of this section, I will further elaborate on how low social 
status influences an individuals’ perception of their social environment. Specifically, I 
will discuss the stigma associated with low social status and how low social status leads 
to biased perception of hostile intent.  
1.4.1 Low social status and stigma  
Stigma is defined as a social identity that is devalued in a particular context 
(Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). The social identity threat literature provides a 
comprehensive background on the causes and consequences of experiencing threat of 
devaluation of one’s identity in a particular context (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 
2002). Steele and colleagues argue that perceiving such a cue triggers a working 
hypothesis in the individual’s mind – a theory of context – that is aimed at verifying the 
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potential devaluation of the individual’s social identity. More specifically, this theory 
of context prompts cognitive processes such as vigilance that may undermine 
performance on tasks that are relevant in the context (e.g., Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; 
2003).  
Members of stigmatised groups are generally more preoccupied about how they 
are being evaluated by interaction partners from high-status groups (Vorauer, 2006). 
They develop expectations of prejudiced treatment (Pinel, 1999; Vorauer, Main, & 
O’Connell, 1998) and as a result, they tend to avoid across group interactions (Shelton 
& Richeson, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Furthermore, when interactions across 
group boundaries do occur, stigmatised individuals’ expectation of prejudiced treatment 
leads to self-fulfilling prophecies that may lead stigmatised individuals to perceive 
signs of prejudice from their interaction partners’ ambiguous social cues (e.g., facial 
expressions). Subsequently, this negatively affects how stigmatised individuals behave 
towards members of the out-group (Pinel, 2002).  
Indeed, studies investigating the effects of social stigmatization found that 
individuals who anticipate being a target of prejudice are more vigilant for cues that 
their social identity is under threat (Kaiser, Vick & Major, 2006). That is, individuals 
with chronic or situationally induced concerns about prejudice preconsciously screen 
their environment for signs of identity devaluation. This finding suggests that 
stigmatized individuals are vulnerable to experiencing automatic social-identity threat, 
which can cause them to become attentionally vigilant toward cues that could 
potentially threaten their identity. This gives reason to propose that the hypervigilance 
to potentially threatening social cues may be a compensatory mechanism that low-
status individuals employ in order to prevent further social devaluation.  
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Despite the relative lack of empirical evidence on how stigma moderates the 
effects of status on cognitive processes, there is a wealth of theoretical propositions that 
low social-status negatively influences social cognition. For example, the Stigma 
Compensation Theory (SCT; Henry, 2009) is a theoretical framework that has been put 
forward to understand how belonging to a low-status group influences one’s core 
psychological processes. High social status groups are naturally more valued than those 
groups at the bottom of the hierarchy (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). How much a 
group is valued is reflected in how many financial and psychological resource are 
available to them. According to the SCT, people have an innate sense of relative value 
that society bestows upon different groups. Members of low-status groups may 
experience threats to their social worth either directly and/or indirectly from the way 
others in the society treat them. Importantly, this theory posits that one’s sense of social 
worth is deeply ingrained such that simply knowing that one is member of a low-status 
group serves as a constant reminder that one is less valued by the society compared to 
members of high-status groups. This pervasive threat to one’s social worth creates a 
psychological conflict between wanting to be valued by others, and at the same time 
being aware of the lack of it to members of high-status groups. As a result, low-status 
individuals develop compensation strategies that function to protect their sense of 
social worth against further threats. Indeed, Henry (2009) found that members of low-
status groups respond to potential threats to social worth with increased vigilance and 
perceived threats to social worth with increased aggression. However, the motivation to 
be vigilant and aggressive is reduced when participants are allowed to reaffirm their 
sense of social worth. This evidence suggests that the vigilance and aggression 
observed functions as protective compensation strategies enabling quick identification 
of potential threats in order to prevent further losses to one’s sense of social worth. 
  36
1.4.2 Hostile attribution bias  
Hostile intent refers to the desire and determination to carry out some form of 
aggressive act toward another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). However, before the 
actual malevolent act is carried out, intent can be inferred from available social cues 
and situational information. This form of inferences is susceptible to potential cognitive 
biases (Bruner, 1957). That is, if the available information is ambiguous, the perceiver 
may rely on existing knowledge structures, and heuristic processing mechanisms to 
judge intentionality (Crick & Dodge, 1994) and this may lead to a biased social 
perception. Hostile attribution bias (Nasby, Hayden, & DePaulo, 1980) refers to the 
tendency to attribute hostile intent to other’s behaviour when their true intentions are 
ambiguous (Dodge, 1980).  
This bias toward interpreting hostility from ambiguous social cues has been 
proposed to be partly due to distinct social information processing (SIP) mechanisms  
(Crick & Dodge, 1994). The original SIP model was built based on children’s 
adjustment and outlined six steps for processing social information (Dodge, Pettit, 
McClaskey, & Brown, 1986). These include: (1) initial encoding, (2) representing and 
interpreting, (3) specifying goals, (4) generating potential responses, (5) selecting a 
response, and (6) enacting the response. According to this model, the hostile attribution 
bias could be due to biased processing at one or more points through this series of 
steps. A more recent revision of the SIP model states the abovementioned series of six 
steps does not occur in a strictly unidirectional way in which the only source of input is 
from the encoding stage. Instead, there is a bidirectional processing occurring 
simultaneously between each of these steps with previous experience, knowledge, and 
memory structures (Dodge & Pettit, 2003). Indeed, knowledge and memory structures 
play a large role in determining how people attend to, interpret and respond to social 
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behaviour (Murphy & Medin, 1985). An important implication of this is that these 
mental representations stored in the long-term memory are mutually shaped by the 
mechanisms in SIP (see Dodge & Pettit, 2003).  
Put together, this suggests that low-status individuals may be prone to this 
social information processing bias in which they have a tendency to exaggerate the 
hostile intent based on social cues and situational information. This is because 
presumably low-status individuals have a greater proportion of previous experiences of 
being targets of aggressive acts. These mental representations and memory structures 
subsequently shape how the individual attends to, interprets, and responds in social 
situations.  
In this section, I have outlined several possible routes, which could account for 
the proposed relationship between low social status and threat sensitivity. In particular, 
I have emphasised how prior experiences of being the target of aggression and the 
awareness of the stigma associated with low social status could lead to biased social 
information processing and a hostile attribution bias with regards to the intent of others. 
The evidence that I have discussed so far has primarily involved some physical form of 
hostility. However, the current research examines subjective sense of status, which 
pertains to a psychological experience involving the social self. Therefore, in the next 
subsection, I will explain how low social status exposes an individual not only to 
physical threat in the form of unprovoked aggression, but also psychological threat in 
the form of threats to one’s social self in the context of social interactions. I will also 
highlight how the motivation to protect the social self triggers similar processes as the 
motivation to protect the physical self. On the basis of the shared common theme of 
threat to the social self, I will draw parallels from relevant literature, namely rejection 
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sensitivity and self-esteem in outlining how loss of social status may affect processing 
of social threat. 
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1.5 Social interactions: Opportunities and threats  
Relative to other animals, much of our interaction with the environment 
involves social interactions (Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010). The myriad social 
problems that exerted selection pressures in our ancestral human population can be 
broken down into two main domains. The first domain pertains to social opportunities, 
which has a positive impact on inclusive fitness if successfully obtained. The second 
domain pertains to social risks, which has a negative impact on inclusive fitness if 
unsuccessfully avoided (Schaller, Park, & Kenrick, 2007).  
Social interactions bring about the possibility for interpersonal relations and 
social support. Meaningful relationships optimise ones’ inclusive fitness (Dunbar, 
2003). However, social interactions also entail that an individual is exposed to potential 
threats to health and well-being (e.g., Kurzban and Leary 2001; Neuberg and Cottrell, 
2006; Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003). These potential threats range from another’s 
intention to harm, cheat, or other forms of social contract violation such as failing to 
reciprocate a resource-consuming prosocial act (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). 
Negotiating between attaining social opportunities and avoiding social risk is likely to 
have exerted a significant natural selection pressures on the evolution of human social 
cognition (Schaller et al., 2007). Cognitive adaptations within the social self that might 
have arisen as a result of evolutionary pressures mostly pertain to specific attentional 
hypersensitivities or information-processing biases (Schaller et al., 2007). 
Recent functionalist accounts of interpersonal relationships states that in order 
to establish and maintain relationships, people must also manage the risk of possible 
rejection and the pain associated with it (Downey, Mougios, Ayduk, London, & 
Shonda, 2004; Murray, Homes, & Collins, 2006; Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004). 
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In addition, these models also state that in the case of managing threats to relationship 
formation and maintenance, a bias toward underestimating threat is potentially adaptive 
(McKay & Dennett, 2009). In other words, interpreting cues from others in a way that 
downplays social threats and giving others the benefit of the doubt is particularly useful 
at the early stages of relationships (Fletcher & Kerr, 2010). 
However, past evidence has consistently shown that there are individual 
differences associated with the negotiation between the goal to form relationships and 
the goal to prevent rejections. Specifically, these individual differences typically arise 
from threats to the social self. Unlike the physical self, the social self reflects one’s 
internal sense of social value, esteem and status. Importantly, it is largely based upon 
others’ perceptions of one’s worth (de Waal, 1989; Gilbert, 1997). Not surprisingly 
then, individuals that have the highest social standing and respect from others are those 
who possess qualities that are valued by the group. On the other hand, those who lack 
in the desired attributes by the group are often rejection by group members and are at 
the lower status position on the social hierarchy. These dynamic social assessments 
feed into the development of the social self (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). 
Humans are motivated to be vigilant to threats that may jeopardize their social 
status as they have the core need to preserve the social self (Dickerson & Kemeny, 
2004). This motivation has been described in various other theories such as the need for 
social status, positive self-presentation, and positive self-regard (Allport, 1937; 
Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1969; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Maslow, 1987; 
McClelland, 1984; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Additionally, this motivation has also been 
demonstrated in other nonhuman primates such that they show an adaptive 
psychobiological response to threats to social status in hierarchies (Sapolsky, 1993).  
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Kemeny and colleagues (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004; Kemeny, 
Gruenewald, & Dickerson, 2004) proposed that the motive to maintain and preserve the 
social self activates a similar biological process as the motive to preserve the physical 
self. This system coined as the social self-preservation system monitors the social 
environment for threats to one’s social status. When threat is detected, the system 
coordinates psychological, physiological, and behavioural responses necessary to cope 
with such threats. Possible responses to these threats include an increase in negative 
self-evaluations. The intensity of these responses depends on several factors such as the 
severity of the threat, the context in which it appears in, and the vulnerability and social 
coping resources an individual has in that particular social situation (Dickerson & 
Kemeny, 2004). In particular, social coping resources such as high self-esteem, 
certainty about one’s state of belonging (i.e., low rejection sensitivity), and of interest 
high subjective sense of status.  
Individuals with low levels of global self-esteem have a biased tendency to 
interpret the behaviour and affect of others as more rejecting compared to individuals 
with high global self-esteem. It is proposed that this is because low self-esteem 
individuals have higher expectations of interpersonal rejection (Murray, Rose, Bellavia, 
Holmes, & Kusche, 2002). Furthermore, the development of low self-esteem has been 
theorised to be a result of repeated experiences of social rejection and criticism. These 
experiences condition an individual to be particularly sensitive to negative social 
evaluations (Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004; Gilbert, 
1992; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). Indeed, under similar circumstances, 
high self-esteem individuals interpret the behaviour of strangers they have just met as 
more accepting than low self-esteem individuals (Cameron, Stinson, Gaetz, & Balchen, 
2010). In addition, systematic biases in the perception and interpretation of social 
  42
events have also been shown between individuals with high and low rejection 
sensitivity. Rejection sensitivity is defined as the disposition to anxiously expect, 
readily perceive, and strongly react to social rejection (Downey & Feldman, 1996; 
London, Downey, Bonica, & Paltin, 2007). Crucially, these differences only occur with 
negative social events, but not with positive social events. This suggests that self-
esteem regulation and rejection sensitivity systems may be social threat focused.  
Situations that require the display of valued attributes in the presence of others 
can threaten the social self as the inability to demonstrate these skills could potentially 
lead to a loss of social status and social rejection. These threatening social-evaluation 
conditions may have a direct effect on other social goals. For example, the desire to 
maintain and improve one’s social status may overlap with one’s need for interpersonal 
belonging. That is, being in a low-status position would imply that an individual is not 
well-respected and this may decrease the likelihood of others wanting to form close 
personal relationships with them (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). 
Importantly, these social-evaluation conditions can significantly impact the way 
we see ourselves because self-evaluations are often based on how we are viewed by 
others (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Cooley, 1902/1983; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Mead, 
1934). The mere presence of others and/or evaluations by them can lead to social 
comparisons (e.g., Swallow & Kuiper, 1988; Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995) or self-
awareness (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) which 
perpetuates negative self-evaluative processes such as negative self-related emotions 
(e.g., shame, embarrassment) (Gilbert, 1997). The resulting negative self-related states 
may mediate the effects of loss of status on social cognitive processes. Taken together, 
the current research proposes that the systematic bias to perceive social-threat cues 
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associated with high rejection sensitivity and low self-esteem extends to individual 
differences in the domain of subjective sense of status. 
1.5.1 Social threat detection system  
Building from the traditional notion of fight-or-flight tendencies, theorists have 
recently proposed that mammals evolved a threat detection system that is not only 
sensitive to physical threats, but also social threats. For example, social rejection 
(MacDonald & Leary, 2005), stigmatisation (Mendes, Major, McCoy, & Blascovich, 
2008), and perceived subordinate rank within social hierarchies (Chow et al., 2008). 
This system enables the organism to respond adaptively to social threats by triggering 
several processes such as threat vigilance in ambiguous situations (Pickett & Gardner, 
2005). The present research extends previous work by examining the possibility that 
low subjective sense of status represents a form of social identity threat. Therefore, just 
as being socially rejected or stigmatised, loss of status should lead to vigilance towards 
potential sources of threat in the social environment.  Specifically, the current research 
proposes that situationally activated concerns about perceived low-status might trigger 
social cognitive biases for potential sources of social threat. This process may serve as 
a learned and adaptive strategy to navigate a more challenging and unstable social 
environment. 
Consistent with this, Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) argue the human social self 
analogue to social status threats in animals is threats to social esteem, respect, and 
acceptance. In other words, it is possible that low self-esteem, high rejection sensitivity 
and low sense of status share the common ground of being a fundamental source of 
social threat.  
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The bulk of research inspired by this framework has looked at more concrete 
environmental cues, such as numerical representation; there has been little empirical 
research on the effects of relatively more abstract social environmental cues, such as 
the amount of respect one receives from their community. More specifically, unlike 
social identities defined by race and gender, ones’ subjective perception of status is a 
largely invisible characteristic (Johnson, Richeson, & Finkel, 2011). Therefore it is not 
immediately obvious whether individuals will experience the same form of stigma and 
identity threat that is brought about by their relatively lower perception of status. That 
is, whether lower subjective sense of status serves as a potential source of social 
identity threat and if it does, does it trigger similar selective cognitive processes as a 
result of the activation of the threat detection system?  
Emerging evidence shows that attention and behavioural responses during 
social interactions differ depending on one’s current motivational state. The 
fundamental motives framework states that motivational systems have evolved 
according to natural selection to produce behaviours that enhances reproductive fitness 
(Kenrick, Neuberg, Griskevicius, Becker & Schaller, 2010). In order to maximise 
reproductive success; human beings need to achieve multiple secondary goals such as 
affiliation, self-protection and status. Crucially, successful attainment of each goal 
demands functionally different cognitive and behavioural responses (Kenrick et al., 
2010). Furthermore, Kashack and Maner (2009) proposed that challenges associated 
with group living may trigger behaviour and motives such as fear of social exclusion 
and effective monitoring of ones’ status in the group (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2009). 
Importantly, group challenges could have led to the evolution of a cognitive and 
nervous system that regulates social behaviour based on an organism’s position within 
its hierarchy (Schultheiss, Wirth, Torges, Pang, Villacorta & Welsh, 2005).  
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Kenrick, Maner, and Li (2005) suggested that the processing of social stimuli is 
selective such that it is often in service to the particular social motive activated. This 
perspective allows for the predictions of which specific type of social target might be 
preferentially encoded when particular motives are activated (Kenrick et al., 2005). 
These motives range from those in the domains of self-protection, seeking and 
maintaining romantic relationships, coalition building and striving for status (Bugental, 
2000). From an evolutionary perspective, goals that are most closely linked to adaptive 
outcomes in social groups are those that are likely to have the most impact on the 
perception of other people (Bugental, 2000; Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003). Most 
empirical research inspired by this reasoning focused on hypotheses pertaining to 
conscious and deliberate higher order social-cognitive processes, for example logical 
reasoning, overt judgement, and behavioural decision making (Kenrick, Neuberg, Zierj, 
& Krones, 1994). Much less is known about how fundamental motivational states can 
influence lower order processing of social information. For instance, selective attention 
and preferential encoding of social information that is likely to contribute to the 
observed overt cognition and action. In addition, while it is generally agreed that social 
cognition is adaptively tuned, most research inspired by these theories lacks direct 
investigation of basic social perception.  
Accurate identification and discrimination between individuals who are 
functional or detrimental requires allocation of attention to social features that may 
provide information diagnostic of either social opportunities or social threat. Social 
attention is defined as an essential ability for achieving emphatic contact with others 
and to discover potentially relevant information in the environment (Shepherd, 2010). 
Given that attention is a finite resource, a compromise is unavoidable such that some 
features in the social environment must be prioritised at the expense of others. The 
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ability to selectively allocate attentional resources to cues most relevant for enhancing 
one’s survival and reproductive success is highly adaptive.  
This pattern of selectively acquiring information most relevant to survival and 
reproduction has been found in abundance in the animal literature (Dukas, 2002). 
Similar findings have been obtained in the human cognition literature, specifically 
within research that focuses on visual attention. Visual attention requires the selection 
of events in the environment to be processed at a higher cognitive level (Alvarez & 
Cavanagh, 2004). Not surprisingly then, the question of which stimuli receive 
prioritised processing (attention) at the expense of other stimuli remains one of the 
central problems of our finite cognitive system. This process has been coined selective 
attention. It should be noted that attention comprises three separate processes: 
disengaging attention from initial target, shifting attention to a new target, and finally 
reengaging attention (Posner, Walker, Feldrich, & Rafal, 1984). A more detailed 
account of the separate processes involved in attention will be outlined in Study 6 in 
Chapter 3.  
In the next section, I will discuss top-down influences on selective attention. I 
will attempt to illustrate how the visual input from the same social stimulus may be 
perceived in distinctly different ways due to differences in expectations, attitudes, 
motives, emotional states, and/or prior experiences of the perceiver. Specifically, I will 
highlight how status differentially influences top-down control of selective attention 
towards overt and subtle forms of social threat in facial expressions. 
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1.6 Face perception and selective attention 
The most basic behavioural response to social stimuli requires two cognitive 
steps. First, one must attend to a wide range of social stimuli in order to identify the 
implications an interaction with different individuals may have. Second, once these 
social cues have been differentiated, one must select the most appropriate means for a 
functionally effective and beneficial behavioural response (Schaller et al., 2007). While 
perception is frequently associated with the first step in social cognitive processes, 
attention is required before perception can take place. The most basic metaphor often 
used to conceptualise attention is that it functions like a “spotlight” (e.g., Derryberry & 
Tucker, 1994). It follows that this spotlight of attention can illuminate only a limited 
amount of information at any given time, thereby allowing further processing of those 
stimuli. In other words, not all stimuli present in the visual field are perceived. Instead, 
attention is directed to some stimuli, resulting in a greater likelihood of these stimuli 
reaching the threshold of awareness (Posner, 1994) while the unattended stimuli are 
processed only very minimally or not at all. This model of attention adheres to the 
traditional notion of a processing bottleneck in our cognitive capabilities (Broadbent, 
1958). In other words, the first step relates to basic selective attentional processes and 
the second step relates to higher-order cognitive processes.  
It is widely established that selective attention can be driven by two distinct 
mechanisms: bottom-up and top-down control. Bottom-up mechanisms are thought to 
rely on raw sensory input and relate to salient features of stimuli that automatically 
capture attention. For example, stimuli that appear unexpectedly (Yantis & Johnson, 
1990), and stimuli that give the illusion that they are either moving (Theeuwes, 1995), 
or approaching the perceiver (Franconeri & Simons, 2003). However, it has also been 
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suggested that the ability of these salient features of a stimulus in capturing attention is 
moderated by the state of the perceiver in a relatively top-down manner (Bodenhausen 
& Hugenberg, 2009). Top-down mechanisms refer to longer-term cognitive strategies 
(Connor, Egeth, & Steven, 2004). Most relevant to the current research, expectancies, 
goals and prior experiences have been shown to be a powerful top-down factor 
determining how attention is oriented and focuses.  
Following selective attention towards a particular stimulus, the next step in 
social perception is to extract meaning from the attended stimuli. This process typically 
involves both bottom-up and top-down factors such that low-level features of the 
stimuli enable the perceiver to construct a more meaningful representation of the visual 
world. However, the ecological perspective stresses the importance of the perceiver’s 
prior experience in recognising and appreciating the implications of the structure (low-
level features) of the attended stimuli (McArthur & Baron, 1983). This proposition is in 
line with the classic account in social perception that the different perceptions of the 
social world are a result of the top-down aspects such as different expectancies, 
attitudes, motives, emotional states, and/or prior experiences of the perceiver (Kelley, 
1950).  
The majority of research on the impact of expectancies on perception looks at 
the influence of an actor’s social category membership on perceptions of his/her 
behavior. In particular, cues that inform social identities such as race, sex and age are 
rapidly extracted. This information directly serves to establish expectations that will 
influence the perception of the target’s subsequent behavior. For example, African 
American targets are often perceived as more threatening or aggressive compared to 
European American targets (Duncan, 1976; Sagar & Schofield, 1988). Recent 
neuropsychological research provided evidence for the role of expectation to explain 
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the effect of social categorization on early attentional processes. Ito and Urland (2003) 
used event-related potentials to investigate how White participants responded to Black 
and White targets. They found that Black targets compared to White targets elicited 
stronger attention in the White participants’ early waveform components (N100, P200). 
Importantly, White participants tended to shift their attention towards members of their 
racial in-group and away from Black targets later in the attentional stream. The authors 
reasoned that because of the racial stereotype about Black men and violence, they 
elicited stronger early attentional vigilance than other social categories. However, 
insofar as the stimuli in the task does not demand sustained vigilance, attention shifts 
back to in-group targets who are presumably evaluated in a more positive light.  
Having said that, while Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003) showed that 
hostility was more likely to be attributed to African American, compared to European 
American faces by European American participants; this effect was moderated by 
participants’ implicit (automatic) racial prejudice. That is, participants who showed 
little evidence of implicit prejudice did not differentially perceive the target faces as a 
function of their race. Put together, these studies suggest the bidirectional relationship 
between the perceivers’ expectancies and their attitudes in constraining the top-down 
aspects of extracting meaning from a given stimulus input.  
Emerging evidence have emphasised the role of the perceiver’s emotional and 
motivational states on attention and perception. The classic demonstration of this 
phenomenon was shown using a simple perception of coin size task. The size of coins 
that were of greater value was consistently overestimated. Interestingly, the perceiver’s 
SES moderated this tendency such that perceivers from low SES backgrounds showed a 
greater ‘value bias’ compared to their high SES counterparts (Bruner & Goodman, 
1947). In addition, Postman and Bruner (1948) found that perceivers experiencing 
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emotional distress tended to avoid processing unpleasant stimuli by increasing their 
perceptual defences (awareness thresholds). In a similar vein, Sacco and Hugenberg 
(2008) tested the idea that motivational states can also enhance perceptual acuity of the 
visual system. In this study, participants’ were manipulated to be either in a 
cooperative, competitive or control mindset. The interpretation of morphed angry to 
happy expressions varied as function of these motivational states such that 
competitively motivated participants interpreted the ambiguous expressions as more 
angry than the cooperatively motivated participants. In another task, both cooperatively 
and competitively motivated participants had an enhanced ability in discriminating 
between Duchenne (genuine) and non-Duchenne smiles. These findings converge in 
suggesting that perceivers make inferences about current priorities based on 
motivational and emotional states. Attentional processes are typically tuned towards 
these priorities (Bodenhausen & Hugenberg, 2003). In addition, motives can also 
enhance the perceptual processing and acuity of motivationally relevant stimuli.  
In relation to that, it has also been suggested that expectations and current goals 
interact with bottom up factors such as visual salience to form a ‘salience map’ which 
controls where, how and what is attended (Compton, 2003; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Feinstein, Goldin, Stein, Brown, & Paulus, 2002). Of particular interest, Corbetta and 
Shulman (2002) suggested that the individual differences in selective attention may be 
attributed to some form of contingency that is established in the brain by learning, 
development or genetics.  
Compton (2003) put forward another theory as to how the brain evaluates which 
incoming stimuli to devote cognitive resources to. Accordingly, the primary way to 
determine the importance and hence prioritised processing is to evaluate the emotional 
significance of a particular stimulus. She further argues that this enhanced processing 
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of emotionally significant stimuli occurs via two attentional mechanisms, namely the 
aforementioned bottom-up and top-down mechanisms. Bottom-up- mechanisms are 
responsible for the automatic orienting of attention, while expectations mediate ‘top-
down’ pathways to produce motivated and effort shifts in attention (Bledowski, 
Prulovic, Goebel, Zanella, & Linden, 2004; Compton, 2003; Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002; Hopf & Mangun, 2000; Nobre, 2001). Importantly, the top-down mechanism 
gives these significant stimuli priority in the competition for attentional resources. For 
example, compared to visual stimuli such as mushrooms and flowers, people are 
quicker at detecting the presence of snakes and spiders (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 
2001). The authors proposed that evolutionarily relevant threatening stimuli in the 
natural environment are especially effective in capturing attention.  
While selective attention allows an individual to process relevant information 
and ignore less relevant information, it is insufficient for ensuring and enhancing ones’ 
survival fitness. Having gathered fitness-relevant information about ones’ surrounding 
social world, one needs higher-order cognitive processes that provides effective means 
of enabling adaptive behavioural responses. Past research has shown that many 
different types of motives can influence social cognition (e.g., Kruglanski, 1989; 
Kunda, 1990). Indeed, the temporary activation of goal-relevant motives can shape the 
way people attend to, encode, and interpret information about others. For example, 
Neuberg and Fiske (1987) proposed that people are motivated to form accurate 
impressions of targets deemed as important for accomplishing personal goals. To that 
end, these targets will prompt more in-depth processing, which includes increased 
attention to individuating information. Moreover, it has also been proposed that 
selective attention to threat may not always be adaptive. The anticipation of potential 
threats has been consistently theorised to account for the physiological findings in 
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anxiety (MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg, & Bradley, 1998). That is, the vigilance to threat 
demonstrated by individuals high in anxiety is driven by top-down expectations to 
perceive threats in their surrounds. Vigilance, in this context, is referred to as a 
readiness to evaluate potential threats in the environment (Oathes, Squillante, Ray, & 
Nitschke, 2010).  
Selective attention to social-evaluative threats has been proposed to act as a 
filter on processing of incoming information such that an individual sees their social 
environment as hostile and unsupportive. This perception feeds back into the vicious 
cycle of further undermining the social self (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004; Williams, 
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). For example, Dandeneau and Baldwin (2004) found that 
low self-esteem individuals showed attentional vigilance for rejection-related words 
compared to acceptance-related words in a reaction time task. This pattern of 
hypervigilance or attentional bias for social evaluative threats relevant to one’s current 
concerns has also been found in clinical disorders such as social anxiety, social 
phobias, and generalised anxiety disorder (Williams et al., 1996).  
Previous research suggests that top-down mechanisms in the frontal and parietal 
lobes are important for assessing the motivationally relevant cues in the environment, 
and subsequently, to direct attention to those relevant stimuli (Corbetta & Shulaman, 
2002; Hopf & Mangun, 2000; Thomsen, Specht, Ersland, & Hugdahl, 2005). Posner 
and Petersen (1990) suggested that the frontal-parietal network regulates selective 
attention processes by maintaining alert states and actively search for motivationally 
relevant cues in the visual environment. Top-down processes, as mediated by activity in 
the frontal-parietal region, plays a crucial role in controlling whether attention is 
directed toward or away from a particular visual cue (Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998). 
Using an attention paradigm, Small et al. (2005) found that activity in the medial 
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orbitofrontal cortex was positively correlated with the responses to targets associated 
with gaining money. On the other hand, activity in the dorsal region of the cingulate 
cortex and insula increased when responding to targets associated with losing (Small et 
al., 2005). Put together, this suggests that top-down attentional processes influences 
attentional focus and orientation to facial cues that are in line with the current goals and 
motivations of the observer (Theeuwes, Atchlet, & Kramer, 2000).  
Furthermore, Bugental (2000) suggested that the basic approach/avoidance 
system is especially sensitive towards the evaluation of potential benefits and dangers 
of interaction with different people and for the specific functions of these different 
relationships. Given that interactions with others can either offer social opportunities or 
pose social threats, it is plausible that low-status individuals tend to be more 
preoccupied with social evaluative information during interactions with others 
(Vorauer, 2006). Faces, in particular provide a rich source of social evaluative 
information. In light of the current research’s aims, in the next subsection, I will focus 
specifically on how status exerts differential top-down influences on the perception 
facial expressions indicative of social threat.  
1.6.1 Top-down influences on perception of facial expressions of threat 
Facial expressions of others are effective diagnostic cues in identifying 
someone’s emotions and intentions (Zebrowitz, 1997). They provide a vast amount of 
information regarding their intent – whether they intend to harm us, avoid us, or 
befriend us. The current research proposes that one’s perceived status may exert top-
down influences on attentional vigilance such that some social cues are selected for 
further processing while others are ignored (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2001). 
Specifically, the current research posits that being in a low-status position triggers the 
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goal of self-protection and this motivates low-status individuals to selectively attend to 
threatening facial cues.  
Cognition serves adaptive action (see also Fiske, 1992, 2010; Semin & Smith, 
2002). Relevant stimuli in the environment are processed more extensively to establish 
potential response mobilization based on prior learning (Scherer, 2001). A selective 
resource allocation to relevant stimuli allows enhanced perceptual analysis of these 
stimuli and triggers necessary changes in the autonomic and motor systems that prepare 
the organism for adaptive behavioural responses (Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005). 
In particular, threat-related expressions demand a need for rapid in-depth processing for 
response preparation (Brosch, Sander, Pourtois, & Scherer, 2008) intended to rectify 
anger-inspiring situations (Ratcliff et al., 2012).  
There is abundant evidence on the special status of human faces in capturing 
attention, especially facial features such as the eyes, eyebrows and mouth that are 
necessary for the identification of facial emotion (Lunqvist and Öhman 2005; Ristic, 
Friesen, & Kingstone, 2002). Accordingly, people are adept at inferring others’ 
emotional states based on their specific facial expression (Ekman, 1972). Burgeoning 
evidence suggest that top-down influences may bias the way other people’s emotion are 
processed. 
To briefly reiterate the rationale outlined in the earlier sections in this chapter, 
being in a low-status position is highly stressful as it represents a significant form of 
threat to the social self. It threatens the core need to have a positive sense of self-worth 
and it also creates high levels of uncertainty over one’s life outcomes. In addition, low-
status individuals are frequently exposed to both physical and psychological forms of 
social hostility and aggression. Taking into account these factors, I have reasoned that 
several social-cognitive processes may be implicated such as the biased processing of 
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social information, and the hostile attribution bias. Furthermore, I compared low-status 
individuals to individuals high in rejection sensitivity and low in self-esteem because of 
their shared nature of threat to the social self. Therefore, the current research focuses on 
how status influences processing of facial expressions indicative of social threat. 
Specifically, it looks at the emotional expression of anger, which is a signal of direct 
social threat, and non-Duchenne smiles, which is a subtle signal of social threat in the 
form of untrustworthiness.  
In the next subsection, I will give a general overview of the nature and functions 
of emotional facial expression, in particular angry expressions and non-Duchenne 
smiles. Then I will conclude this section by describing several potential moderators that 
has been proposed in past research to account for individual differences in the 
processing of threat-related cues from faces.   
1.6.2 Emotional expression of anger 
Emotional expressions affect perceptions of social position. People believe 
individuals with angry facial expression occupy more powerful social positions than do 
individuals with sad facial expressions (Keating, 1985b). In other words, people seem 
to believe that emotional expressions are diagnostic of the social position of the 
expresser. Furthermore, the status boundary enforcement framework (Thomsen, Green, 
& Sidanius, 2008) posits that more attention is directed towards angry high-status 
individuals because they have relatively greater ability to act on their anger.  
Emotional facial expressions also play a crucial role in the formation and 
maintenance of social relationships (Parkinson, 2005), acting as a dynamic social cue to 
communicate and signal the expressers thoughts and intentions. Ekman (1972) 
proposed six universal facial expressions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and 
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surprise. Of all these expressions, anger is a particularly important emotion (Ratcliff, 
Bernstein, Cundiff, & Vescio, 2012) as the inability to detect anger signals may lead to 
negative consequences. Two distinctive features typically signal angry facial 
expressions: down-turned mouth and frowning (“v-shaped”) eyebrows (Fox et al., 
2000). Anger is associated with the behavioural-approach system (Harmon-Jones & 
Sigelman, 2001), which is the motivational system responsible for regulating 
appetitive, incentive motivation, and approach behaviour (Gray, 1982; 1987). 
Importantly, anger signals that the expresser is a direct impending threat to the 
perceiver (Adolphs, Russell, & Tranel, 1999) and therefore it is an important social cue 
for predicting actions and behaviours of others that are likely to be threatening (Adams, 
Ambady, Macrae, & Kleck, 2006). Displays of anger are also similar to the facial 
display shown by dominant primates when they assert their positions in social 
hierarchies (Hinde, 1975).  
This notion is supported by the well-established evidence that humans tend to 
preferentially attend to angry faces (Hansen & Hansen, 1988). Furthermore, it has also 
been suggested that expressions of anger automatically engage selective attentional 
processes (Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002) and initiate rapid avoidance behaviour (Marsh, 
Ambady, & Kleck, 2005). However, despite this automaticity, emerging evidence 
suggests that processing of emotional expressions is sensitive to top-down influences, 
in particular, contextual and motivational factors (Barrett, Mesquite, & Gendron, 2011). 
For example, angry expressions were recognised more quickly when individuals were 
experiencing high feelings of threat (Coles, Heimberg, & Schofield, 2008), or when the 
angry expressions were presented alongside threatening nonverbal cues such as 
aggressive body postures (e.g., Adams & Kleck, 2005; Aviezer et al., 2008).  
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As previously stated, the current research is interested in how status influences 
the perception of facial expressions indicative of overt and subtle forms of threat. The 
next subsection will give a brief overview of trustworthiness. I will highlight how 
perceived untrustworthiness from another individuals’ facial expression may imply an 
increased likelihood of a social interaction that may be threatening (Winston, Strange, 
O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2002). In Chapter 5, non-Duchenne smiles were used as the facial 
stimuli indicative of subtle forms of social threat. The distinction between Duchenne 
and non-Duchenne smiles will be reviewed in the next section.  
1.6.3 Untrustworthy facial expressions: Non-Duchenne smiles  
Upon encountering someone for the first time, one needs to make an immediate 
decision whether to trust that unfamiliar person or not. Perceived trustworthiness 
determines ones approach/avoidance behaviour. Therefore the ability to make accurate 
trustworthiness judgements is one of the most important decisions for social interaction.  
Smiling has been shown to be highly correlated with trustworthiness such that 
the more a person smiles, the more trustworthy they are perceived to be. Although 
smiling is a powerful cue of affiliation intent, it is also one of the easiest expressions to 
fake (Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Ekman, Friesen, & O’Sullivan, 1988). People may fake 
smiling in order to gain access to resources that would otherwise be denied (Krumhuber 
et al., 2007). Accordingly, Ekman and Friesen (1982) suggested that there are two 
variants of human smiles: Duchenne (genuine) smiles, and non-Duchenne (fake) 
smiles. These two types of smiles can be distinguished on the basis of behavioural 
markers such as morphology, intensity, timing, location and laterality. In particular, 
Duchenne smiles can be differentiated from non-Duchenne smiles based on the 
presence of the crow’s feet wrinkles in the eye region which arises from the automatic 
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activation of the orbicularis oculi (Ekman, 1989; Ekman & Friesen, 1982). Crucially, a 
Duchenne smile is typically indicative of honest intent of cooperation and affiliation 
(Brown & Moore, 2002). On the other hand, a non-Duchenne smile may be an attempt 
to conceal underlying negative emotions (Ekman et al., 1988). Put simply, Duchenne 
smiles reflect trustworthy intent, whereas non-Duchenne smiles reflect untrustworthy 
and potentially threatening intent.  
Lundqvist, Flykt, and Öhman (1998) demonstrated that trustworthiness 
judgements are highly correlated with other traits. Using a set of standardised faces, 
they found that judgements of trustworthiness correlated .83 with judgements of 
emotional stability, .75 with judgements of attractiveness, -.76 with judgements of 
aggressiveness, and .63 with judgements of intelligence. Hence, it appears that in 
situations lacking context, trustworthiness judgements from faces reflect overall 
inferences about the positivity/negativity of the face. In other words, when clear 
emotional cues demonstrating the intentions of the other person are absent, judgements 
of trustworthiness are crucial to an approach/avoidance decision.  
Having said that, it is not surprising that these judgments are made faster than a 
variety of other personality judgements. To obtain the minimal time exposure to a face 
required for people to form a person impression, Willis and Todorov (2006) studied 
five trait judgments from emotionally neutral faces: likeability, trustworthiness, 
competence, aggressiveness, and attractiveness. Participants were asked to make one of 
these five judgements when faces were presented for 100, 500, or 1000ms. For all five 
judgements, judgements made after 100ms exposure to faces closely agreed with 
control judgments made in the absence of time constraints. More importantly, this 
agreement did not improve with additional time exposure. This indicates that 100ms 
exposure is sufficient for people to form a reliable person impression and that people 
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are particularly efficient at making trustworthiness judgments from faces. In sum, 
trustworthiness is an excellent approximation of the general valence evaluation of faces 
(Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008) and hence serves the function of preparing one’s 
behaviour in relation to the other person (Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008).  
It should be noted that in the current research, Duchenne and non-Duchenne 
smiles were used as stimuli instead of faces that varied on trustworthiness for two 
reasons. Firstly, I was interested in dynamic facial expressions (i.e., facial expressions 
that changes from one state to another) as they are more indicative of natural social 
interactions. As will be explained in more depth in Chapter 4, the stimuli used in 
Studies 8 and 9 involved an initially neutral target face shifting to a smiling expression 
and back to neutral expression. Importantly, the targets displayed either Duchenne or 
non-Duchenne smiles. Given that trustworthiness is a personality trait, it was not 
possible to construct dynamic stimuli in which a target’s trustworthiness or 
untrustworthiness gradually became apparent.  
Secondly, I also wanted to eliminate the possibility of a ceiling effect with 
presenting participants with a stereotypical trustworthy and untrustworthy face. The 
stimuli used in Studies 8 and 9 were all of smiling expressions that do not appear to 
differ objectively, and therefore it provides a stronger test for the hypothesis that low-
status heightens the ability to detect subtle cues of untrustworthiness.  
1.6.4 Individual differences in threat sensitivity 
Past studies in research areas pertinent to the development of the rationale 
underlying the current research has indicated several potential variables that may 
indirectly account for the proposed enhanced threat sensitivity in low-status 
individuals. More specifically, numerous studies have indicated that differences in the 
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level of self-esteem, rejection sensitivity, mood/affective state, need to belong and 
generalised trust would influence how individuals process social-threat related 
information. I will briefly define each of the abovementioned moderating factors and 
elaborate on how these factors have been implicated in the processing of social threat in 
past studies. 
Self-esteem can be defined as the general emotional evaluation of the self. It 
relates to the extent to which individuals are accepted and liked by themselves 
(Sedikides & Skwronski, 2003). Past studies have shown that difference in the level of 
self-esteem can affect how individuals respond to information related to evaluative 
threat information (Heatherton & Vohs, 2000). In particular, it has been reasoned that 
low self-esteem arises in part due to repeated experiences of social rejection and 
criticism. As a result, an individual may be vigilant to perceive the environment with an 
attentional bias for negative social evaluations (Baccus, Baldwin, & Parker, 2004). 
Using the dot probe task and ERP technology, Li and Yang (2013) found that 
emotional stimuli (both angry and happy faces) elicited greater mobilisation of 
attentional resources in individuals with low self-esteem. Thereby demonstrating that 
the attentional bias observed in low self-esteem individuals is not constrained to 
negative information, but emotional information more generally.  
Rejection sensitivity is defined as the extent to which an individual anxiously 
expects, readily perceives, and overreacts to social rejection (Downey & Feldman, 
1996).  Individuals high in rejection sensitivity are more likely to interpret ambiguous 
stimuli as rejection. As a result, they overreact and consequently feel greater distress, 
compared to individuals low in rejection sensitivity (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Past 
research has shown that rejection sensitivity moderates social, cognitive, and behavioral 
responses to potentially socially threatening information. For example, individuals high 
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in rejection sensitivity interpret short video clips of others’ ambiguous emotional 
responses as expressing more interpersonal negativity, instead of positivity (Romero-
Canyas, Downey, Franco, & Bolger, 2008).  
The role of affective state/mood in influencing attention has been described in 
various mood-cognition frameworks. Of interest, selective attention processes have 
been put forward as a possible explanation of the downstream effects of mood states, 
such as mood-congruent processing in the domains of judgment (e.g., Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983), or memory (e.g., Bower, 1981), and decision-making (e.g., Petersm 
Vastfjall, Garling, & Slovic, 2006). Accordingly, such mood-congruent processing 
tendencies increase the accessibility of undesirable stimuli in negative mood states and 
the accessibility of desirable stimuli in positive mood states (Watson, 2000). While 
there is some evidence that positive mood states bias attention in favour of rewarding 
stimuli in the environment (e.g., Carver, 2001; Watson, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), the 
majority of the evidence demonstrates that negative mood states biases attention to 
threatening information in selective attention paradigms (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Matthews, 1997).  
The need to belong relates to the need for seeing oneself as socially connected 
with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In particular, stigmatisation threatens this 
need and gives rise to belonging uncertainty. Individuals in this state may be especially 
sensitive to information indicative of the quality of their social connections (Walton & 
Cohen, 2007). Specifically, when individuals are uncertain about their state of 
belonging, they may develop a bias of being stereotyped and this may manifest as 
selective attention for concerns relevant to specific individuals.  
Finally, generalised trust refers to the act of trusting a stranger or a casual 
acquaintance. That is, one’s belief that the unfamiliar target has a benign intention in 
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social interactions (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). This form of trust is qualitatively 
different from trusting someone of which one is familiar with and have shared 
knowledge. Past research has shown that social class, a closely related construct to 
social status, is a robust predictor of generalised trust. Individuals from higher social 
class backgrounds are relatively more trusting than their counterparts from lower social 
class backgrounds (Putnam, 2000; Whiteley, 1999). 
Taken together, self-esteem, rejection sensitivity, mood/affective state, need to 
belong and generalised trust could potentially moderate the effects of status on 
perception of social-threat related information. Therefore, the extent to which enhanced 
sensitivity to angry faces can be accounted for by these factors were examined in 
Studies 3, 4, and 5.  
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1.7 Summary and aims of the present research 
The core purpose of the current research was therefore to further our 
understanding of how subjective sense of status influences social cognitive processes 
involved in perception of social threat cues and threatening facial expressions 
Specifically, the current research aimed to empirically test the causal relationship 
between loss of social status and social threat vigilance in social information processing 
and face perception.   
The bulk of the existing research on social status and social cognition has been 
focused on theorising the link from an evolutionary perspective, and examining the 
structure and antecedents of the effects of status. In addition, effects of status are 
frequently looked at from the target group’s perspective, instead of the individual 
perceiver’s perspective. The present research aimed to contribute to filling this gap by 
focusing on the social cognitive processes that may vary as a function of subjective 
perception of status.  
The underlying assumption in the current research is that subjective sense of 
status predicts differential patterns of social perception. In building up the rationale to 
support that assumption, my review has so far described how status leads to 
physiological changes that are primarily driven by exposure and experiences of social 
stressors. I have also reviewed the stigma associated with being in a low-status 
position, in terms of how it increases occurrences of experiences with physical threats 
and how it exacerbates the negative consequences of social threats. Additionally, I have 
highlighted some of the evolutionary and cognitive theoretical propositions on how 
social status could influence social cognitive tendencies. Of central interest, I outlined 
the emerging evidence on the motivated basis of face perception and how status might 
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triggers functionally distinct motivations, which in turn influences basic social 
cognitive processes.  
Guided by the findings from the rejection sensitivity and self-esteem literature, 
and by the theoretical frameworks of the stigma compensation theory, social 
preservation theory, and hostile attribution bias, I proposed that low status individuals’ 
chronic exposure to social hostility and social challenges should trigger the motivation 
to be more vigilant towards sources of social threat in their environment.  
Given the intricate nature of natural group relations, it is important to 
differentiate which specific aspects of between and within individuals’ causes 
heightened threat vigilance. The current research examines the role of subjective sense 
of status in the domains of respect and prestige. A person’s subjective status differs 
from objective SES measures in that it reflects internal perceptions of their prestige in 
the social hierarchy compared to others. The current account of subjective sense of 
status also differed from the related constructs of social rank and social class. Social 
rank implies the ability to influence others, and social class takes into account both SES 
and subjective sense of status. The current research aimed to separate these intertwining 
concepts in social status by explicitly looking at subjective sense of status. 
Furthermore, the rationale behind the current research was built based upon the notion 
that loss of status represents a significant form of threat to the social self. Therefore, the 
definition of social status was confined within the domains of social prestige and 
respect.  
The current research investigated how the subjective sense of social status 
shapes various processes along the social information-processing stream including 
attentional processes and social evaluative judgements above and beyond objective SES 
measures. In particular, I aimed to disentangle and identify the unique contributions of 
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social status in the domains of respect and prestige in the documented phenomenon of 
increased threat reactivity in low-status individuals in past studies. To that end, I 
focused mainly on attentional processes towards social-threat related information and 
facial expressions indicative of threat. I hypothesised that loss of status in the domains 
of respect and prestige selectively heightens vigilance and processing motivation of 
social threat, and not for general threat or negative valence social stimuli.   
Furthermore, the existing evidence on the behavioural correlates of low social 
status seems to diverge. On the one hand, low-status individuals are more submissive 
than their dominant counterpart. On the other hand, it is frequently reported that 
individuals from low SES backgrounds have a greater tendency to respond to social 
threats with increased aggression. Insofar as attentional and social perception processes 
predicts later-stage behaviour, the current research attempted to disentangle these 
conflicting behavioural effects by looking at the consequences of loss of social status 
on an attentional and early processing stage. In relation to that, this research also aimed 
to explore how status influences the way individuals negotiate the conflict between the 
goal of creating promising interpersonal connections and the goal of protecting 
themselves against detrimental interactions. 
To address the empirical and theoretical gap in the relationship between status 
and top-down influences on social perception, specifically social threat information and 
facial expressions of threat, all the studies in the current paper manipulated social 
status. Moreover, as stated above, I was interested in providing novel empirical 
evidence on how abstract social environmental cues such as prestige and respect 
influences basic social cognitive processes.  Therefore, In studies 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 
participants were asked to recall a recent interaction they had with a person either at the 
very top or at the very bottom of the hierarchy as defined by a person who is most (or 
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least) respected by members of their community. Based on previous studies, it is 
reasoned that recalling and describing an interaction with a highly or least respected 
individual would temporarily prime subjective perceptions of low or high sense of 
status. Study 3 employed the dot-estimation task, which is a common minimal group 
paradigm (Tajfel, 1970) commonly used to arbitrarily categorise participants into 
separate groups. Finally, in studies 8, and 9, participants were given false information 
regarding the status of graduates from their department compared to other departments 
in the university. Research on social status are often interlinked with other variables 
(e.g., SES, power), the manipulation of subjective sense of status specifically in the 
domain of respect provides the first evidence that this construct can sufficiently create 
differential attentional biases. Furthermore, manipulations of this nature help establish 
stronger causal links between social status and social cognitive tendencies.  
The current research advances previous studies by investigating the effect of 
status on various stages of social information processing, specifically at the attentional 
processing and social evaluation levels. I also proposed a potential attentional 
mechanism that could account for these status-specific differences. Importantly, the 
proposed attentional vigilance towards social threat in low-status individuals may be 
driven by a direct or indirect phenomenon. A direct phenomenon would be based upon 
the prior and learned experiences a low-status individual had with increased hostility 
and aggression. These past experiences create the expectation of further encounters 
with threatening targets and therefore lead to an increased motivation to be vigilant 
towards social threat cues. An indirect phenomena would imply that the heightened 
threat sensitivity demonstrated by low-status individuals was due to secondary related 
factors such that self-esteem, rejection sensitivity, mood, need to belong, and 
generalised trust. These variables have been implicated in accounting for individual 
  67
differences in sensitivity to threat in past studies. The current research will measure by 
means of questionnaires, whether status influences these variables across the studies in 
Chapter 3.   
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the source of 
heightened threat reactivity observed in individuals from low SES backgrounds, I 
examined the perceptual and processing biases that may be involved. I aimed to 
demonstrate that low-status individuals have perceptual biases in allocating attention to 
angry facial expression, and a bias to process social-threat related information more 
extensively. To this end, I used a variety of tasks to examine the role of status in the 
perception of socially threatening facial cues.  
My core hypothesis was that low-status individuals will demonstrate vigilance 
and enhanced processing motivation for threat-related cues in faces. Social-threat will 
be operationalised both in the context of angry emotional facial expression and 
untrustworthy facial expression.  Study 1 aimed to first establish the influence of status 
on social threat information processing. It was hypothesised that low-status individuals 
would have heightened accessibility for social threat information, whereas high-status 
individuals would not show any differentiation in their accessibility for social threat 
and general negative information. Study 2 investigated if heightened accessibility of 
social threat also extends to face processing. It was hypothesised that low-status 
individuals would be more motivated to encode targets embedded within a social-threat 
context.  
Study 3 tested the assumption that status triggers functionally distinct motives. 
Stimuli relevant to these motives should disrupt attention and interfere with any 
simultaneous processes. It was hypothesised that irrelevant angry background faces 
would cause the greatest interference on low-status individuals goal-directed attention 
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on the focal task. Study 4 investigated the role of social status in moderating processing 
motivation and processing styles of emotional faces. It was hypothesised that low-status 
individuals are motivated to accurately identify angry faces such that they would 
redirect additional processing resources to compensate for difficulties in identifying an 
inverted facial expression. Studies 5 and 6 examined if vigilance towards threatening 
social cues (angry faces) along the time-course of attention would vary as a function of 
status. It was hypothesised that low-status individuals would show strategic vigilance 
towards angry faces. It was further predicted that this selective vigilance towards angry 
faces results from an enhanced motivation to increase awareness of direct social threat 
in the environment. Consequently, low-status individuals should also suffer greater 
interference on simultaneous processes when presented with angry faces, but not fearful 
faces, because they are motivated to avoid direct social threat. Study 7 tested the idea 
that the selective vigilance towards static images of angry faces would also extend to 
processing of dynamic facial expression in low-status individuals. It also examined the 
role of the relationship between the target and the perceiver. It was hypothesised that 
low-status individuals would take a longer time in detecting the initial hostile 
expression offset in targets they expected to interact with, but not with targets whom 
they do not expect an interaction with. Finally, studies 8 and 9 examined the social 
evaluative consequences of the proposed social threat vigilance. In particular, it 
investigated whether low-status individuals would also be sensitive towards more 
subtle cues of social threat, such as those present in non-Duchenne smiles as they are an 
indicator of untrustworthiness. It was hypothesised that low-status individuals would be 
able to discriminate between Duchenne and non-Duchenne smiles, and they would also 
be motivated to avoid targets displaying non-Duchenne smiles.  
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In conclusion, the current research aimed to investigate the link between early-
stage attentional process and late-stage behavioural reactions in social interactions. 
More specifically, whether early-stage attentional biases predict social evaluation 
judgements, and crucially, if this link varies as a function of status. Moreover, I aimed 
to provide a comprehensive overview of how subjective perception of one’s social 
standing in the status hierarchy can significantly influence perceptual and attentional 
processes during face perception and its subsequent effects of social evaluative 
judgements. 
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Chapter 2 Selectivity in Social Information 
Processing 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In the current chapter, I aimed to provide novel evidence that the loss of status 
in the domains of prestige and respect selectively activates accessibility of social threat. 
To this end, I pitted social threat against non-social threat information in Study 1; and 
social threat against general negative valence in Study 2. I also aimed to show that this 
heightened accessibility of social threat extends to face processing, such that targets 
associated with social threat are better encoded and subsequently better remembered by 
low-status individuals. Finally, I expected that these effects would not be present in 
high-status individuals.  
There is abundant evidence that social information receives preferential 
processing. First, it has been shown that social relations are automatically extracted 
from the social stream. For instance, people are often spontaneously categorised based 
on their relationships (e.g., family, married couple, friends). Following that initial 
categorisation, information about those individuals is subsequently stored within their 
relationships (Sedikedes, Olsen, & Reiss, 1993). Furthermore, in the domain of 
attribution formation, the causal effect of interpersonal demands has been shown to be 
the strongest dimension in attributional processing (Anderson, 1991). This work 
highlights how social information processing may be influenced by top-down factors 
such as motivation and prior expectations.  
For the remainder of this section, I will first give a broad overview on how 
motivation influences information processing. Then I will review evidence on the role 
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of prior expectation in biasing social perception. Finally, in justifying the rationale 
underlying the current hypotheses that low social-status leads to enhanced accessibility 
and processing of social threat, I will draw supporting evidence from the relevant 
literature of social identity threat, self-esteem and rejection sensitivity.  
2.1.1 The role of motivation 
It is generally agreed that motivation influences information processing.  
Theories on the relationship between motivation, deprivation, and goal attainment 
states that when an individual fails to achieve satisfaction from an important goal, they 
would seek alternative means of satisfying that thwarted need (Maner, DeWall, 
Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007). For example, Brewer and Pickett (1999) showed that 
heightening the need for assimilation and belonging led to increased self-stereotyping.  
It has been argued that low-status individuals tend to search more exhaustively for 
information about others in the environment to compensate for a lack of certainty over 
their life outcomes (Pittman & Pittman, 1980). Importantly, these findings also suggest 
that motivation can influence the intervening cognitive processes. 
The subjective perception of being in a low-status position may signal that one’s 
need for control and security is thwarted. That is, being in a vulnerable position 
threatens the social self, low-status individuals may feel a strong desire to restore their 
subjective sense of value by being aware of possible threats around them. Despite the 
common assumption of “automatic” biases toward threat (e.g., Carlson & Reinke, 
2008; Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003), recent evidence has suggested that not all threat 
processing fulfils the criteria for automaticity (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) in terms of 
the involuntary and capacity-free nature of automatic processing. Instead, processing of 
threat is strategically subjected to top-down goals, which influences processing of 
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threat at an attentional level. The current study proposes that the loss of status in the 
domains of social prestige and respect may trigger heightened sensitivity or 
accessibility to social threat-related concepts. In the next subsection, I will discuss the 
role of prior expectations. Specifically, I will elaborate on how prior expectations can 
exert top-down influences on motivation and subsequent basic cognitive processes in 
social information processing and face perception.  
2.1.2 The role of prior expectations  
Human survival relies heavily on the ability to anticipate and prepare for 
possible future events before actually experiencing them (Bar, 2007; Holland, 1900). 
This ability is based largely on the ability to bring to the fore mental representations of 
prior experiences (Bar, 2007, 2009; Friston, 2005). However, if our subjective 
experiences are shaped by expectations set by prior mental representations and actual 
sensory input (Petrovic et al., 2005), then there is the inherent risk that these mental 
representations may bias sensory input. For example, evidence from brain imaging 
studies have found that false expectations can skew perceptual judgement, affective 
responses and neutral processing in various stimulus modalities including olfaction 
(e.g., De Araujo, Rolls, Velazco, Margot, & Cayeux, 2005), pain (e.g., Wager et al., 
2004) and vision (e.g., Petrovic et al., 2005). The general finding from these studies is 
that preconceptions based on past experiences may provide misleading information that 
could modulate perceptual experience by enhancing prefrontal top-down influences on 
category-specific sensory brain activation (Diekhof et al., 2011). 
Being constantly reminded of negative stereotypes about one’s in-group could 
trigger universal expectations of prejudice. That is, one might develop a script for 
intergroup rejection, in which one worries about being socially devalued and becomes 
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vigilant for cues communicating this rejection. Recent research supports this notion 
such that individual differences in prejudice expectations, such as stigma consciousness 
or rejection sensitivity can activate a biologically based defensive motivation system 
that orients individuals towards negative stimuli in order to react appropriately (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990).  
In line with that, Kaiser et al., (2006) found evidence suggesting that women 
who were high in stigma consciousness paid more attention to subliminally presented 
social-identity threatening cues. Furthermore, Downey and colleagues (2004) found 
that individuals who were high in personal rejection-sensitivity reacted to rejection-
relevant cues with an augmented startle eye-blink response, which is a marker of the 
activation of the defensive motivation system. This suggests that they were especially 
sensitive to rejection cues and readily perceives rejection in other people’s behaviour.  
Being in a low-status position is socially threatening as it exposes an individual 
to various social challenges which may be difficult to overcome given the limited 
disposable social resources low-status individuals have. Thus, it is possible that 
accessibility of social-threat related concepts may be influenced by the prior 
experiences of being in a socially threatening position coupled with the awareness of 
their unfavourable comparison compared to high-status individuals. 
In conclusion, deriving from the rationale outlined in the Chapter 1, relative to 
others, low-status individuals are more often victims from being targets of direct and 
indirect forms of hostility, including social discrimination and unprovoked aggression 
(e.g., Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Crocker et al., 1998; Sapolsky, 2004; Sidanius, Levin, 
Federico, & Prato, 2001). I proposed for the first time that low-status individuals would 
be motivated to detect and engage with social threat cues. An enhanced accessibility 
and processing of social threat could help low-status individuals navigate a more 
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challenging social world as this awareness would enable them to protect themselves 
against potential sources of further hostility. Specifically, I hypothesised that loss of 
status in the domains of prestige and respect increases accessibility for social threat that 
also extends to face memory. Two studies addressed these hypotheses, Study 1 used a 
lexical decision task as a measure of accessibility, and Study 2 used a face recognition 
task as a measure of motivated processing of relevant targets.  
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2.2 Study 1 
The primary aim of Study 1 was to provide an initial test of whether status 
triggers differential motivations, which then heightens accessibility of motivationally 
relevant concepts. Additionally, the current study was also interested in whether there 
would a differentiation between social and non-social threat related words as a function 
of status.  
Participants completed the status manipulation task, after which they completed 
a lexical decision task (LDT) that included social threat words, non-social threat words, 
and matched control neutral words. The LDT is a commonly used reaction-time 
measure of accessibility. In this task, participants are asked to decide whether or not 
letter strings form English words. Crucially, some of the letter strings are target-related 
words, some are target-unrelated and others are non-words. Higher accessibly of the 
target concept is indicated by the relatively faster accurate detection of target-related 
words (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). This procedure allowed the assessment of the 
extent to which participants were quicker to respond to social threat and non-social 
threat words in comparison to the matched control-neutral words. This pattern of 
effects will inform us as to whether or not accessibility of threat-related concepts vary 
as a function of status.  In addition to measuring accessibility, I also used the LDT to 
measure social goal activation. Using this implicit measure allowed us to identify 
whether low social status increases accessibility of social threat without the 
participants’ conscious control. As active goals can temporarily increase the cognitive 
accessibility of goal-relevant information (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002), I 
expected low status participants to identify words associated with social-threat 
compared to non-social threat and neutral words more quickly.  
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Method 
Participants and design. Sixty-three participants recruited from the University 
College London (UCL) subject pool received monetary compensation for participation. 
One participant with an overall mean accuracy lower than 3 SD of the sample was 
excluded. The remaining 62 participants (40 females, 22 males, Mean age = 23.89) 
were randomly assigned to a high-status condition (n =22), low-status condition (n =21) 
or control condition (n =19). This study employed a 3 (Status: high, low, control) x 3 
(Word type: social threat, non-social threat, neutral) mixed-model design, with repeated 
measures on the last factor. There were no effects of participant gender, which are not 
discussed further. 
Materials. A total of 32 social threat, 32 non-social threat and 64 neutral words 
(See Appendix I) were selected from the ANEW (Bradley & Lang, 1999) database. 
Social threat, non-social threat and neutral words were matched in terms of length and 
frequency (See ion of lengths were constructed. 
Table 2.1). Using the ARC nonword database (English) (Rastle, Harrington, & 
Coltheart, 2002), 128 nonwords that matched the target words on distribution of lengths 
were constructed. 
Table 2.1  
Mean (and standard deviations) of lexical characteristics of word stimuli used in Study 1 
 Word type 
Neutral  Social threat Non-social threat 
Word length  6.84 (1.48)  6.25 (1.59)  6.72 (1.22) 
Word frequency  26.77 (27.17) 30.39 (15.49)  20.45 (12.93) 
 
Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed the entire 
experiment in individual cubicles. The study was described as a study on “linguistic 
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processing” and social factors that may influence this process. There were two parts to 
this study. Firstly, participants completed the status manipulation task. Next, they 
completed the lexical decision task.  
Status manipulation task. The status manipulation was adapted from Kraus, 
Côté, and Keltner (2010). In this task, participants were presented with a ladder with 10 
rungs. Participants were asked to think of the ladder as representing where people stand 
in their country. Participants received the following instructions:  
“Now, please compare yourself to the people at the very bottom (top) of the 
ladder. These are people who are the worst (best) off – those who are least (most) 
respected in your society. In particular we’d like you to think about how you are 
different from these people in terms of your own social prestige. Where would you 
place yourself on this ladder relative to these people at the very bottom (top)?”  
To strengthen the status manipulation, participants were asked to write about a 
recent interaction with a person from the bottom (top) of the ladder. In particular, 
participants were asked to “think about how the differences between you might impact 
what you would have talked about, and how the interaction went. ” Next, participants 
indicated their perceived position on the ladder relative to the person at the very bottom 
(top) (1 = bottom rung to 10 = top rung) (see Appendix II). 
In the control condition, participants were not presented with the ladder. To 
match the recall task of the experimental conditions they were asked to write about 
their day yesterday. 
Lexical decision task. Participants were tested individually in a cubicle. Each 
trial began with a fixation cross that appeared at the middle of the screen for 500ms 
followed immediately by the letter string. The letter string remained on the screen for 
2000ms or until a response was given (whichever was earlier). Participants were 
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instructed to press the z key on the keyboard (marked green) if the string was a word, 
and the m key on the keyboard (marked red) when the string was not a word. 
Participants were told to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. There was a 
blank inter-trial interval of 1000ms after participants made a response or time-out (See 
Figure 2.1). After twelve practice items, the 128 words and 128 non-words were 
presented in a random order. Upon completion, participants were checked for 
suspicion, carefully debriefed, paid and thanked.  
 
Figure 2.1 Trial sequence of lexical decision task in Study 1. Trial onset was indicated by a 
fixation cross. This is followed by the presentation of a letter string (in this example, a social 
threat word). Participants then indicated using labelled keys on the keyboard whether the letter 
string was a word or a non-word.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. Participants’ indication of their perceived standing on the 
ladder served as the manipulation check scores; the bottom rung was coded as “1”, and 
the top rung was coded as “10”. The manipulation check scores were subjected to an 
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independent-samples t-test. Participants in the high-status condition reported 
significantly greater perceived status (M = 6.82, SD = 1.50) compared to participants in 
the low-status condition (M = 5.52, SD = 1.54), t (41) = -2.79, p < .01, d = .85. This 
indicates that the status manipulation was successful. 
Reaction times. The data analysis for this task was based on RTs for correct 
responses. RTs faster than 200ms were excluded from analysis. Outliers, defined as 
RTs that deviated more than three SD from the overall mean RT were removed. Data 
from trials with errors and outliers were discarded and not analysed further. Error rates 
did not differ across status conditions, p = .702. 
My primary interest was whether status influences the accessibility of neutral, 
social threat and non-social threat words. Shorter RT for social threat and/or non-social 
threat words as compared to matched control-neutral words would indicate that 
accessibility of those word categories had been activated as a result of the status 
manipulation task. For each participant, I averaged (separately) their RTs for each word 
category. Low-status participants were quickest to respond to social threat words (M = 
549.84, SD = 66.57), followed by non-social threat words (M = 557.12, SD = 68.20), 
and neutral control words (M = 563.73, SD = 67.93). High-status participants were 
quickest to respond to non-social threat words (M = 547.43, SD = 54.61), followed by 
neutral control words (M = 556.74, SD = 61.12), and social threat words (M = 558.49, 
SD = 65.49). Control participants were quickest to respond to social threat words (M = 
575.77, SD = 87.31), followed by neutral control words (M = 588.08, SD = 81.47), and 
non-social threat words (M = 590.26, SD = 75.77). These averages were subjected to a 
3 (Status: high status, low status, control) x 3 (Word category: social threat, non-social 
threat, neutral) mixed-modal ANOVA with repeated measures on the latter factor. 
Results revealed a main effect of word category, F (2, 118) = 3.32, p < .05, ηp2 = .053 
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such that participants were quickest to respond to social threat words (M = 560.86, SD 
= 72.75), followed by non-social threat words (M = 563.84, SD = 67.64) and neutral 
words (M = 568.71, SD = 70.25). Of interest, there was a significant interaction 
between word category and status, F (4, 118) = 3.18, p < .02, ηp2 = .097. (See Figure 
2.2). 
Planned comparisons using one-way ANOVA for each status condition 
respectively revealed that there was a significant difference in accessibility across word 
categories for low status participants, F(2, 40) = 4.57, p < .02, ηp2 = .186.  Low-status 
participants were marginally faster at categorising social threat words (M = 549.84, SD 
= 66.57) compared to non-social threat words (M = 557.12, SD = 68.20), t (20) = -1.78, 
p = .09. Importantly, they were significantly faster at categorising social threat words 
compared to neutral words (M = 563.73, SD = 67.93), t (20) = -3.05, p < .01; the 
accessibility of non-social threat words did not differ significantly from neutral words, 
p > .2. There was no significant difference in accessibility across the word categories in 
the high-status and control condition. 
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Figure 2.2. Mean lexical decision RT for social-threat, neutral, and non-social threat words as 
a function of status conditions; error bars represent standard error. 
The current findings provide preliminary support to the hypothesis that 
subjective perception of low-status heightens accessibility of social threat such that 
low-status participants were quicker at accurately identifying social threat words 
compared to matched neutral control words. High-status and control participants did 
not show this pattern of response as they did not differ in their response times across 
the word categories. Based on the overall pattern of response within each status 
category, it is worth noting that while low-status and control participants were quickest 
to respond to social threat words, high-status participants were slowest to respond to 
this category. This raises the possibility that high-status individuals may be inhibiting 
the accessibility of social threat words, however the current results lack statistical 
evidence for this claim.  
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In so far as cognitive accessibility of goal-relevant information informs the 
underlying social goal, the current study suggests that low-status individuals may be 
motivated by the self-protection goal, specifically in the social domain and not threat in 
general. The next study sought to investigate if this heightened accessibility for social 
threat extends to face perception. Specifically, if targets associated in a social threat 
context would be privileged in face processing. That is, the next study aimed to test the 
notion that heightened accessibility for social threat observed in low-status individuals 
would also lead to better memory of social stimuli (faces) associated with social threat.  
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2.3 Study 2 
Faces provide a rich source of social evaluative information. That is, embedded 
in each face are cues signalling an individuals identity and social category, it also 
provides information about their emotions and behavioural intentions. As a result, faces 
elicit enhanced attention and processing resources during social encounters 
(Bindermann, Burton, Hooge, Jenkins, & de Haan, 2005). 
The significance of faces as social stimuli has led to a wide array of social 
cognitive research on face perception and processing that focuses on how facial cues, 
once encoded, modulate other cognitive processes. For example, structural cues on 
faces have been shown to influence trait inferences (Wills & Todorov, 2006), 
impression formation (Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2005), prejudice and discrimination 
(Maddox, 2004).  
Recently, there has been burgeoning interest in how social motives exert top-
down influences on basic cognitive processes in face perception such as the way faces 
are attended to, remembered, and encoded (Ratcliff, Hugenberg, Shriver, Bernstein, 
2011). More specifically, face processing is attuned to targets that are deemed 
functionally relevant for a perceiver (Hugenberg et al., 2010), and these top-down 
motivational influences are reflected in the lower order social cognitive processes 
involved in encoding faces.  For example, men and women who have mating goals 
active selectively attend to signals of both sexual receptivity and genetic fitness sent by 
female faces (Sacco, Hugenberg, & Sefcek, 2009). Group memberships can also serve 
as a trigger to selectively attend and encode a face (Hugenberg et al., 2010). This is 
because a shared in-group membership indicates that the person may serve as social 
  84
resources (Correll & Park, 2005), and therefore motivating perceivers to direct more 
processing resources to encode that particular target.  
Study 2 aimed to expand on this research on how motivations exert top-down 
influences in face processing by investigating how the perceiver’s social status 
influences face processing. Hugenberg and colleague (2010) proposed that the ability to 
remember faces’ identities reflects the amount of processing resources that has been 
allocated to a face) and this allocation of processing resources is often dependent upon 
top-down factors. In relation to that, past studies have shown that face perception is 
attuned to targets that are functionally relevant for the perceiver (Becker et al., 2005). 
Faces that are deemed low in subjective relevance may be disregarded.  For example, 
Rodin (1987) found that face memory was better for potential interaction partners and 
targets who were more physically attractive (see also Maner et al., 2003). In other 
words, there was a memory disadvantage for social targets that were deemed irrelevant 
to the perceiver’s goals and motives.  
I argue that social status activates differential social motivation that 
subsequently influences the memory for target faces deemed most relevant to the 
perceiver. The current study investigates this notion by pairing neutral target faces with 
different types of personal context created by descriptions of common daily events. I 
manipulated the relevance of different target faces based on the personal context these 
faces are embedded in.  In particular, personal context were either of social threat or 
general negative valence nature were included.   
The current study proposed that differences in social prestige and respect 
influence face memory independent of cultural, educational or financial differences that 
accompany naturally occurring status differences. There were three parts to this study. 
Firstly, participants completed the status manipulation task. Next, utilising an 
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adaptation of Higgins and Tykocinski’s (1992) diary paradigm as a measure of 
motivated processing, I paired each diary event with a neutral target face.  According to 
Higgins and Tykocinski (1992), an individual’s chronic-self guides influence the type 
of information that was later recalled about another individual’s life. In their studies, 
they found that participants who were motivated to avoid losses or anticipate gains 
preferentially remembered events reported in another student’s diary that were 
consistent with their underlying motivations.  
In the current study, each face was paired with a diary extract describing an 
event that had ostensibly occurred to that target yesterday. The events were either social 
or non-social in nature. Crucially, the social events could be further categorised as 
either threat-related or non-threat related (general negative valence). Participants are 
instructed to form a global impression about each target they are presented with. That 
is, to form an impression based on the target’s face and also the accompanying diary 
event. Following a short filler task, a surprise recognition task was given. Participants 
were presented with a series of faces, half of which were novel faces and were asked to 
indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible which targets were ‘Old’ or ‘New’.   
As shown in Study 1, mere reduced sense of prestige and respect could increase 
the accessibility of threat-related cues in the social domain. Building from that, in the 
current study, I claimed that the heightened accessibility of social threat information 
could be derived from increased motivation to process social-threat information more 
extensively. It was hypothesised that loss of perceived sense of respect and prestige 
would trigger the motivation to process threatening information in the social domain 
more extensively. It was also predicted that this effect would be social threat-specific 
and not negative valence in general. Therefore, I expected that low-status individuals to 
be more motivated to process targets embedded in a social-threat context compared to 
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high-status individuals. Specifically, low-status individuals would be quicker at 
accurately recognising targets associated with social threat.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Fifty participants recruited from the University 
College London (UCL) subject pool received monetary compensation for participation. 
Three participants with an overall mean accuracy lower than 3 SD of the sample were 
excluded. The remaining 47 participants (30 females, 17 males, Mage = 23.89) were 
randomly assigned to either a high-status condition (n =23) or a low-status condition (n 
=24). This study employed a 2 (Status: high, low) x 2 (Event type: social, non-social) x 
2 (Valence: positive, negative) mixed-model design, with repeated measures on the last 
two factors. There were no effects of participant gender, which are not discussed 
further. 
Materials. Twenty-eight male and 28 female target photos selected from the 
Glasgow Unfamiliar Face Database (Burton, White & McNeill, 2010) served as stimuli. 
All targets faces wore a neutral expression and faced the camera. A separate sample of 
participants rated the faces for physical attractiveness on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
attractive) to 7 (highly attractive).  Faces were average in physical attractiveness with a 
mean score of (M = 3.33, SD = 0.54). Male (M =3.32, SD =0.39) and female (M =3.34, 
SD =0.52) target faces were matched on attractiveness, t (54) = -0.21, p > 0.8. Half of 
these faces (14 males, 14 females) were randomly paired with a diary event. Target 
faces were situated on the bottom left-hand corner of the screen while the diary event 
appeared as a ‘thought bubble’ above the photo on the upper right-hand corner. All 56 
faces (without diary events) were later presented in the recognition task (see Figure 
2.3). 
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The diary events were presented as events extracted from a diary of another 
individual (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000). Participants’ task was to form an 
impression about this individual based on their face and the accompanying event. The 
events could either be social or non-social in nature. Crucially, the social events were 
either social-threat related or general negative valence (See Appendix III).  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Example of stimuli used in Study 2. In this example, a female target paired with a 
social threat background. 
 
Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed the entire 
experiment in individual cubicles. The study was described as an experiment designed 
to investigate indirect impression formation and social factors that may influence this 
process. More specifically, the study ostensibly investigated the relationship between 
the different types of social interactions people have in their daily lives and how they 
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form impressions about others in the absence of face-to-face interaction. There were 
three parts to this experiment. Firstly, participants completed the status manipulation 
task. Next, they were presented with faces paired with diary events. Finally, they were 
given a surprise recognition task of the faces.  
Status manipulation. The status manipulation procedure for the high-status and 
low-status conditions was identical to Study 1.  
Face recognition task. Next, participants were presented with 28 faces each 
paired with a diary event that has ostensibly occurred to that particular target the day 
before. Participants were asked to pay attention to both the face and the accompanying 
event description and to form a general impression of each target they were presented 
with. Following the presentation of all 28 targets, participants were asked to complete a 
timed verbal ability task in which they made as many words as possible using the 
letters from the word CRUSTACEAN and LIBRARIAN. This task acted as a filler task 
for four minutes. Finally, participants were asked to complete a surprise recognition 
task. In this task, participants were presented with 56 faces (28 previously seen target 
faces without the diary events and 28 new target faces) individually and were asked to 
press 1 for ‘Old’ faces (faces previously seen in the earlier parts of the experiment) and 
2 for ‘New’ faces. This task was self-paced but participants were instructed to respond 
as quickly and as accurately as possible. Finally, participants were checked for 
suspicion, carefully debriefed and thanked.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. Participants’ indication of their perceived standing on the 
ladder served as the manipulation check; the bottom rung was coded as “1”, and the top 
rung was coded as “10”. The manipulation check scores were subjected to an 
independent-samples t-test. Participants in the high-status condition reported 
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significantly greater perceived status (M = 6.52, SD = 1.27) compared to participants in 
the low-status condition (M = 5.54, SD = 1.67), t (45) = 2.26, p < .03, d = .68. This 
indicates that the status manipulation was therefore successful. 
Reaction times (RT) for accurate recognition. Another common means of 
measuring recognition is the signal detection parameter sensitivity (d’). This measure is 
assesses perceivers’ overall performance in a recognition task. (Stansislaw & Todorov, 
1999). This is done by taking into account perceivers’ “old” responses to faces that 
were presented before (hits), and perceivers’ “old” responses to faces that were not 
presented before (false alarms).  
However, in the current study, this measure was not suitable due to the 
hypothesis of the current study. More specifically, the current aimed to investigate the 
extent to which the perceiver’s social status influenced the motivated processing of 
targets associated with social threat compared to targets associated with general 
negative valence. To that end, the current study is primarily interested in faces that 
were previously paired with social-threat and negative valence events. Both these 
categories of faces are “old”/previously seen faces. The calculation of the d’ scores 
require both hit rates and false alarm rates. The hit rate (the probability of responding 
“old” to old/previously seen faces) and the false alarm rate (the probability of 
responding “old” to new faces). However, given the current hypothesis, only faces that 
were previously paired with social threat context and the general threat context were of 
interest. The “new” faces/faces that were not previously paired with any context were 
not relevant. Therefore, it was not possible to compute the false alarm rates for the 
variables of interest in the current study.  In addition, the signal detection measure takes 
into account both sensory processes and decision processes (Sternberg, 2004), which 
are beyond scope of the current study. With regards to overall recognition performance, 
  90
participants in the high-status (M = 1.93, SD = .91) and low-status (M = 1.48, SD = .81) 
conditions did not differ significantly, F (1, 45) = 3.16, p > .05. 
The data analysis for this task was based on RTs for correct responses. Outliers, 
defined as RTs that deviated more than three SD from the overall mean RT were 
removed. Data from trials with errors and outliers were discarded and not analysed 
further. Error rates did not differ across status conditions, p = .503.  
It was predicted that low-status, and not high-status would trigger the 
motivation to process target faces paired with threatening social events more 
extensively compared to target faces paired with general negative social events. That is, 
low-status participants should be quicker at accurately recognising faces that were 
previously paired with social-threat events compared to faces that were paired with 
negative valence events. This pattern of response should not be evident in the high-
status condition. To test this, the RTs for accurate target recognition were entered into a 
2 (Status: high, low) x 2 (Social event type: threat, negative) mixed-model ANOVA 
with status as the between-subjects factor (See Figure 2.4). 
Results revealed no main effect of status (p = .257); the two status conditions 
did not differ in their RT for correct responses. Of interest, there was a significant 
interaction between event type and status, F (1, 45) = 4.62, p < .05, ηp2 = .093. Planned 
comparisons using one way ANOVA for each social event type revealed that there was 
a significant difference between high- and low-status condition for the faces paired with 
the socially threatening events, F(1,45) = 4.12, p < .05, but not for the non-threat 
related/negative valence events, p > .6. Additionally, participants in the low-status 
condition were marginally quicker at correctly recognising faces paired with socially 
threatening events (M = 1231.64, SD = 358.77) compared to general negative valence 
social events (M = 1426.35, SD = 533.49), F (1, 23) = 3.50, p = .07, ηp2 = .132. In 
  91
contrast, there was no significant difference between event types for participants in the 
high-status condition.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Mean RT of correctly recognised faces paired with social threat or negative valence 
events as a function of status; error bars representing the standard error of the mean. 
 
The results supported the proposed notion that social status differentially 
triggered motivations that influenced the selective processing of social information. 
Specifically, loss of social respect and prestige influence processing of faces such that 
low-status participants allocated more resources to the processing of faces presented in 
a social-threat context. Low-status participants were quicker at accurately recognising 
faces that were previously paired with social-threat events compared to high-status 
participants. No differences in reaction time was found for the faces paired with the 
negative valence event suggesting that high- and low-status participants differed in 
their processing of threat-related of the social information, and not general negative 
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valence social information. Having said that, the results could also be interpreted as 
high-status participants being slower at accurately recognising faces that were 
previously paired with social-threat events compared to low-status participants. This is 
broadly consistent with the pattern of response observed in Study 1, in which high-
status participants were slower at accurately categorising social-threat words. 
Therefore, it remains a possibility that high-status individuals may be suppressing or 
inhibiting the processing of social threat information. This notion is investigated in 
greater detail in the remaining studies of the current research. 
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2.4 Summary and Conclusions  
Past studies on social cognition indicate that basic social cognitive processes 
involved in information processing and face perception can be influenced by top-down 
factors such as motivation. In addition, prior research on naturally occurring SES 
effects indicates that low social status leads to heightened threat reactivity. Studies 1 
and 2, integrated these independent lines of research to show, for the first time, a link 
between subjective sense of status and early-stage social cognitive processes. Study 1 
found that low-status participants showed increased accessibility of social-threat related 
words compared to neutral control words. Study 2 extended this result by showing that 
low-status participants were quicker at accurately recognising faces that were 
previously presented in a social-threat context compared to high-status participants. 
Furthermore, the effects obtained were social-threat specific and did not extend to 
general negative valence.  
The present findings are consistent with past research showing that members of 
low SES tend to be more wary of potential threats in their external environment 
compared to members of high SES groups (Gallo, Bogart, Vranceanu, & Matthews, 
2005; Taylor & Seeman, 1999). Indeed, with fewer resources to buffer against threats, 
individuals from low SES backgrounds consistently show elevated self-reports of 
hopelessness, and hostility (for a review, see Gallo & Matthews, 2003).  Here I 
established that mere decrease of social prestige is capable of activating accessibility of 
social threat, independent of educational and financial factors. In addition, the current 
findings also provide novel evidence that processing of neutral targets may be 
influenced by the type of information the target is associated with such that 
motivationally relevant information received enhanced processing.   
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Although the theoretical basis for heightened threat reactivity in low-status 
individuals is well established, the actual mechanism and social cognitive processes 
likely to contribute to this biased perception of threat, especially in the domain of face 
processing has been widely neglected. Studies 1 and 2 provides preliminary evidence 
that loss of social status in the domains of social prestige and respect is associated with 
heightened accessibility to social threat which can extend to processing of faces. This 
further demonstrates that status has a fundamental impact on motivation and this can 
affect basic cognitive functions, such as processing of threatening social information. 
However, the paradigms used in Studies 1 and 2 did not allow us to distinguish between 
possible cognitive processes that could underlie the heightened accessibility of social 
threat and quicker recognition of targets associated with social threat. That is, the 
shorter response times low-status participants’ needed to accurately recognise targets 
associated with social threat may be driven by selective attention allocation during the 
initial encoding stages or memory biases during the retrieval stages. 
The studies in the next chapter aimed to elucidate the underlying processing and 
attentional biases that may be associated with the observed heightened accessibility and 
motivation to process social threat. Specifically, the studies presented in the next study 
aimed to examine how attention is involved in involuntary processing and recognition 
of emotional faces, registering and differentiating between different facial expressions 
of emotion.  
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Chapter 3 Perception of Overt Threat from Angry 
Facial Expression  
 
 
Faces are especially diagnostic in identifying a person’s emotions and intentions 
(Zebrowitz, 1997). The ability to accurately identify and respond appropriately to 
emotional expressions is well documented in humans and other social species (Darwin, 
1872; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002). In particular, the facial expression of anger 
has been shown to have a strong influence on perception and cognition because it 
signals direct social threat and a high likelihood for imminent conflict (Adolphs, 2002). 
Hence, the inability to detect and respond appropriately to anger signals may 
potentially lead to undesirable consequences.  
While there is widespread consensus that the expression of anger automatically 
engages selective attentional processes (Fox et al., 2002) and initiates rapid avoidance 
behaviour (Marsh et al., 2005), recent evidence suggests that processing of emotional 
expressions is sensitive to top-down influences, in particular, motivational factors 
(Barrett, Mesquite, & Gendron, 2011). The current chapter extends this notion of 
motivated face perception by providing novel evidence that low-status enhances the 
readiness to respond to, orient attention towards, and deploy effort during the 
processing of facial expressions of anger. As mentioned in the previous chapters, my 
central focus is on how differences in subjective sense of status drive attention to 
emotional expressions of anger independent objective measures of status. Additionally, 
I examined the motivational orientation that accompanies sensitivity to angry 
expressions in low-status individuals. The aim of the studies presented in the current 
chapter is threefold. Firstly, I aim to show that mere reduced sense of social prestige 
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and respect could automatically increase the readiness to identify and process angry 
facial expressions.  
 Secondly, I aimed to demonstrate that angry faces, and not other negative or 
positive expressions elicit enhanced attentional processing in low-status individuals. I 
also inspected whether status affects attention to other negative emotions (fear, 
sadness). Specifically, I aimed to demonstrate the selectivity in enhanced attentional 
processing of angry faces compared to other negative facial expressions. Both the facial 
expressions of fear and anger have largely been presumed to represent threat to 
perceivers and therefore are often used as threatening stimuli across a wide range of 
studies (Fitzgerald, Angstadt, Jelsone, Nathan, & Phan, 2006; Marsh, Ambady et al., 
2005). Angry faces signal direct impending aggression on the part of the expresser, 
whereas fear faces suggest potential environmental threat perceived by the expresser 
(Adolphs et al., 1999; Whalen et al., 2001). Based on the underlying rationale behind 
the current research that loss of status represents a significant form of social threat 
coupled with the findings from Studies 1 and 2, I expected that low-status individuals 
would show vigilance to angry faces only and not to other negative emotions. That is, 
status should not lead to generalised sensitivity to negative social information. This was 
tested in Studies 3 and 4. Happy faces were also included to examine status related 
biases in positive emotional processing. High-status individuals are more exposed to 
admiration (Sweetman et al., 2013). Therefore high-status individuals may be 
particularly sensitive to signs of social reward and approval. Given that the smile of a 
happy face signals social reward (O’Doherty, Winston, Critchley, Perrett, Burt, & 
Dolan, 2003), I explored the possibility that high-status increases attention to happy 
faces. By looking at a range of negative and positive emotional expressions, I was in a 
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better position to determine the attentional priorities of high- and low-status 
individuals.  
Finally, I claim that these effects are motivational in nature and are dependent 
on the top-down control of attention. Increased sensitivity to angry faces in low-status 
individuals may reflect a desire to suppress and ignore hostility that is present in the 
environment or a desire to be vigilant and respond to hostility. I expected low-status 
individuals to show strategic vigilance towards angry faces. To test that prediction, I 
present five studies that used different paradigms that allow us to distinguish between 
the desire to avoid threat and the desire to be aware of and the readiness to engage with 
threat.  
In sum, this chapter tested the hypothesis that low-status triggers the enhanced 
motivation to heighten the readiness to respond to, orient attention towards, and deploy 
effort during the processing of facial expressions of anger across five studies. Study 3 
utilised a modified emotional Stroop paradigm (Stenberg, Wiking, & Dahl, 1998) and 
investigated whether low-status individuals prioritise the processing of angry 
expressions, compared to other expressions, even when angry expressions were 
irrelevant to the task at hand. Study 4 used an emotion expression identification task 
(Young & Hugenberg, 2010) to inspect face processing styles and allocation of effort 
during the identification of emotional expressions. Studies 5 and 6 examined the effects 
of status on attentional biases towards threatening faces, along with the time-course of 
attention, using a dot-probe paradigm (MacLeod et al., 1986; for a review, see Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). Across these studies I examined the role of various factors that have 
been related to status and could be implicated in the enhanced sensitivity towards angry 
faces in low-status individuals: mood, self-esteem, rejection sensitivity, self-worth, 
need to belong, and general trust. Finally, Study 7 inspected whether the threat 
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vigilance observed with static images of angry facial expression extends to dynamic 
expression of angry faces. It also examined whether the expected interaction with the 
target would affect the perception of hostile cues in those target’s faces.  
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3.1 Study 3 
Study 3 tested the notion that low-status individuals prioritise the processing of 
anger in facial expressions, using an adaptation of the emotional Stroop paradigm 
(Williams et al., 1996). In this paradigm participants are given a focal task (e.g., 
reading words) whilst irrelevant-stimuli (emotional facial expressions) are 
simultaneously presented on the computer screen. In order to maximise performance 
participants need to ignore the distractor faces. However, if the distractor faces are 
relevant to other accessible goals they will capture attention and will interfere with 
performance of the focal task. Therefore, interference scores reflect the relative 
processing of the irrelevant stimuli, and variations in interference as a function of type 
of distractor reflect the motivational relevance of the distractor information (see Engle, 
2002).  
In the present study, background distractor faces expressed anger, fear, sadness, 
and happiness or was neutral. If low-status triggers a motivation to detect facial signals 
of social threat, then low-status individuals should show greater interference (i.e., 
should be slower at categorising target words) in the presence of distracting angry faces 
compared to neutral faces or faces that expressed other negative emotions. Fearful 
facial expressions inform us about potential threats in the environment (Adams, 
Gordon, Baird, Ambady, & Kleck, 2003), whereas sad facial expressions have been 
linked to general negative emotion that is nonthreatening (Öhman et al., 2001). 
Therefore, if low-status triggers generalised sensitivity to negative emotional 
expressions, low-status individuals should show increased interference from all 
negative (vs. neutral) emotional stimuli. In contrast, if low-status individuals have a 
generalised sensitivity to threat they should be more sensitive to both angry and fearful 
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faces. However, based on the findings from Studies 1 and 2, I expected prioritised 
processing shown by low-status participants to be specific to angry faces as they signal 
direct social threat. Lastly, happy faces were included to identity whether status affects 
the processing of positive facial stimuli. Past studies have shown that expressions of 
happiness are identified more quickly than other emotions, an effect termed the happy-
face advantage (Kirita & Endo, 1995). Furthermore, it has been proposed that the smile 
in the mouth region, with the visibility of the teeth, is a distinctive feature of happy 
expressions that captures attention in a bottom-up manner, independently of the 
motivational states of the perceiver (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2011; see also Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980). In addition, sensitivity to social reward should also be indicated by 
greater interference from happy faces.  
Study 3 also examined whether status affects mood, self-esteem and rejection 
sensitivity, factors that have been implicated in sensitivity to threatening emotional 
expressions (Burklund, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007; Ewbank et al., 2009; Li & 
Yang, 2013) and could be implicated in the links between status and the processing of 
facial expression of anger. Negative affective states influence responses to facial 
signals of threat (Ewbank et al., 2009). Similarly, individuals with low self-esteem tend 
to mobilise more attentional resources towards the processing of negative stimuli such 
as angry faces (Li & Yang, 2013). Finally, sensitivity to disapproving facial 
expressions is moderated by individual differences in rejection sensitivity (Burklund et 
al., 2007).  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Thirty-five participants (21 females, 14 males, Mage = 
26.1), recruited from the departmental subject pool at UCL, were paid for participation. 
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Participants were randomly assigned to either a high-status condition (n =17) or a low-
status condition (n =18). The study employed a 2 (Status: high, low) x 5 (Face type: 
angry, fear, sad, happy, neutral) x 2 (Word valence: positive, negative) mixed-model 
design, with repeated measures on the last two factors. There were no effects of 
participant gender, which are not discussed further. 
Materials. Fifty pictures were taken from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) set of 
emotional expressions. The pictures comprised ten individuals (5 females) each posing 
angry, fear, sad, happy, and neutral facial expressions with gaze directed into the 
camera (see Appendix IV for examples). The external features of the faces were 
removed and the faces were presented in a grey rectangular frame. The image size 
(including the frame) measured 9cm x 11. 5 cm centred on the screen. The words were 
displayed in black 24-point text and were positioned such as to occupy the area across 
the lower part of the nose. This area was chosen to minimize hiding of any of the facial 
features essential for the detection of the facial expressions (see Stenberg et al, 1998).  
Two hundred and ten words was selected from the ANEW (Bradley & Lang, 
1999) database. 105 positive words and 105 negative words that were matched on word 
length and word frequency dimensions were chosen such that on a scale of 1 (most 
negative) to 9 (most positive) ratings were lower than 3.5 for negative words; and 
higher than 6.5 for positive words. Ten combinations of word valence and facial 
expression were constructed (See Table 3.1). Each combination appeared in 1 practice 
trial and 20 test trials, resulting in a total of 10 practice trials and 200 test trials for this 
study.  
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Table 3.1  
Mean (and Standard Deviations) of lexical characteristics of word stimuli used in Study 3 
 Word type 
Negative  Positive 
Valence 2.76 (0.498) 7.24 (0.456) 
Word length 5.86 (1.794) 5.91 (1.494) 
Word frequency 8.96 (0.543) 9.05 (0.537) 
 
For the dot-estimation task, 10 slides with random collections of yellow dots on 
a blue background were created and presented on a Microsoft PowerPoint slideshow 
with each slide shown for 500ms.  
Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed the entire 
experiment in individual cubicles. Participants learned that the purpose of this study 
was to investigate the relationship between perceptual acuity and word processing.  
Status manipulation. First, participants completed a dot-estimation task (Gerard 
& Hoyt, 1974) on the computer. In this task, participants saw a series of slides with 
dots presented on the computer screen, and estimated the number of the dots. Next, 
while waiting for the score, participants read information about different perceptual 
styles. In this information pack, the dot-estimation task was described as a measure of 
perceptual style and acuity that identified two groups of perceivers: overestimators and 
underestimators. Participants in the high (low) status were told that overestimators have 
a superior (inferior) perceptual style because it has been consistently shown that their 
style predicts better (worse) performance in other unrelated tasks. Participants were 
then given false feedback about their perceptual style (all participants were categorised 
as overestimators).  
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As the status manipulation check, participants were asked, on 7-point scales, to 
what extent do they think that overestimators: (1) will have prestigious professional 
positions in the future compared to underestimators? (2) will have high social 
recognition in the future compared to underestimators? (3) will attain financial success 
in the future compared to underestimators? All three questions were averaged to assess 
perceived status (α = .87).  
Word processing task. Participants then completed the word processing task 
(following Stenberg et al., 1998). They were instructed to categorise words as positive 
or negative by pressing one of two response keys on the keyboard. Each trial began 
with a fixation-cross presented at the middle of the screen for 500ms, followed by the 
presentation of a picture of a face for 250ms. Subsequently, the compound picture-word 
stimulus was presented for 500ms, followed by a blank screen the participant made a 
response or 1500ms had elapsed (see Figure 3.1). Participants were asked to ignore the 
background picture, and to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to the 
word. Participants were given 10 practice trials to familiarize themselves with the 
procedure before completing the 200 test trials. All stimuli and instructions were 
presented on a computer screen, using SuperLab Pro software package (Cedrus 
Corporation, 2002).  
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Figure 3.1 Trial sequence for word processing task in Study 1. Trial onset was indicated by a 
fixation cross. The presentation of a face (in this example, an angry facial expression) is 
followed by the presentation of a word (in this example, a negative word). Participants then 
indicated using labelled keys on the keyboard whether the word was positive or negative. 
 
Finally, participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965), and the Adult-Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (A-RSQ; 
Downey & Feldman, 1996). The PANAS is a 20-item self-measure of current 
emotional state that assesses positive (α = .86) and negative affect (α = .77). Self-
esteem was measured with Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale. This scale assesses a 
person’s overall evaluation of their self-worth. Participants indicated their agreement 
with 10 items (1 = completely disagree to 6 = completely agree) on a 6-point scale (α = 
.91). The RSQ measures anxious expectations of rejection (Downey & Feldman, 1996). 
This measure consists of 9 situations in which there is a possibility of being rejected (α 
=.69). For each situation, participants indicate how concerned/anxious they would be 
about the outcome of the situation (1 = very unconcerned, 6 = very concerned) and how 
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likely will they experience acceptance (1 = very unlikely, 6 = very likely). The order of 
the questionnaires was counterbalanced across participants. Upon completion, 
participants were checked for suspicion, carefully debriefed, paid and thanked.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. The manipulation check scores were averaged and 
examined using an independent-samples t-test. Participants in the high-status condition 
reported significantly greater perceived status (M = 5.87, SD = 1.50) compared to 
participants in the low-status condition (M = 4.54, SD = 1.66), t (33) = 2.60, p < .02, d 
= .84. The status-manipulation was therefore successful.  
Reaction times. Individual reaction times (RTs) that deviated more than three 
standard deviations (SDs) from an individual participants’ overall mean were removed. 
The remaining RTs were log transformed to correct for lack of normality and averaged 
to obtain a mean RT for each trial type. All analyses were based on the transformed 
means of correct responses (raw means are reported in the text/figures). Error rates did 
not differ across status conditions, p = .54. Errors and outliers accounted for 11% of the 
data (See Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2  
Mean Reaction Times and Standard Deviations (in ms) Angry, Fear, Sad, Happy and Neutral 
Faces Across Status Conditions in Study 3. 
Face type Angry Fear Sad Happy Neutral 
High status 320.34 
(109.87) 
329.01 
(137.19) 
310.7 
(126.86) 
361.59 
(133.83) 
322.89 
(118.96) 
Low status 324.66 
(148.37) 
308.01 
(147.94) 
301.42 
(139.57) 
387.35 
(143.61) 
311.72 
(136.2) 
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To examine whether status affects the processing of emotional facial 
expressions, separate interference scores were calculated for angry, fear, sad, and happy 
faces. This was done by subtracting the log transformed mean RT for each emotional 
facial expression (angry, fear, sad, happy) from the mean RT for the neutral facial 
expression (baseline value) for both positive and negative words respectively. A 
positive interference score indicates that emotional faces captured less attention than 
neutral faces, and therefore interfered less with word categorization. In contrast, a 
negative interference score indicates increased interference when an emotional face was 
present compared to baseline. For ease of interpretation, the means and SD reported 
below have been converted back to milliseconds.  
An initial inspection of the data was made using a 2 (Status: high, low) x 4 
(Face type: angry, fear, happy, sad) x 2 (Word valence: positive, negative) repeated-
measures ANOVA on transformed interference scores with status as a between subjects 
condition. This analysis yielded a main effect of face type, F(3,99)= 31.28, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .49, and a marginally significant interaction between face type and status, F(3,99) 
=2.38, p = .07, ηp2 = .07. Emotional interference differences were found both for high-
status, F(3,48)= 9.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .38 and low-status participants, F(3,51)= 24.43, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .59, thereby with a different profile. There was no main effect of word 
valence, F < 1, or a significant 3-way interaction between word valence, face type and 
status, F < 1. Therefore, the data were collapsed across word valence for all critical 
analyses (See Figure 3.2) 
To examine interference biases for the different emotional expressions, the 
transformed interference scores were compared to zero (the value of no interference) in 
separate one-sample t-test for high-status and low-status. Significant interference scores 
emerged only for happy and angry faces. Happy faces showed the strongest 
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interference of all emotional faces, for both low-status (M = -74.79, SD = 49.37), t(17)= 
-5.62, p < .001, d = -2.3 and high-status participants (M = -37.88, SD = 40.37), t(16) = -
3.61, p < .01, d = -1.81. This result is consistent with past research showing that happy 
faces are recognised faster than neutral or angry faces (Gallegos & Tranel, 2005; 
Kaufmann & Schweinberger, 2004; Shimamura, Ross, & Bennett, 2006). Of particular 
importance, there was an interference bias for angry faces only for low-status 
participants (M = -13.31, SD = 33.76), t(17) = -2.10, p = .051, d = -1.02 and not for 
high-status participants (M = 5.24 , SD = 52.97), t(16) = 1.01, p = .33. In addition, there 
was no reliable increased interference effects for sad faces for both low-status, t (17)= 
1.03, p > .3, and high-status participants, t(16) = 1.92, p > .05; there was also no 
interference for fearful faces for both low-status, t(17)= -.31, p >.7, and high-status 
participants, t(16) = .35, p > .7.  
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Figure 3.2 Mean interference score (ms) for angry, fear, sad, and happy facial expressions as f 
function of status in Study 3; error bars representing the standard error of the mean. 
 
To test whether the observed findings were due to changes in affect, self-
esteem, or rejection sensitivity, three one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the scores 
obtained in these measures. The results revealed no significant differences between the 
status conditions for the positive affect subscale, F(1,33) = 1.04, p > .3 and the negative 
affect subscale F(1,33) = .45, p > .5, the self-esteem scale, F(1,33) = .51, p > .4 and for 
rejection sensitivity questionnaire, F(1,33) = 2.70, p > .1. These results suggest that the 
observed interference effects for angry faces in the low-status condition were not due to 
differences in affect, self-esteem and rejection sensitivity.  
Overall, the results of this study provide further support for the hypothesis that 
low-status individuals have increased sensitivity towards angry faces, a signal of direct 
social threat. That is, angry faces were more likely to interfere with the deliberate 
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responses of low-status participants. High-status participants did not show this pattern 
of response1.  
In addition, happy faces showed the greatest interference level compared to 
other emotional expressions across both status categories. This finding is consistent 
with the happy-face advantage (Kirita & Endo, 1995) and the notion that the distinctive 
feature of a smile in the mouth region captures attention in a bottom-up manner, 
independently of the motivational states of the perceiver (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 
2011). Therefore, the present results were difficult to interpret. Since top-down and 
bottom-up processes were likely to interact to optimise attentional performance (see 
Egeth & Yantis, 1997), I was unable to conclusively differentiate whether the 
interference effects observed were driven primarily by top-down or bottom-up effects 
of status, or both. In the next three studies, I addressed this issue with a better control of 
the saliency of the smiles, and by pitting responses to happy and angry faces against 
each other (Studies 5 and 6).  
                                               
1 The interference scores were calculated by subtracting the response times for the 
emotional face trials (angry, fear, sad, and happy) from the neutral trials. Therefore, it 
was not possible to directly compare the interference scores between the high- and low-
status conditions as each status condition had a separate baseline (response times on the 
neutral trials).  
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3.2 Study 4 
In Study 3 angry faces (compared to baseline neutral faces) interfered with the 
performance of low-status participants on the focal task. The pattern of performance 
interference for high-status participants did not differ when presented with angry faces 
or baseline neutral faces. The faces of Study 3 were easily visible and accessible for 
processing. They did not require extensive effort on the part of the participant to detect 
them. Furthermore, even though in Study 3 angry faces disrupted on-going goal-
directed processes in the low-status condition, I was unable to determine whether the 
interference observed was due to automatic attention capture or controlled attentional 
bias towards angry faces. This occurred because the irrelevant face background 
preceded the letter string (focal task). When participants performed the focal task 
enough time had elapsed for the engagement of effortful processes. The aim of Study 4 
was to obtain stronger evidence for an effortful, motivational component of attention to 
angry faces in low-status individuals.  
Despite the broad agreement on the universality and biological basis for 
accurate encoding and identification of emotional expressions (e.g., Ekman, 1972, 
Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972), many studies have observed reliable top-down 
effects in both the identification of faces and of their emotional expressions (e.g., 
Marsh, Elfenbein, & Ambady, 2003). For example, emotions are better identified in 
ingroup compared to outgroup faces (Young & Hugenberg, 2010). This occurs in part 
because perceivers are more motivated to process ingroup relative to outgroup faces 
and this enhanced motivation translates into a superior processing style (configural) for 
ingroup relative to outgroup faces (Young & Hugenberg, 2010).  
The current study proposes that low-status increases the motivation to process 
and identify angry faces. To test this hypothesis I used a face-inversion paradigm (e.g., 
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Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003). Configural processing (i.e., processing the spatial 
relations between facial features) is presumed to contribute to efficacious face 
processing and superior face recognition accuracy (Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004). 
Inverting faces disrupts configural processing and dampens the perceivers’ ability to 
identify facial expressions (McKelvie, 1995). However, given enough motivation and 
processing capacity (e.g., encoding time) perceivers can overcome the disruption 
caused by face inversion (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009; see also Palermo & Rhodes, 
2002). In particular, should there be sufficient motivation; any additional processing 
resources will be redirected to the encoding of inverted faces thereby allowing better 
identification of these faces.  
In the present study I manipulated the orientation (upright, inverted) of the faces 
and the amount of time participants had to encode the faces. I hypothesised that status 
differentially affects the allocation of attentional resources to the processing of angry 
faces, but not to the processing of other negative emotions. I expected low-status 
participants to overcome the inversion effect for angry faces, shown by superior 
expression identification for inverted angry faces, when given enough time to process 
these faces.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Sixty participants recruited from the online subject 
pool from UCL received monetary compensation for participation. Four participants 
with an overall mean accuracy lower than 3 SD of the sample were excluded. The 
remaining 56 participants (44 females, 12 males, Mage = 21.89) were randomly assigned 
to the status and face orientation conditions. The study employed a 2 (Status: high, low) 
x 2 (Orientation: upright, inverted) x 4 (Facial expression: angry, sad, fearful, happy) x 
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2 (Time: 250ms, 500ms) mixed-model design, with repeated measures on the last two 
factors. There were no effects of participant gender, which are not discussed further. 
Materials. Twenty (10 female, 10 male) target identities were taken from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 
1998) and served as stimuli. These images were photographs of amateur actors between 
20 and 30 years of age with no beards, moustaches, earrings, eyeglasses or visible 
make-up, all wearing grey T-shirts. Each target identity displayed anger, happiness, 
sadness, and fear, for a total of four expressions per identity, or 80 target images total. 
(see Appendix V for examples). The image (including the frame) measured 6. 7cm x 8. 
6 cm and was centred on the screen. All stimuli and instructions were presented on a 
computer screen, using E-Prime software package (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 
2002) and were viewed by participants from a distance of approximately 60cm.  
Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed the entire 
experiment in individual cubicles. Participants were told that the experiment was 
designed to look at the relationship between social interactions and social perception. 
Participants were told that the experiment consisted of two phases, the first phase 
involved describing a recent social interaction they had; the second phase involved an 
emotion-identification task.  
Status manipulation. The status manipulation procedure for the high-status and 
low-status conditions was identical to Study 1.  
Expression identification task. After completing the status manipulation task, 
participants proceeded to the emotion-identification phase of the experiment. 
Participants were informed that they would be presented with faces of other people. 
Their task was to use the keyboard to identify which emotion was expressed by each 
target. Both accuracy and speed were emphasized in the instructions. The expression 
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identification task consisted of 80 trials (10 facial identities, each expressing four 
different emotions, presented onscreen one at a time). On half (40) of these trials, each 
face was presented for 250ms, and on the remaining half, the faces were presented for 
500ms.  
On each trial, a fixation cross was presented at the centre of the computer screen 
for 1000ms. Next, the stimulus face was presented. After 250 or 500 ms the face was 
replaced by a blank grey square for 1000ms. Finally, participants identified the emotion 
of the previous face, and were given reminders of the emotion-key mappings. The next 
trial began immediately after participants responded.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. Participants indication of their perceived standing on the 
ladder served as the manipulation check scores; the bottom rung was coded as “1”, and 
the top rung was coded as “10”. The manipulation check scores were subjected to an 
independent-samples t-test. Participants in the high-status condition reported 
significantly greater perceived status (M = 6.21, SD = 1.05) compared to participants in 
the low-status condition (M = 5.37, SD = 1.80), t(54) = 2.14, p < .05, d = .58. This 
indicates that the status manipulation was successful.  
Emotion identification accuracy. Participants’ percentages of correctly 
identified emotions were calculated separately for each facial expression. These scores 
were submitted to a 2 (Status: high-status, low-status) x 2 (Face orientation: upright, 
inverted) x 4 (Emotion expression: anger, happiness, sadness, fear) x 2 (Encoding 
duration: 250ms, 500ms) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with status and 
facial orientation as between-subjects factors.  
  114
This analysis revealed three significant main effects. First, a main effect of 
emotion expression, F(3,156) = 42.69, p < . 001, ηp2 = .45, showed that the happy 
emotion was the most accurately identified compared to the other emotions (Mhappy = 
97.38, Msad = 83.53, Mangry = 72.75, Mfear = 72.05). This result replicates the well-
established happy face advantage in expression identification (e.g., Kirita & Endo, 
1995). The main effect of emotion type was not moderated by status, F(3,156) = 1.48, p 
= .22. Second, there was a main effect of encoding duration, F(1,52) = 16.95, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .25, with participants more accurately identifying the facial expressions  when 
presented for 500ms (M = 80.72, SD = 15.55) compared to 250ms (M = 74.86, SD = 
16.12). Third, the analysis revealed the expected main effect of face orientation, 
F(1,52) = 33.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .39, with upright faces (M = 87.83, SD = 7.68) being 
identified more accurately than inverted faces (M = 74.16, SD = 8.73). There were 
several other lower order effects, all of which were qualified by the marginally 
significant four-way interaction between status condition, face orientation, encoding 
duration, and facial expression F(3, 156) = 2.50, p = .062, ηp2 = .05. Separate analyses 
for high- and low-status participants revealed that for high-status participants, there was 
a facial expression and orientation interaction, F(3, 81) = 3.71, p < .02, ηp2 = .45 but the 
three way interaction between facial expression, orientation and encoding duration was 
not significant, F(3, 81) = .79, p > .5. In contrast, the analyses with low-status 
participants revealed not only a facial expression and orientation interaction, F(3, 75) = 
3.92, p < .02, ηp2 = .48, but crucially also a three-way interaction between facial 
expression, orientation and encoding duration interaction, F(3, 75) = 3.61, p < .02, ηp2 = 
.13.  
My hypothesis proposed that status differentially affects the allocation of 
attentional resources to the processing of angry faces but not to the processing of other 
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negative emotions. In addition, I was interested in comparing the amount of processing 
effort allocated to each emotional expression. To test this hypothesis, separate analyses 
were conducted for each emotional expression. 
Angry faces. The 2 (Status: high-status, low-status) x 2 (Face orientation: 
upright, inverted) x 2 (Encoding duration: 250ms, 500ms) mixed-model analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with status and facial orientation as a between-subjects factor for 
angry faces revealed a significant main effect of time, F(1,52) = 9.87, p < .01, ηp2 = .16, 
in which participants were more accurate when the angry faces were presented for 
500ms (M = 77.83, SD = 22.71) than when they were presented for 250ms (M = 67.68, 
SD = 30.62). There was also a significant main effect of orientation, F(1,52) = 26.22, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .34, in which participants were more accurate for upright angry faces (M = 
84.81, SD = 14.41) compared to inverted angry faces (M = 58.84, SD = 23.40). 
Crucially, a significant three-way interaction between encoding duration, status and 
facial orientation emerged, F(1, 52) = 4.28, p < .05, ηp2 = .08 emerged. Further analyses 
were conducted for high- and low-status participants separately to gain a better 
understanding of the nature of this 3-way interaction.  
As predicted, the main effect of encoding duration, F(1,25) = 11.41, p < .01, ηp2 
= .31 and interaction between encoding duration and face orientation, F(1,25) = 11.94, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .32, was only significant for low-status participants and not for high-
status participants. At 250ms, low-status participants were significantly better at 
recognising upright angry faces (M = 88.61, SD = 13.42) than inverted angry faces (M 
= 46.50, SD = 28.45), F(1,25) = 24.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .5. However, facial orientation 
did not significantly affect recognition at 500ms, F(1,25) = 1.59, p > .22. In addition, 
the recognition accuracy of low-status participants significantly improved when 
inverted angry faces were presented for 500ms (M = 79.53, SD = 22.36) compared to 
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250ms (M = 46.5, SD = 28.45), F(1,13) = 14.28, p < .01, ηp2 = .543. Low-status 
participants did not show  significant improvement in accuracy when presentation time 
increased from 250ms to 500ms in the upright condition, F(1,13) = .01, p > .9.  
Furthermore, a comparison between high and low-status participants revealed 
that when faces were upright, status did not affect the identification of angry faces, F(1, 
28) = 1.68, p > .2. However, when the faces were inverted, and configural processing 
was difficult, a significant interaction between encoding duration and status emerged, 
F(1, 24) = 5.88, p < .05, ηp2 = .20. As expected, planned comparisons revealed that at 
250ms, there was no significant difference between high and low-status individuals. 
However, at 500ms, low-status participants (M = 79.53, SD = 22.36) were significantly 
better at identifying inverted angry faces than high-status participants (M = 58. 57, SD 
= 28.57), t(24) = -2.09, p < .05. d = -.85. This result is consistent with the notion that 
low-status participants invested more effort during the processing of angry faces. On 
the other hand, high-status participants did not show enhanced motivation to accurately 
identify angry faces. Together these results indicate a top-down advantage for low-
status individuals during the processing of angry faces.  
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Figure 3.3. Emotion recognition accuracy (%) and standard errors for angry faces as a function 
of face orientation and presentation duration for the low-status condition in Study 4; error bars 
representing the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Emotion recognition accuracy (%) and standard errors for angry faces as a function 
of face orientation and presentation duration for the high-status condition in Study 4; error bars 
representing the standard error of the mean. 
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Sad, fearful, and happy faces. A 2 (Encoding duration: 250ms, 500ms) x 2 
(Face orientation: upright, inverted) x 2 (Status: high-status, low-status) repeated 
measures ANOVA with facial orientation and status as between subjects factor 
revealed no significant interactions with status for sad, fearful, and happy faces, and 
therefore were not analysed any further.  
The current results indicate that the effects of status are specific to angry faces. 
Low-status participants, compared to high-status participants, more accurately 
recognised angry faces, even when presented in an inverted orientation. They did not 
show a generalised negativity bias. The effects of status on angry faces occurred as a 
result of differential motivation to redirect attentional resources to the processing of 
angry faces, more so than to other facial expressions.  
In addition, past studies have also shown that adults only demonstrate the 
detection advantage for angry faces when they are presented in an upright orientation; 
they are no longer quicker at detecting angry faces compared to happy faces when the 
faces are inverted (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003). The current study highlights the role of 
top-down motivation in processing of emotional faces such that the processing 
advantage for angry faces can be sustained even when the faces are inverted. 
Finally, studies 3 and 4 complement studies 1 and 2 and provide stronger 
evidence of a bias that is specific to perceptions of social threat rather than general 
negative valence in low-status participants. 
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3.3 Study 5 
Study 3 demonstrated that low-status individuals prioritised the processing of 
angry faces even when doing so interfered with a focal task. Study 4 found that low-
status individuals invested top-down effort in order to accurately identify angry faces. 
In both studies the faces were centrally presented and participants did not need to orient 
their attention to the faces. Furthermore, angry faces did not compete for attention with 
other social stimuli. In addition, it has been proposed that while tasks like the one used 
in Study 3 measures attentional resource allocation, it was also confounded by effortful 
control. For example, the increase in interference from angry faces in the low-status 
condition could be due to attentional avoidance or attentional vigilance to threat. That 
is, the longer time low-status participants took to categorise the letter strings may 
reflect either the motivation to suppress the processing of threatening background faces 
or the motivation to direct attention towards the processing of angry faces. More 
importantly, it is unclear from Studies 3 and 4, whether the threatening faces were 
processed automatically during early stages of attention deployment, or if strategic 
attentional intervention interacted with reactive processing.  
Given the power of social stimuli, in particular faces, to attract attention (Ro, 
Russell, & Lavie, 2001), and the propensity of low-status individuals to be socially 
attentive (Fiske, 1993; Guinote, 2001), it is possible that the increased sensitivity to 
angry faces of low-status individuals would no longer occur when angry faces compete 
for attention with other faces simultaneously present. In Study 5, I examined attention 
orientation to threatening faces, when threatening and non-threatening faces are 
presented simultaneously and compete for attention. An attentional bias towards angry 
faces emerged under these circumstances provides a more robust test to the hypotheses 
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that low-status individuals give priority to the processing of angry faces among other 
emotional expressions. 
The influence of emotional relevance of a social stimulus on the orientation of 
attentional resources is well established (Taylor & Fragopanagos, 2005; Vuilleumier, 
2005; Yiend, 2010). The dot-probe paradigm (MacLeod et al., 1986) is one of the most 
commonly use paradigm to investigate the relationship between attention and emotion 
on selective attentional processes. The dot-probe method was initially developed with 
the use of auditory probes by Halkiopoulos (1981) to investigate the relative allocation 
of attentional resources to threatening auditory information, when threatening and non-
threatening information was presented simultaneously to both ears in a dichotic 
listening task (see Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987; Mathews, 1990). In the 
visual version of this method used here (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1999), participants were presented with pairs of faces (happy-neutral or angry-
neutral, in counterbalanced locations), followed by a probe that replaces one of the 
faces. Selective allocation of attentional resources to the angry face would be reflected 
in faster RTs when the probe replaces the angry face (vs. the neutral face). That is, 
when the probe’s location is congruent with the angry face’s location (see Lipp & 
Derakshan, 2005). Such a pattern of response shows vigilance to angry faces. Vigilance 
occurs when perceivers are motivated to selectively orient attention to the target cues. It 
often precedes the preparation of a response that actively copes with the threat. In 
contrast, delayed responses to probes that replace an angry (vs. neutral) face at the same 
location would reflect an avoidance pattern. Avoidance occurs when perceivers are 
motivated to prevent objective evaluation of the threatening cues (Mogg, Bradley, de 
Bono, & Painter, 1997). 
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As previously noted, attention is not a unified construct. It comprises processes 
that allow capture of attention and also processes that allow holding of attention. Past 
findings that have been attributed to the capture component of attention have recently 
been called to question and the role of the hold component of attention takes 
precedence. Indeed, an increasing number of empirical studies in the attention research 
are devoted to distinguishing between stimuli that captures attention versus stimuli that 
holds attention. For example, Fox and colleagues (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 
2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002) highlighted the inadequacy of common attentional 
paradigms such as the Stroop task in disentangling between automatic attention 
orientation towards a stimuli during the pre-attentive scan, or whether once attention 
has been engaged, there is difficulty in disengaging it.  
Furthermore, according to the cognitive-motivation model by Mogg and 
Bradley (1998), a valence evaluation system controls the deployment of attention 
during the processing of threatening stimuli. This process does not consist as a unitary 
preconscious attentional orientation, but rather a system of multiple levels of processing 
ranging from early attentional deployment to strategic cognitive mechanisms that 
enables disengagement of on-going focus of attention to the switching of attention to 
goal-relevant stimuli.  
Taken together, it is possible that enhanced processing for angry faces may arise 
from biases that may occur at any of the multiple stages. To that end, the dot probe task 
used in the current study aimed to determine whether attentional biases triggered by 
status occur in the early and/or late stages of attentional processing, and whether the 
direction of these biases (i.e., vigilance or avoidance) varies across these information-
processing stages. This was examined by varying the presentation duration of the facial 
stimuli (100ms, 500ms, and 1250ms). Following an active motivational account of the 
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effects of status, I hypothesised that a low-status position would lead to vigilance to 
angry faces, shown at the longer stimulus duration, as a result of a strategic top-down 
orienting of attention.  
The current study also aimed to examine whether the difference in sensitivity 
towards angry faces induced by status are due to an increase in sensitivity in the low-
status condition, or a decrease in sensitivity in the high-status condition. To this end the 
study incorporated a control condition. Finally, Study 5 examined the contributions of 
mood, self-esteem and rejection sensitivity to the effects of status on selective attention 
to angry faces. Sensitivity to threatening faces could be the result of heightened 
rejection sensitivity (Burklund et al., 2007), low perceived self-worth (Li & Yang, 
2013) or negative affect (Ewbank et al., 2009).   
 
Method 
Participants and design. Sixty-three participants recruited from the UCL 
subject pool were paid for participation. Two participants were excluded because of an 
error with the experimental program. The analyses were based on the remaining 61 
participants (38 females, 23 males, Mage = 26.4). Participants were randomly assigned 
to a high-status (n = 20), low-status (n = 22) or control condition (n = 19). This study 
employed a 3 (Status: high, low, control) x 2 (Face type: angry, happy) x 2 
(Congruency: congruent, incongruent) x 3 (Stimulus presentation time: 100ms, 500ms, 
1250ms) mixed-model design, with repeated measures on the last three factors. There 
were no effects of participant gender, which are not discussed further. 
Materials. Thirty pictures were taken from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) set of 
emotional expressions. The pictures comprised ten individuals (5 females) each posing 
angry, happy, and neutral facial expressions with gaze directed into the camera. The 
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external features of each of the faces were removed and the internal features were 
presented in a grey rectangular frame. The image size (including the frame) measured 
6.7cm x 8.6cm and was centred on the screen. Each emotional face (angry or happy) 
was paired with a neutral face of the same gender identity. The face pair was placed on 
a white background, side-by-side, separated by 5cm. Two versions of each face-pair 
were created with the relative position switched so that each face could appear in either 
location (left or right). All stimuli and instructions were presented on a computer 
screen, and were viewed by participants from a distance of approximately 60cm. This 
task was programmed and presented using an E-Prime software package (Schneider et 
al., 2002).  
Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed the entire 
experiment in individual cubicles. The study was described as an experiment designed 
to investigate social cognitive processing and social factors that may influence this 
process. More specifically, the study ostensibly investigated the relationship between 
the different types of social interactions people have in their daily lives and social 
cognitive processes involving faces. There were three parts to this experiment. Firstly, 
participants completed the status manipulation task. Next, they completed the dot probe 
task. Finally, they were given a set of questionnaires to complete.   
Status manipulation. The status manipulation procedure for the high-status, 
low-status and control conditions was identical to Study 1.  
 Dot-probe task. After the status manipulation, participants completed the dot-
probe task. Each trial started with a fixation-cross presented in the middle of the screen 
for 1000ms. A pair of faces, with margins of 2.2cm from the centre of the screen 
appeared then for 100ms, 500ms or 1250ms at the left or right side of the screen. This 
was then followed by 3 dots that appeared on either side (left or right) of the screen. 
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Participants’ task was to identify whether the dots were horizontally or vertically 
orientated by pressing one of two response keys on the keyboard. It was emphasized 
that the face was irrelevant to the task and should be ignored. The dots remained on the 
screen for two seconds or until a response was made (Figure 3.5). Participants were 
given 12 practice trials to familiarise themselves with the procedure. This was followed 
by 240 test trials with a break in the middle. There were a total of 12 conditions, with 
20 test trials each: two emotional facial expressions (angry, happy), two probe 
position/congruency (the location of the emotional face/congruent, the location of the 
neutral face/incongruent), and three presentation times (100ms/500ms/1250ms). 
Presentation of trials was fully randomized, and type of probe (horizontally or 
vertically orientated) was counterbalanced across participants.  
 
  125
Figure 3.5. Trial sequence of dot-probe task in Study 5. Trial onset was indicated by a fixation 
cross. This is followed by the presentation of the face-pair (in this example, an angry face 
paired with a neutral face). Next, a probe replaces the location occupied by one of the faces. 
Participants then indicate using labelled keys on the keyboard whether the probe was 
horizontally or vertically orientated.  
 
Next, participants completed the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer 
& Gaschke 1988), the Contingencies of Self-Worth (CSW; Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, 
& Bouvrette, 2003), and the Adult-Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (A-RSQ; 
Downey & Feldman, 1996). The BMIS consist of 16 adjectives (α = .60), measuring 
current emotional state relative to the pleasant-unpleasant and arousal-calm dimensions. 
Participants are asked to rate how well each adjective describes their present mood 
using 4-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (definitely do not feel) to 5 (definitely feel). 
The CSW is a 35-item scale (α = .91) assessing seven contingencies on which people 
typically base their self-worth on: Appearance, Others’ Approval, Academic 
Competence, God’s Love, Competition, Virtue, and Family Support. Each domain 
subscale consists of five items, which were completed on a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
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from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Participants also completed the A-
RSQ (see Study 1) (α = .83). The order of the questionnaires was counterbalanced 
across participants. Upon completion, participants were checked for suspicion, 
carefully debriefed, paid and thanked.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. As described in Study 1, participants perceived position 
on the social ladder served as the manipulation check scores. Participants in the high-
status condition reported significantly greater perceived status position (M = 6.40, SD = 
1.82) compared to participants in the low-status condition (M = 4.32, SD = 1.32), t(40) 
= 4.27, p < .001, d = 1.35. This indicates that the status manipulation was successful.  
Reaction times. The data analysis for this task was based on RTs for correct 
responses. Individual outliers, defined as RTs that deviated more than three SD from 
the individual mean RT, were removed. Data from trials with errors and outliers were 
discarded and not analysed further. Error rates did not differ across status conditions, p 
= .460. Errors and outliers accounted for 4% of the data.  
To test the main hypothesis of a difference in selective attention allocation to 
angry facial expressions across status conditions, mean RTs were first subjected to a 2 
(Face type: angry, happy) x 2 (Congruency: congruent, incongruent) x 3 (Face 
presentation time: 100ms, 500ms, 1250ms) x 3 (Status: high, control, low) repeated 
measures ANOVA with status as the between-subjects factor. This analysis yielded a 
significant main effect of presentation time, F(2, 116) = 9. 72, p < .001, ηp2 = .14 such 
that RTs were fastest when the stimuli was presented for 100ms (M = 606. 57, SD = 
86.16), followed by 1250ms (M = 617. 38, SD = 85. 41), and finally by 500ms (M = 
623. 95, SD = 86.74). This main effect was qualified by a marginally significant four-
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way interaction between congruency, emotional face type, presentation time, and status, 
F(4, 116)= 2. 26, p = .067, ηp2 = .07. 
 Further analyses were conducted for high- and low-status and control 
participants separately to gain a better understanding of the nature of this 4-way 
interaction. High-status and control participants did not show differential allocation of 
attention across face types across the presentation durations, F(2, 38)= 2.03, p = .15 and 
F(2, 36)= .18, p = .84 respectively. In contrast, for low-status participants the expected 
three-way interaction between face type, congruency and time was significant, F(2, 42) 
= 3.36, p <. 05, ηp2 = .14.  
To establish attentional biases, RTs on congruent trials were subtracted from 
RTs on incongruent trials (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). A positive bias score reflects 
attention towards the emotional face (i.e., vigilance); a negative bias score reflects 
attention away from the emotional face (i.e., avoidance) (See Table 3.3).  
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Table 3.3 
 Mean Attentional Bias Scores and Standard Deviations (in ms) as a Function of Face Type 
and Status at 100ms, 500ms, and 1250ms Presentation Durations in Study 5 
Status Face type Presentation duration (ms) 
Attentional bias 
scores (SD) 
Low 
Angry  
100 - .910 (32.51) 
500  -8.69 (45.47) 
1250  16.99 (37.52) 
Happy 
100 -3.56 (25.88) 
500 3.60 (30.38) 
1250 -6.92 (34.28) 
Control 
Angry  
100  .68 (37.83) 
500  -11.37 (59.11) 
1250  - .15 (33.21) 
Happy 
100  10.23 (38.29) 
500  4.76 (40.59) 
1250  6.74 (43.29) 
High 
Angry  
100 12.53 (31.61) 
500 11.94 (33.05) 
1250 -1.18 (32.82) 
Happy 
100 -2.23 (20.67) 
500  4.73 (43.54) 
1250  11.49 (38.42) 
 
To investigate the time-course of attention to emotional faces, three 3(Status: 
high, low, control) x 2(Face type: angry, happy) repeated measures ANOVAs, with 
face type as the within subject factor, were performed on the attentional bias scores, for 
each face presentation time condition separately. Using one-sample t-tests, the bias 
scores across all conditions were also compared with zero (zero = no attentional bias) to 
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assess the significance and direction of an attentional bias. To further examine the 
specificity of attentional bias, paired t-test was carried out for each status condition 
separately.  
100 ms and 500ms. The 3 x 2 ANOVA on attentional bias scores revealed no 
significant main or interaction effects 
1250 ms. In this condition, the 3 x 2 ANOVA on attentional bias scores 
revealed a significant interaction between status and face type, F(2, 58) = 3.34, p <. 05, 
ηp2 = .10. (See Figure 3.6). Of interest, this interaction showed the predicted pattern of 
attentional bias for angry faces with low-status participants demonstrating positive 
attentional bias (M = 16.99, SD = 37.52), while participants in the high-status (M = -
1.18, SD = 32.82) and control conditions (M = -.15, SD = 33.21) showed negative 
attentional bias towards angry faces. In contrast, low-status showed negative attentional 
bias (M = -6.92, SD = 34.28), while participants in the high-status (M = 11.49, SD = 
38.42) and control conditions (M = 6.74, SD = 43.29) showed positive attentional bias 
towards happy faces. A positive attentional bias score suggests a vigilance pattern of 
attentional bias, whereas a negative attentional bias score suggest an avoidance pattern 
of attentional bias. In order to determine whether the vigilance and avoidance pattern 
observed was significant or not, the attentional bias scores were compared against zero 
in a one-sample t-test for each status condition respectively. Comparison of the bias 
scores against zero indicated a significant vigilance pattern for angry faces in low-
status, t(21)= 2.12, p <. 05, d = .93. No effects were found for the high-status and 
control condition. The lack of biases found for control and high status participants 
using the dot-probe task is not uncommon (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1999). Overall, the 
results indicate that low-status participants showed enhanced vigilance to angry cues, 
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and that this vigilance was not automatic but was a result of an effortful top-down 
control of attention.  
 
Figure 3.6. Mean attentional bias scores (ms) as a function of face type and status conditions at 
1250ms presentation duration in Study 5; error bars representing the standard error of the 
mean.  
Note: A positive bias score reflects attention towards the emotional face (i.e., vigilance); a 
negative bias score reflects attention away from the emotional face (i.e., avoidance).  
 
To test whether the observed findings were due to changes in mood, feelings of 
self-worth, or rejection sensitivity, ANOVAs with status as the independent measure 
were conducted on the scores of the BMIS scale, the Contingencies of Self-Worth Scale 
and the A-RS scale respectively. Results revealed no significant differences between 
the status conditions across the pleasant-unpleasant dimension (p > .2) and the arousal-
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calm dimension (p > .5) of the BMIS scale. There were also no differences on the 
contingencies of self-worth (all ps > .1). Participants across status conditions also did 
not differ in terms of rejection sensitivity (p > .6). These findings suggest that the 
effects of low-status on vigilance towards angry faces were not due to differences in 
emotional experience, feelings of self-worth and rejection sensitivity.  
To summarise, a low-status position was associated with attentional vigilance to 
angry faces, even when these faces competed for attention with other faces. This 
pattern was not observed for high-status participants or participants in the control 
condition. Furthermore, the responses of high-status and control participants did not 
differ from one another, demonstrating that the effects of status on attentional biases to 
threatening faces derive from being in a low-status position. Furthermore, consistent 
with the results of Study 4, low-status participants displayed an increasing pattern of 
vigilance towards angry faces that involved motivated, strategic processes (1250ms) 
rather than an automatic, initial shift in attention (100ms, 500ms). Past studies have 
suggested that the presentation duration of 1250ms is long enough for strategic 
processes to occur, such as allocating attention away from threat or recovering from 
interference (Schrooten & Smulders, 2010; Lonigan & Vasey, 2009). Moreover, the 
attentional biases of low-status individuals occurred for the neutral- and angry-face 
pairs and not for the neutral- and happy-face pairs. This result was particularly 
important given that in Study 3 low-status participants showed increased sensitivity to 
both angry faces and happy faces. The current result suggests that low-status 
participants prioritised the processing of angry faces, given that they showed a bias in 
the attentional processing of angry faces (vs. neutral) faces, but not in the processing of 
happy (vs. neutral) faces.  
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3.4 Study 6 
Study 6 was designed to further investigate the components of visual attention 
towards angry faces found in Study 5. Study 5 did not incorporate dual neutral face 
pairs (i.e., trials that consist of two neutral faces presented side-by-side). Therefore, it 
was not possible to compare attention to angry and happy faces to attention to neutral 
faces. This comparison is necessary to distinguish whether low-status participants had 
elevated awareness of social threat in the environment or greater difficulty in 
disengaging attention from social threat upon encountering it (Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006).  
Posner and colleagues (e.g., Posner & Peterson, 1990) have demonstrated that 
attention to a new stimulus consists of three distinct operations: (1) an initial orienting 
of attention to the stimulus (i.e., shift component); (2) focusing of attention on the 
stimulus (i.e., an engagement component); and (3) directing attention away from the 
stimulus (i.e., a disengagement component). The first two operations have been 
associated with attention capture processes, whereas the third operation has been linked 
to the ability to shift attention away from the stimulus (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 
2001). The present study separates these components of attention to better understand 
the motives triggered by a low-status position.  
A stronger engagement or attentional focus on targets displaying angry 
expressions (see Koster et al., 2006) would indicate elevated awareness of hostile social 
stimuli in the environment. This elevated awareness is akin to an activation of the threat 
detection system, which may predispose an individual to detect threat in ambiguous 
social situations (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). It would be an adaptive response 
consistent with the greater base rates of hostility that low-status individuals usually 
encounter in the environment. Given the links between status and aggression across 
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species, such attentional pattern could derive from longstanding evolutionary pressures 
(Cummins, 2005).  
Alternatively, low-status individuals may have more difficulty than other 
individuals in disengaging attention from signals of anger upon encountering them. 
Patterns of impaired ability to disengage from threat are not adaptive and are common 
in clinical cases, such as in highly anxious individuals (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, 
& De Houwer, 2004). Given the debate regarding the association between low-status 
and negative affect (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000), as well as reduced 
self-esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989), it would be possible that a low-status position 
leads to a dysfunctional pattern of attentional sensitivity to social threat. Importantly, 
the excessive dwelling on threatening stimuli that comes with disengagement 
difficulties would slow down behavioural responses necessary for necessary adaptation 
to a hostile environment. It would hinder the allocation of attention needed to initiate 
defensive action required to overcome this threat.   
Engagement and disengagement patterns of attention have been found in a 
variety of conditions (Koster et al., 2006; Maratos, 2011; Van Damme, Crombez, 
Eccleston, & Koster, 2006). To illustrate, threat related states, such as those caused by 
anxiety, pain, or phobia, vary in attentional patterns of vigilance. These variations are 
proposed to be related to different priorities and adaptive strategies that follow 
engagement and disengagement processes. For example, through studying 
hypervigilance to pain in healthy individuals, Van Damme et al (2006) found that 
attentional vigilance to pain signals emerges as a result of enhanced processing 
(engagement) once a pain signal is detected, rather than rapid initial shifting to the pain 
signal. This result suggests that the anticipation of pain plays a central role in pain 
processing, which evolved from evolutionary pressures and has a protective function. 
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On the other hand, socially anxious individuals initially orient attention toward threat 
but then quickly shift attention away to alleviate anxious mood (Mogg et al., 1997; 
Mogg, Matthews, & Weinman, 1989).  
In the context of social status, I predicted that a sense of low social regard 
triggers a motivation to detect and respond to objective social hostility potentially 
present in the environment. Low-status individuals should therefore show increased 
alertness and hypervigilance to angry faces, reflected in a greater ability to focus 
attention (i.e., in enhanced engagement) on signals of social threat. Low-status 
individuals should not show maladaptive attentional patterns, in particular an avoidant 
pattern of attention to angry faces. This hypothesis is consistent with the results of 
Studies 3, 4 and 5, indicating that low-status did not primarily associated with negative 
emotional dwelling, low self-esteem or fear of rejection.   
To identify whether the attentional strategies observed in Study 5 were driven 
by attentional engagement or disengagement processes, Study 6 employed a similar 
dot-probe task, with the addition of trials that contained two neutral faces. By including 
pairs of neutral faces I created a baseline comparison that allowed us to distinguish 
between engagement and disengagement processes. Attentional engagement to angry 
faces would be indicated by faster response times on congruent angry-neutral face trials 
(i.e., trials in which the probe followed the angry face in the same location) compared 
to dual neutral baseline trials. In contrast, difficulty in disengaging attention from angry 
faces would result in slower response times for incongruent angry trials due to the time 
needed to shift attention from the threatening to the neutral location (Koster et al., 
2004).  
Study 6 also examined the contributions of the need to belong (Leary, Kelly, 
Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2012) and general trust (Yamagishi, 1998) to the effects on 
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attention. Individuals with low social status based on race and ethnicity tend to have 
higher levels of belonging uncertainty (Walton & Cohen, 2007) and tend to be less 
trusting of others compared to higher status individuals (Gheorghiu, Vignoles, & Smith, 
2009). These factors could account for the present results. 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-five adults recruited from UCL’s 
departmental subject pool participated in this study and were compensated for their 
time. Six participants were excluded from the data analyses because of overall mean 
accuracy rates lower than 3 SD of the sample (n =5) and for suspicion of the status 
manipulation (n = 1). The analyses were based on the remaining 69 participants (51 
females, 18 males, Mage = 23.56). Participants were randomly assigned to either a high-
status (n = 24), low-status (n = 25) or control condition (n = 20). The study employed a 
3 (Status: high, low, control) x 2 (Face type: angry, happy) x 2 (Congruency: 
congruent, incongruent) x 3 (Stimulus presentation time: 100ms, 500ms, 1250ms) 
mixed-model design, with repeated measures on the last three factors. There were no 
effects of participant gender, which are not discussed further. 
Materials and procedure. The stimuli and procedure used in the current study 
were similar to that of Study 5. The only change pertains to the face pairs used in the 
experimental task. In the current study, participants were randomly presented with 
angry-neutral face pairs, happy-neutral face pairs, and neutral-neutral face pairs.  
Upon completion of the dot-probe task, participants’ completed the Need to 
Belong Scale (Leary et al., 2012), which measures individual differences in belonging 
needs (α = .81). This scale asks participants to indicate the extent to which they agree 
with 10 statements on 5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). 
Participants also completed the General Trust Scale (Yamagishi, 1998) (α = .70), which 
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consists of six items in which they are asked to indicate how much they think that 
others can be trusted on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).  
The order of the questionnaires was counterbalanced across participants. Upon 
completion, participants were checked for suspicion, carefully debriefed, paid and 
thanked.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. As described in Study 1, participants perceived position 
on the social ladder served as the manipulation check scores. Participants in the high-
status condition reported significantly greater perceived status position (M = 5.83, SD = 
1.43) compared to participants in the low-status condition (M = 4.80, SD = 1.87), t(47) 
= 2.16, p < .05, d = .63. This indicates that the status manipulation was successful.  
Reaction times. Error rates did not differ across status conditions, p > . 1 Errors 
and outliers (RTs that deviated more than three SDs from the individual mean RTs) 
were discarded from the analyses. Errors and outliers accounted for 8% of the data.  
To test the main hypothesis of a difference in selective attention allocation to 
angry facial expressions across status conditions, mean RTs were first subjected to a 2 
(Face type: angry, happy) x 2 (Congruency: congruent, incongruent) x 3 (Face 
presentation time: 100ms, 500ms, 1250ms) x 3 (Status: high, control, low) repeated 
measures ANOVA with status as the between-subjects factor. This analysis yielded a 
significant main effect of presentation time, F(2, 132) = 12.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .16 such 
that RTs were fastest when the stimuli was presented for 100ms (M = 590.93, SD = 
70.29), followed by 1250ms (M = 596.98, SD = 75.58), and finally by 500ms (M = 
612.14, SD = 75.80). This main effect was qualified by a significant four-way 
  137
interaction between congruency, emotional face type, presentation time, and status, 
F(4, 132)= 2.58, p = < .05, ηp2 = .07.  
Similarly to Study 5, attentional bias indices were calculated for each face type 
by subtracting response latencies on congruent trials from response latencies on 
incongruent trials (MacLeod & Matthews, 1988). A zero score indicates no attentional 
bias, a positive attentional bias score indicates attention towards the emotional face, and 
a negative attentional bias score indicates avoidance of the emotional face. These 
scores were subjected to a 2 (Face type: angry, happy) x 2 (Congruency: congruent, 
incongruent) x 3 (Face presentation time: 100ms, 500ms, 1250ms) x 3 (Status: high, 
control, low) repeated measures ANOVA with status as a between-subjects factor. This 
analysis yielded several main effects which were qualified by a significant three-way 
interaction between emotional face type, presentation time, and status, F(4,132) = 2.58, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .07 (see Table 3.4).  
In order to clarify the source of this interaction, three 2 (Status: high, low, 
control) x 2 (Face type: angry, happy) repeated measures ANOVAs with face type as a 
within subject factor were performed on the attentional bias scores for each face 
presentation time condition separately. Using one-sample t-tests, the bias scores across 
all conditions were also compared with zero to assess the significance and direction of 
an attentional bias.  
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Table 3.4 
 Mean Attentional Bias Scores and Standard Deviations (in ms) as a Function of Face Type 
and Status at 100ms, 500ms, and 1250ms Presentation Durations in Study 6 
Status Face type Presentation duration (ms) 
Attentional bias 
scores (SD) 
Low 
Angry  
100 2.47 (59.87) 
500 12.56 (62.42) 
1250 17.83 (34.57) 
Happy 
100 13.02 (50.29) 
500 -1.93 (45.7) 
1250 -4.15 (57.49) 
Control 
Angry  
100 40.54 (62.42) 
500 -2.24 (68.96) 
1250 -.94 (49.07) 
Happy 
100 2.9 (65.2) 
500 -2.09 (79.3) 
1250 16.87 (70.14) 
High 
Angry  
100 6.83 (44.86) 
500 4.97 (54.81) 
1250 -7.11 (40.15) 
Happy 
100 12.13 (48.67) 
500 -8.82 (45.92) 
1250 26.8 (43.42) 
 
Crucially, the current study aimed at extending the previous findings by 
identifying which components of visual attention contributed to the observed 
attentional bias of Study 5. To this end, I compared RTs on neutral face pairs with RTs 
on trials that contained an angry face. This comparison allowed us to test if vigilance 
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towards angry faces (i.e., preferentially holding attention at the hostile location) was 
due to enhanced attentional engagement or difficulty in disengagement.  
100 ms and 500ms. The 3 x 2 ANOVA on attentional bias scores revealed no 
significant main effects or interactions.  
1250 ms. The 3 x 2 ANOVA on attentional bias scores revealed the expected 
significant interaction between status and face type, F(2, 66) = 3.83, p < .05, ηp2 = .10. 
(See Figure 3.7). Replicating the results of Study 5, low-status participants had a 
positive attentional bias, indicative of an attentional vigilance pattern, (M = 17.83, SD = 
34.57). High-status (M = -7.11, SD = 40.74) and control (M = -. 94, SD = 49.07) 
participants had a negative attentional bias towards angry faces, typically associated 
with an avoidance pattern of attention. Comparison of the bias scores against zero 
indicated significant vigilance to angry faces in low-status participants, t(24)= 2.58, p < 
.05, d = 1.1. The negative attentional bias scores shown by high-status, t(23)= - .86, p > 
.4, and control, t (23)= -.09, p > 9, participants were not significant. In sum, once again 
low-status participants showed attentional vigilance towards angry faces only at 
1250ms.  
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Figure 3.7. Mean attentional bias scores (ms) as a function of face type and status conditions at 
1250ms presentation duration in Study 6; error bars representing the standard error of the 
mean.  
 
Engagement and disengagement scores. In Study 6, RTs on congruent and 
incongruent angry face trials were compared to RTs on neutral trials to determine 
whether the attentional bias scores reflect enhanced attentional engagement or a 
difficulty to disengage attention. As predicted, in the low-status condition RTs on 
congruent angry face – neutral trials (M= 566.08, SD = 71.68) were significantly faster 
than RTs on congruent dual neutral trials (M= 581.89, SD = 71.71), t(24) = 2.08, p < 
.05, d = .85.  
For high-status participants, a one-sample t-test against zero revealed a 
significant positive bias scores for happy faces at 1250ms (M= 26.8, SD = 43.42), t(23) 
= 3.02, p < .01, d = 1.26.  Furthermore, RTs on incongruent happy – neutral faces at 
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1250ms trials (M= 608.90, SD = 72.11) were significantly slower than RTs on dual 
neutral trials at 1250ms (M= 587. 4, SD = 51.28), t(23) = -2.14, p < .05, d = .89. This 
result indicates that attentional bias towards happy faces at 1250ms was due to 
difficulty in disengagement from happy faces.  
For control participants a significant positive bias scores for angry faces 
emerged at 100ms (M = 40.54, SD = 62.42), t(19) = 2.90, p < .01, d = 1.33. This 
indicates that these participants had a pre-attentive sensitivity to threat. This result is 
consistent with claims that threatening information can be processed automatically 
(Öhman et al., 2001). Furthermore, RTs on congruent angry – neutral faces at 100ms 
trials (M= 590.50, SD = 56.12) were significantly slower than RTs on dual neutral trials 
at 100ms (M= 622.20, SD = 88.52), t(19) = -2.63, p < . 02, d = -1.21.  This indicates 
that the attentional bias towards angry faces at 100ms was due to enhanced engagement 
in control participants.  
As expected, participants in the low-status condition showed significant positive 
bias scores for angry faces at 1250ms (M= 17.83, SD = 34.57), t(24) = 2.58, p < .02, d 
= 1.05.  Furthermore, RTs on congruent angry – neutral trials (M= 566.08, SD = 71.68) 
were significantly faster than RTs on dual neutral trials (M= 581.89, SD = 71.71), t(24) 
= 2.08, p < .05, d = .85. (See Figure 3.8).  This indicates that attentional bias towards 
angry faces at 1250ms was due to enhanced engagement.   
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Figure 3.8. Mean RTs (ms) and standard errors on neutral, congruent and incongruent angry 
face trials as a function of status condition at 1250ms presentation duration in Study 6; error 
bars representing the standard error of the mean. 
 
To test whether the observed findings were due to changes in need to belong or 
trust, two one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the scores of the Need to Belong 
Scale and General Trust Scale. Results revealed that status did not significantly affect 
need to belong, F(1,48) = 2.71, p > .1, and general trust, F(1,48) =.43, p > .5.  These 
results suggest that the observed enhanced strategic engagement towards angry faces in 
low-status participants was not due to differences in trust or the need to belong.  
While emotional attention is a common feature of normal human cognition 
(Vuilleumier, 2005), it has been proposed that psychological factors such as anxiety 
may increase this innate tendency to exaggerate the processing of threatening 
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information (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Yiend, 2010). The findings from Studies 5 and 6 
contribute to this body of evidence in documenting the effects of social status on the 
processing of angry emotional expression. Specifically, the psychological experience of 
losing social status appears to increase the tendency to strategically focus attention 
towards threatening social cues.  
The current findings showed that when faced with an angry expression, low-
status individuals are motivated to maintain attentional engagement towards the angry 
face, which would suggest an enhanced awareness of social threat and a greater 
preparedness to respond to the angry target. In sum, instead of a maladaptive difficulty 
in disengaging attention from angry cues, the effects observed in the current study seem 
to be driven by a causal effect of low-status that derives from a top-down strategic 
orienting of attention to angry cues. On the other hand, high-status participants oriented 
attention strategically to happy faces and had difficulty disengaging from these faces. 
This suggests that high-status individuals dwell on happy faces, presumably because of 
the increased reward value of these faces for them (see O’Doherty et al., 2003).
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3.5 Study 7  
Traditionally, research on emotion perception has often been based upon the 
assumption that emotions on an individuals’ face can be perceived as easily as words 
are perceived from a page such that inferring the meaning from a facial expression can 
simply be determined by the particular structural arrangement of facial features and 
actions (Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011). However, mounting evidence has shown 
that perception of faces and detection of facial emotions may be biased by various 
kinds of top-down influences, such as the affective state of the perceiver (Niedenthal & 
Halberstadt, 2003).  For example, people may perceive emotions in others that are 
functionally related to their own emotional states. That is, when a specific emotion (and 
its allied motivational state) is aroused, a perceiver may be especially likely to detect in 
others’ faces whatever emotions could inspire goal-consistent reactions on the part of 
the perceiver. Sometimes those functionally relevant emotions may be similar to their 
own (e.g., the arousal of some affiliative affective state may motivate perceivers to 
detect a similar affiliative emotion in others), other times, the functionally relevant 
emotion may be qualitatively different.  
It has also been suggested that the emotions we feel can determine how long we 
see similar emotions last on someone else’s face. Using a novel method, Niedenthal, 
Halberstadt, Margolin, and Innes-Ker (2000) had participants watch a short movie 
showing a person’s face expressing a specific emotion (e.g., happiness) that gradually 
changed to a second emotion (e.g., sadness). Participants in the emotion induction 
condition were asked to indicate when the initial expression dissipated. Results showed 
that emotion congruent expressions (e.g., perceiving happiness after being induced with 
happiness) were perceived to last longer than emotion incongruent expressions (e.g., 
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perceiving sadness after being induced with happiness). This suggests that specific 
emotional states can enhance the perceptual processing of similar emotions in others. 
In addition to that, Barrett et al., (2011) reviewed recent evidence demonstrating 
the role of context in affecting the perception of emotions from faces.  In particular, 
they highlighted three types of context effects namely: stimulus based context, 
perceiver based context, and cultural context. For the purposes of this discussion, I will 
focus on the stimulus-based and perceiver-based context.  
The stimulus-based context refers to the context in which a face is physically 
presented alongside other sensory input that is of informational value. In particular, 
evidence suggests that perceivers’ judgements of facial expressions can be influenced 
by descriptions of the social situation (Carroll & Russell, 1996). For example, 
descriptions of danger have been shown to increase the likelihood of a scowling face 
(posed, exaggerated display of anger) being perceived as fear (Carroll & Russell, 1996, 
Study 1). Additionally, these situational descriptions exert an even stronger influence 
when the facial expressions are ambiguous rather than exaggerated (Carroll & Russell, 
1996, Study 3).  
The perceiver-based context relates to the top-down processes within the 
perceiver’s such as motivation or dispositional orientation that can influence emotion 
perception. For example, relational concerns have been proposed to affect the amount 
effort and depth of social information processing. That is, greater processing effort is 
allocated to targets with whom we expect to develop a relationship with, as opposed to 
those with whom we do not expect to interact with (Devine, Sedikides, & Fuhrman, 
1989). The same holds true for individuals whom we are committed to, such that they 
receive greater processing effort compared to individuals whom we are not committed 
to (Beach & Tesser, 1988). Finally, it has been suggested that the cognitive system 
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favours the processing of those with whom we feel we have in common with as 
opposed to strangers. For example, past studies have shown the tendency of a bias in 
the evaluation and attributions of interaction partners or ingroup members such that 
they are viewed more positively compared to strangers (Fletcher & Fitness, 1996).  
In relation to that, interdependent individuals more accurately read others’ 
emotions relative to their more independent counterparts (Graziano, Habashi, Sheesh, 
& Tobin, 2007). Given that lower class individuals are more engaged with others and 
are more reliant on others’ emotions (Kraus & Keltner, 2009), it is plausible that low-
status individuals would be more sensitive to individuals they interact with. 
Additionally, cognitive processing tends to be reserved for targets of higher subjective 
relevance (Fiske, 2004). Therefore it is possible that low-status individuals would 
perceive interaction partners as a valuable social resource and consequently be more 
motivated to direct cognitive resources to processing facial expressions of those targets. 
Specifically, I hypothesised that low-status individuals would be more focused on 
processing the facial expressions of targets they expect to interact with compared to 
strangers they do not expect to interact with, because they are more reliant on the 
former.  
A secondary aim of the current study was to investigate how status influences 
the perception of dynamic facial affect. People have the innate ability to decode 
intense, unambiguous and overt non-verbal facial expressions (Ekman, 2003). 
However, differences across individuals arise when the expressions are subtle and 
ambiguous. In addition, although mixed emotions occur frequently in social life (e.g., 
Scherer & Ceschi, 1997), we know little about the perception of dynamic facial 
expressions (i.e., facial expressions that change from one to the other). The bulk of 
research, including the previous studies reported in this chapter, has focused 
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predominantly on the study of prototypical emotions and the perception of static 
expressions (Scherer, Clark-Polner, & Mortillaro, 2011).  
The ability to identify changes in emotion expressions is important for the 
coordination of social interactions, for the assessment of others’ attitudes, and for 
emotion regulation (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Indeed, the way a face changes over the 
course of an expression can provide as much information about emotion as does the end 
state (Wehrle & Kaiser, 2000). Therefore, the current study aimed to investigate to 
what extent status influences individuals’ ability to identify changes in emotion 
expressions, in particular, angry emotional expressions. Moreover, the design in the 
current study also aimed to account for the potential ceiling effects that may occur if 
participants are only presented with extreme prototypical static emotions, as used in the 
previous studies in the current chapter. In addition, dynamic expression increases face 
recognition, affect discrimination and affect intensity (Hill & Johnson, 2001). 
Therefore they tend to elicit stronger responses compared to static expressions. For 
example, participants were presented with video clips that showed a neutral expression 
digitally morphing into an angry or fearful expression in a neuroimaging study. 
Compared with static presentation of these emotional expressions, dynamic 
presentation of expressions resulted in greater activation in face representation regions 
such as the fusiform gyrus and in the emotional processing regions, such as the 
amygdala (LaBar, Crupain, Voyvodic, & McCarthy, 2003). 
To test the hypothesis that status influences perception of changing facial 
emotion expressions, participants watched natural faces morphed from one facial 
expression to another. I constructed brief movie clips in which the targets’ facial 
expressions morphed from unambiguous threatening to unambiguous neutral 
expression. Participants watched four of such movies and indicated when the initial 
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threat expression offset (i.e., was no longer perceptible). The movie clips were 
constructed such that, while the facial displayed changes, there was a substantial period 
in each movie where the target’s expression was ambiguous, somewhere between 
hostile and neutral. In addition, the current study also manipulated the social context in 
which the targets were presented. Specifically, two short descriptions, which described 
the participants’ encounter with the targets, were created. These short descriptions 
either entailed an interaction or no interaction between the target and the participant. As 
outlined in Chapter 1, loss of social status puts an individual in a vulnerable position. In 
addition, extending from the previous findings in this chapter, I predicted that low-
status individuals would be hypervigilant towards facial cues of anger, and that this 
hypervigilance will also lead to a biased perception of dynamic expressions of anger. 
Anger emotion offset is used in the current study as a measure of the extent status 
triggers differential top-down effects on the perception of anger cues in ambiguous 
facial expressions. Specifically, low-status individuals should take longer time to detect 
anger emotion offset on targets they expect to interact with compared to targets they do 
not expect to interact with. This differentiation between targets should not be evident in 
high-status individuals. Importantly, this bias will only be evident with targets low-
status individuals expect to interact with.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Forty-two adults recruited from the UCL online 
subject pool participated in this study and received monetary compensation for their 
time. Two participants were excluded from the data analyses because they expressed 
confusion about the instructions for the emotion change detection task. The analyses 
were based on the remaining 40 participants (23 females, 17 males, Mage = 20.75). 
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Participants were randomly assigned to either a high-status condition (n = 21), or low-
status condition (n = 19). The study employed a 2 (Status: high, low) x 2 (Context: 
interaction, no-interaction) mixed-model design, with repeated measures on the last 
factors.  There were no effects of participant gender, which are not discussed further. 
Materials. Two sets of emotional facial displays were selected from the 
Karolinska directed emotional faces (KDEF) Database (Lundqvist et al., 1998) to be 
used as visual stimuli. The first set that was used in the trial session included two 
female faces (Caucasian) and two male faces (Caucasian), all posing neutral 
expressions. For the experimental phase, a second set of stimuli was selected that 
contained faces displaying anger and neutral from four female faces (Caucasian) and 
four male faces (Caucasian).  
Facial stimuli were digitally morphed using Morpheus Photo Morpher to create 
200-frame movies. For the trial session, a movie was prepared in which a face morphed 
from female to male, and vice versa. For the experimental phase, the movies showed a 
face initially expressing anger that gradually morphed into the same face identity with a 
neutral expression. The morphing movies obtained were 13.3 seconds in duration at 15 
frames per second, and were displayed at a size of 800 x 560 pixels. The resulting clip 
showed a natural looking, dynamically moving face. The presentation order of the eight 
morphing movies was fully randomised.  
Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed the entire 
experiment in individual cubicles. The study was described as an experiment designed 
to investigate social perception of emotion change and social factors that may influence 
this process. More specifically, the study ostensibly investigated the relationship 
between the different types of social interactions people have in their daily lives and 
perception of dynamic emotional expressions.  
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Status manipulation. The status manipulation procedure for the high-status and 
low-status conditions was identical to Study 1.  
Emotion change detection task. Before the critical emotion change task, 
participants viewed a practice trial in which a female face morphed into a male face. 
Participants viewed each movie twice. The first time, participants saw the whole 
morphing movie in order to become familiarised with the full range of facial 
movements. The second time, participants were instructed to press the space key on the 
keyboard to indicate the moment at which they no longer saw traces of the original 
gender.  
After the task familiarisation (practice) phase, participants viewed a second 
series of morphing movies, this time showing faces morphing from angry facial 
expression to a neutral facial expression. Prior to each trial, participants were provided 
with a brief description of the social context in which the participant would encounter 
the target. Two different social contexts were created, namely the Interaction and No-
interaction condition. In both conditions, the participant was asked to imagine queuing 
up at a coffee shop. Crucially, in the interaction condition participants were told that 
they saw a fellow course mate (the target), and they intended to interact with them. In 
the no-interaction condition, participants were told that they saw a stranger (the target) 
passing by and there was no interaction between them  Participants were allowed to 
read these social context descriptions at their own pace and were instructed to press the 
spacebar to begin the movie presentation. Participants were instructed to press the 
spacebar to indicate the moment at which they no longer saw traces of the original 
emotion expression. The frame number at which the morphing movie was stopped was 
recorded. Upon completion, participants were checked for suspicion, carefully 
debriefed, paid and thanked. 
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Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. As described in Study 1, participants’ perceived position 
on the social ladder served as the manipulation check scores. The manipulation check 
scores were subjected to an independent samples t-test. Participants in the high-status 
condition reported significantly greater perceived status (M = 6.86, SD = 1.01) 
compared to participants in the low-status condition (M = 5.53, SD = 1.58), t(38) = 
3.21, p < .01, d = 1.04. This indicates that the status manipulation was successful.  
Number of frames elapsed. To test the hypothesis that low-status participants 
would take longer to perceive angry emotion offset on targets they expected to interact 
with compared to targets they do no expect interaction with, the mean number of 
frames that elapsed before participants stopped the video (no longer perceived the 
hostile emotion) was subjected to a 2 (Context: interaction, no-interaction) x 2 (Status: 
high, low) repeated measures ANOVA with status as the between-subjects factor. 
There was no main effect of status (p = .47), and context (p = .14). This analysis 
yielded the predicted significant two-way interaction between context and status, 
F(1,38)= 5.46, p < .05, ηp2 = .126. (See Figure 3.9). Separate analyses found that high-
status participants did not differentially perceive anger cues across both interaction and 
no-interaction context, F(1, 20)= .357, p = .557. In contrast, low-status participants 
showed the expected main effect of context, F(1,18)= 7.05, p < .02, ηp2 = .281 such that 
they perceived anger cues on the ambiguous faces for significantly longer period when 
they expected to interact with the target faces (M = 183.92, SD = 61.84) compared to 
when they did not expect to interact with the target faces (M = 150.32, SD = 61.23).  
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Figure 3.9. Mean frame of angry facial expression offset in the interaction and no-interaction 
context as a function of status condition in Study 6; error bars representing the standard error 
of the mean. 
 
In the current study, low-status participants tended to perceive anger cues for a 
longer time on targets they expected to interact with compared to targets they did not 
expect to interact with. This pattern was not evident in high-status participants. From a 
motivational perspective, the longer time taken to detect anger offset observed in low-
status participants may reflect greater motivation to fixate and focus attention on anger 
cues thereby leading to the perception of anger despite ambiguous nature of the facial 
expression as it was morphing from angry expression to neutral expression. 
The current study differed from Studies 3,4, 5 and 6 in the current chapter such 
that it looked at perception of ambiguous emotional facial expressions rather than 
prototypical static emotions. The use of these ambigious stimuli in the current study 
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provides us with a more complete understanding of the how status influences 
perception of emotion from faces. Specifically, given the nature of the morphing 
videos, all participants typically responded somewhere during the middle section of the 
video during which the facial expression is neither angry nor neutral. Therefore, most 
judgements were made while the facial expressions were ambigious. Past research 
proposed that some individuals perceive ambiguous stimuli as threatening and this 
biased perception triggers a withdrawal response (e.g., avoiding unfamiliar others in a 
social setting). Other individuals, however, deal with ambiguous stimuli with a sense of 
curiosity and this triggers an approach response (e.g., taking the initiative in making 
new acquaintances). In addition, it has been proposed that biases in interpretation of 
others’ facial expressions may lead to a biased mental representation of the individual 
(perceiver) themselves (Coles, Heimberg, & Schofield, 2008). Therefore, to the extent 
that low-status individuals are biased towards interpret ambiguous facial expressions as 
threatening, or to selectively focus on threat-related features within facial expression, 
their mental representation of themselves may also be negatively biased.  
In addition, past research has proposed that faces that are of low subjective and 
functional relevance may simply be disregarded (e.g., Maner et al., 2003; Rodin, 1987; 
Wright & Sladden, 2003). The current findings revealed that high-status individuals did 
not differ in their perception of anger emotion offset according to whether or not they 
expected an interaction with the target or not. This suggests two possibilities. First, it is 
possible that high-status individuals do not value the potential functionality of others as 
much as low-status individuals because they are in control of their social outcomes and 
are less reliant on others compared to low-status individuals. Second, it is also possible 
that the anger emotion is deemed less relevant to high-status individuals because they 
are better able to cope with potential threats compared to low-status individuals.  On 
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the other hand, interaction partners may be deemed more functionally relevant for low-
status individuals. Therefore the perception of emotion offset in those targets was 
modulated by top-down motives such that low-status individuals are especially 
sensitive to anger cues (perceived anger cues on ambiguous faces for longer) when they 
are expecting an interaction with the target.  
Another important contribution of the current study to the previous 4 studies in 
this chapter is that it demonstrates an additional processing bias in low-status 
individuals. This suggests that low-status participants are not only selectively vigilant 
to angry faces (Studies 5 and 6), but there is also a potential interpretation bias of anger 
cues as low-status participants perceive the anger-cues as persisting for longer in 
ambiguous faces in interaction partners compared to targets they do not expect to 
interact with. Similar pattern of findings have been obtained in the social anxiety 
literature. For example, individuals with social anxiety have a tendency of perceiving 
others’ facial expressions as more negative than do low-anxious individuals (Winton, 
Clark, Edelmann, 1995). It has been proposed that highly-anxious individuals are not 
characterised by their inability to perceive emotions from faces, instead the 
maintenance of their anxiety may be due to biases in their perception of the meaning 
(the intensity of negative valence) of such faces (Coles et al., 2008). Similarly, while I 
obtained evidence for motivated processing (Studies 3 and 4) and selective attention to 
angry facial expressions (Studies 5 and 6) in low-status participants, based on the 
results in the current study it is possible that low-status individuals are also 
characterised by biases in their perception of social threat from ambiguous faces.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the some studies on dynamic expressions 
generally use video clips that morph from a neutral expression to an emotional 
expression (e.g., Biele & Grabowska, 2006; Sato & Yoshikawa, 2004). Additionally, it 
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has also been found that angry faces that returned to a neutral blank state appeared 
somewhat amused, whereas happy faces that returned to a blank state appeared 
annoyed (Marian & Shumamura, 2013). Furthermore, some studies have suggested that 
videos displaying a target changing from one emotional face to another are better than 
one that changed from an emotional face to a neutral face because of the potential bias 
towards judging neutral faces as negative (Arce et al., 2009). However, I chose the 
current design in which an emotional face morphed into a neutral face, as it was best 
suited for the purposes of my research aims. To reiterate, the current study aimed to 
examine if the strategic vigilance demonstrated by low status participants toward angry 
cues (Studies 5 and 6) would lead to a bias in which anger cues are perceived to still be 
present even when it is no longer there.  
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3.6 Summary and Conclusions  
The studies in the current chapter tested several hypotheses. Firstly, I 
hypothesised that angry faces would cause greater interference during focal task 
performance for low-status individuals. I did not expect high-status individuals to 
demonstrate this pattern of response. Low-status individuals should also allocate more 
attentional resources towards the processing of angry faces. Low-status individuals 
should also more readily orient their attention towards threatening faces present in the 
environment (i.e. they should be more vigilant to expressions of anger) compared to 
individuals who are not in a low-status position. I expected these effects to occur for 
angry faces and not for other negative expressions, such as fear and sadness. I also 
inspected whether status affects attention to positive facial expressions.  Additionally, I 
inspected whether increased vigilance towards angry faces depended on automatic or 
voluntary control of attention, and whether it involved engagement with threatening 
cues or difficulty in disengaging from threatening cues. Finally, low-status individuals 
should take longer to detect the offset of angry emotion in targets they expect to 
interact with.  
Five studies supported my hypotheses. Together, the results of these studies 
provide a complete and coherent understanding of the ways status affects the early-
stage processing of threatening facial expressions. In Study 3, low-status participants 
suffered greater interference on the performance of the focal task (categorising words) 
when an irrelevant angry face background was presented, compared to a neutral face 
background. High-status participants did not show this selective interference effect. An 
enhanced processing was not observed for other negative expressions such as 
expressions of sadness and fear. In Study 4 the perceivers’ status affected the 
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identification accuracy of angry faces. When identification was difficult (i.e., when the 
faces were inverted) and enough encoding time was provided, low-status perceivers 
more accurately identified angry faces compared to high-status perceivers. I reasoned 
that this was possible because low-status perceivers were motivated to allocate more 
attentional resources to the identification of inverted angry faces. High-status 
participants did not show this pattern of enhanced motivation to process angry faces. 
Once more, greater effort was found for the processing of angry faces but not for the 
processing of sad or fearful faces. Study 5 used an attentional cuing task and found 
greater attentional bias towards angry faces for low status participants. High-status 
participants did not demonstrate attentional bias towards angry faces. Enhanced 
vigilance was found when the faces were presented for 1250ms, and not when they 
were presented for 100 or 500ms. Study 6 replicated the findings of Study 5 with 
greater vigilance to angry faces in the low-status condition for 1250ms, but not for 
shorter durations. This finding suggests that status affects later-stage, strategic focus of 
attention towards angry faces rather than automatic attention orienting to angry faces. 
Finally, using a dynamic emotion detection task in which an angry facial expression 
morphed into a neutral expression, Study 7 demonstrated that low-status participants 
are biased to perceived hostile cues on ambiguous faces when they expect to interact 
with that target. Thus, low-status individuals do not seem to have acquired an automatic 
expectation of social threat in the environment; instead the results suggest that they are 
vigilant to cues of social hostility, once these cues have appeared in their environment 
and sufficient time is provided to strategically orient attention to them. These findings 
demonstrate increased readiness to mobilise attention and effort in the presence of 
angry expressions. Additionally, this effect is further pronounced when the target is an 
interaction partner.  
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The absence of effects for sad and fearful faces denotes that low-status 
individuals did not have generalised sensitivity to negative social information. 
Furthermore, given that fearful faces signal potential threat in the environment and 
have been often used as threatening stimuli across a wide range of studies (e.g. , 
Fitzgerald et al., 2006; Marsh, Adams, & Kleck, 2005), the present findings suggest 
that a low-status position defined in terms of social respect and prestige is not 
associated with sensitivity to threat in general but only to aggressive cues. However, 
because fearful faces only indirectly suggest threat in the environment this result needs 
to be considered with caution. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
Across these studies I examined whether status affects attentional strategies 
towards positive facial expressions (happy faces). Low-status participants showed 
interference from happy faces in Study 3, however this result was not sustained across 
the remaining studies. Furthermore, a relative processing advantage for angry faces was 
systematically found when happy faces were pitted against angry faces (Studies 5 and 
6). On the other hand, high-status individuals showed an increased sensitivity towards 
happy faces in Studies 3 and 6. In Study 6, high-status individuals had difficulty in 
disengaging attention from happy faces, which could derive from an amplified 
sensitivity to the rewarding properties of smiling, happy faces (O’Doherty et al., 2003) 
Emotional expressions can elicit either a similar or complementary emotional 
response in perceivers (Marsh, Ambady et al., 2005). For example, when confronted 
with an angry expression, people may have a greater desire to escape rather than 
respond with anger (Blairy, Herrera, & Hess, 1999). Study 6 showed that low-status 
participants focused attention on threatening faces rather than directed attention away 
from threatening faces. That is, low-status individuals engaged with threatening faces 
instead of avoiding them (see Lonigan & Vasey, 2009). Facilitated attentional focus to 
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threatening stimuli reflects elevated awareness of threat in the environment (Koster et 
al., 2006). Therefore, the current findings show that when faced with an angry 
expression, low-status individuals have an enhanced awareness of impending social 
aggression, and are motivated to maintain an attentional engagement towards the angry 
target, and a greater preparedness to respond to it.  
The influence of several factors that could potentially be related to enhanced 
sensitivity to threatening faces was examined. Individuals have a core need to be valued 
by others, and a challenge to this need can have far reaching consequences (Sedikides, 
Skowronski, & Dunbar, 2006). Social status challenges the need to be valued (Fiske, 
2009). It is therefore possible that status may have broader effects on the ways 
individuals construe the self and their social relations. The attentional biases of low-
status individuals found here could be derived from negative affect, low self-esteem, 
feelings of exclusion, lack of trust or rejection sensitivity. However, in the current 
context these factors did not play a role in low-status individuals’ heightened sensitivity 
to social threat. Low-status individuals did not engage in self-handicapping strategies 
that magnify threat and prevented them from adaptive responses to social threat. I 
interpreted the present results as indicative that status has direct effects on attention to 
social hostility, and that these effects are driven by prior experience and may be an 
attempt to respond to and to negotiate the challenges they face from their hostile social 
environment.   
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Chapter 4 Perception of Subtle Threat from 
Untrustworthy Facial Expression 
 
The current chapter was interested in whether the heightened sensitivity towards 
overt signals of threat from angry faces demonstrated by low-status individuals would 
persist when the threat cues are presented subtly on a universally positive facial 
expression: a smiling expression. Duchenne and non-Duchenne smiles were used as the 
facial stimuli in this study as non-Duchenne smiles are indicative of untrustworthy 
affiliation intent, whereas Duchenne smiles have been proposed to reflect genuine felt 
happiness. Targets displaying non-Duchenne smiles may be perceived as relatively 
more threatening compared to targets displaying Duchenne smiles. I aimed to 
complement findings from the previous chapters by providing novel empirical evidence 
on how status influences processing of facial expressions indicative of subtle threat. I 
also aimed to examine the subsequent effects of attentional vigilance to social threat 
cues in faces on the social evaluation judgements of these faces. Additionally, building 
specifically from Study 7, which highlighted the role of social interaction, I aimed to 
further investigate how the expectation of social interaction influences threat vigilance 
in low-status individuals.  
To address these research questions, Studies 8 and 9 compared responses to 
Duchenne and non-Duchenne smiles. Specifically, these studies were interested in how 
status influences the implicit and explicit ability to discriminate untrustworthy and 
unreliable indicators of affiliation signals from non-Duchenne smiles compared to 
Duchenne smiles. Duchenne smiles are also known as genuine smiles and it is typically 
understood as a automatic reflection of concurrent positive affect. On the other hand, 
non-Duchenne smiles are also known as fake smiles and are generally believed to be 
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under much more volitional control compared to Duchenne smiles (Gunnery, Hall, & 
Ruben, 2013). For the remainder of this section, I will give a detailed account on how 
these two variants of smiles differ. Then, I will outline the relevance of the distinction 
between these two types of smiles in the context of social interactions.  
4.1 Duchenne and non-Duchenne smiles  
It is generally accepted that smiling serves as a prominent communicative signal 
in regulating social exchanges (Soussignan, 2002). However, the view that smiling 
reflects inner positive emotion remains controversial. While some studies report that 
activity of zygomaticus major is correlated with the perception of a variety of pleasant 
stimuli (Cacciopo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986), other studies show that positive 
emotions (e.g., pleasure, happiness) is not a necessary prerequisite for smiles 
(Fernandex-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1997; Fridlund, 1994). In line with that, smiling has 
been shown to occur in social contexts that lack in positive feelings (e.g., 
submissiveness, embarrassment), and may also reflect underlying negative emotion 
during deceitful interactions (Keltner, 1995; Lafrance & Hecht, 1999).  
As outlined in Chapter 1, (Krumhuber et al., 2007), there are two variants of 
human smiles: Duchenne (genuine) smiles, and non-Duchenne (fake) smiles (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1982). According to Duchenne (Duchenne, 1862/1990), the two variants of 
smiles can be distinguished by considering two facial muscles. The first muscle is the 
zygomaticus major which pulls the lip corners obliquely. The second muscle is the 
orbicularis oculi, which is responsible for pulling the skin from the cheeks and forward 
toward the eyeball. Of interest, unlike the zygomaticus major, which can be controlled 
voluntarily, the orbicularis oculi can only be automatically activated by “true feelings”.  
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The ability to discriminate between the two variants of smiles should be 
especially important to low-status individuals, as they will be able to identify targets 
that are likely to harbour dishonest intentions. In the next subsection, I will discuss the 
relevance and functionality of considering the distinction between these two smile 
variants in the context of social interactions and how it contributes to the my 
overarching research question. 
4.2 The role of social interactions  
Successful social interactions are a highly dynamic process that requires 
constant interpersonal adjustments based on our understanding of those whom we are 
interacting with. In other words, the ability to accurately infer nonverbal emotional 
information from facial expressions plays a crucial role to the development of adaptive 
and functional interpersonal skills. This is because emotions expressed on others faces 
can act as rich sources of information, indicating, for example, whether they intend to 
harm us, hide from us, or befriend us (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). This is especially 
important in times of high uncertainty as the rapid discrimination between friend and 
foe would ensure the appropriate response to cope with potential threats.  
An underlying theme in the interpretation of the current results was in the 
context of social interactions. However, notwithstanding Study 7, which manipulated 
the relationship between the participant the target (interaction partner, no-interaction 
stranger), Studies 1 to 6 relied on participants’ RT across different tasks that involved 
presentation of a static facial expression in determining enhanced processing or 
attentional resources towards social threat. Therefore, in the next study, in order to 
create a social interaction context, participants were asked to specifically imagine the 
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target that they will be presented with as a partner whom they will work alongside with 
on a project.  
Finally, while Studies 8 and 9 aimed to complement the findings from the 
previous studies, these two studies differs from the other studies in the current research 
such that anger faces will not be used. Instead, dynamic smiling facial expressions will 
be used, as it is one of the most universally used nonverbal signals used in the 
interactions between humans (Kraut, & Johnston, 1979). Furthermore, the notion that 
anger expressions are generally disapproved and hence suppressed in Western culture 
(Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005; Lee & Wanger, 2002). Importantly, anger is 
also frequently deemed as a socially proscribed emotion that signals low affiliative 
intent (Hess & Bourgeois, 2010)  
To sum up, the current chapter presents two studies aimed at investigating the 
notion that low-status individuals are faced with high uncertainty in their social 
environment, therefore they are motivated to make rapid identification of facial cues 
that are indicative of unreliable and untrustworthy affiliation intent. It was hypothesised 
that low-status individuals are more sensitive to subtle facial cues indicative of threat, 
including those that differentiate Duchenne from non-Duchenne smiles. Hence, they 
would be better than high-status individuals at discriminating between genuine and fake 
smiles. This hypothesis was tested in two studies. Studies 8 and 9 examined 
participants’ implicit and explicit ability, respectively, to discriminate subtle social 
threat cues present in non-Duchenne smiles (untrustworthy indicators of affiliation) as 
opposed to genuine affiliation cues present in Duchenne smiles respectively. 
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4.3 Study 8 
One of the frequently asked questions on the interconnections between 
emotional and attentional processing is how and which emotional stimuli are selected 
for prioritised processing given the limited capacity system. Evidence from 
neuroscience research suggests that this selective process occurs at two-stages. First, 
emotional significance of a particular stimulus is evaluated preattentively by a 
subcortical circuit involving the amygdala. Second, stimuli that are deemed emotionally 
and motivationally significant are given priority in the allocation of attentional 
resources. The second stage mainly involved top-down influences from the frontal lobe 
regions involved in goal setting (Compton, 2003).  
Assuming that goal setting typically drives top-down influences, the secondary 
goal of the current study was to investigate how low-status individuals negotiate the 
goal between creating promising relationships and the goal of protecting themselves 
from social threat that may result in further social devaluation. Indeed, it would be a 
costly error for low-status individuals to direct their scarce resources towards 
individuals faking affiliative displays as this pose a high risk for further social 
devaluation. At the same time, it would also be highly valuable for low-status 
individuals to accurately identify targets who have genuine intentions as these targets 
may provide valuable social resources.  
The responses of low-status individuals to social discrimination and hostility 
can be diverse, and seem to depend on context (see Fiske et al., 2002). Previous 
findings indicated that low-status individuals can respond in hostile ways (Kubzansky, 
Kawachi, & Sparrow, 1999). For example, mothers from low SES backgrounds tend to 
report more hostile emotions and a greater likelihood of suppressing their non-hostile 
  165
emotions in response to hypothetical stories of their child’s anger (Martini, Root, & 
Jenkins, 2004).  
It is possible that hostile reactivity in low-status individuals is potentiated by an 
enhanced awareness of social threat in the environment as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter. This pattern could lead to an escalation of negativity in intergroup relations 
such that low-status individuals respond to anger with hostility, which could further 
decrease their social status, creating a self-perpetuating vicious cycle of negative social 
relations. However, recent evidence suggests that an alternative strategy to cope with a 
threatening social environment is to engage in affiliative behaviours that builds 
cooperative social support system to overcome challenges (Taylor et al., 2000).  
A full understanding of the reactions of low-status individuals requires the 
consideration of the social context (Fiske et al., 2002). Study 7 from the previous 
chapter provided preliminary indication of the importance of the target’s relation, 
specifically whether the target is simply a stranger or someone whom the individual 
expects to interact with. This findings merits further investigation on how status 
influences social evaluative judgements in a potential social scenario that involves an 
interaction between the perceiver and the target.  
Finally, a recent study by Babbit and Sommers (2011) highlighted the 
importance of framing for interracial interactions. The researchers noted that past 
studies investigating interracial interactions often found negative outcomes. However, 
these studies have typically focused on social contexts. In their study, interaction 
context was manipulated such that Black and White participants worked together with 
instructions that shifted the context to be either focused on social objectives or task 
objectives. They found that Black participants reported less vigilance towards 
perceiving prejudice in an imagined interracial interaction with a task focus instead of a 
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social focus. This study further emphasises the importance of specifying the nature of 
the experimental task. Specifically, it is possible that the attentional tasks used in 
Chapter 3 inadvertently created a task focus context. Therefore, Study 8 explicitly 
created a social focus context by instructing participants to imagine the targets they are 
presented with as potential project partners.  
 
Methods 
Participants and design. Fifty-three Psychology undergraduate students from 
UCL (29 females, Mage = 21.1 years) were recruited through opportunity sampling 
method. Participants were randomly assigned to either a high-status condition (n = 24), 
or low-status condition (n = 29). The study employed a 2 (Status: high, low) x 2 (Smile: 
Duchenne, non-Duchenne) mixed-model design with repeated measures on the last 
factor.  There were no effects of participant gender, which are not discussed further.  
Materials. The status manipulation task involved an article that had ostensibly 
been written by the UCL Monthly newsletter. The article consisted of a passage 
followed by a ranking table. All participants read that UCL recently published a 
departmental ranking table that was based on professional success (professional 
position, annual income, and social prestige) attained by graduates from different 
departments. Participants in the high-status [low-status] conditions read that the 
Psychology department had been ranked #2 [#8] out of nine departments (e.g. 
Economics, Law, Engineering) (see Appendix VI). 
To ensure effectiveness of status manipulation, participants were asked to 
respond to the following questions, all of which began with “Based on the UCL 
Monthly report, to what extent do you think that Psychology students from UCL” (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much): (1) will have prestigious professional positions in the future 
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compared to students from the other departments at UCL? (2) will have high social 
recognition in the future compared to students from the other departments at UCL? (3) 
will attain financial success in the future compared to students from the other 
departments at UCL? All three questions were averaged to assess perceived status (a 
= .886). 
The facial stimuli used were video clips extracted from the BBC Science 
website (http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/humanbody/mind/surveys/smiles). Participants 
were presented with a total of 20 videos, 10 Duchenne smiles video and 10 non-
Duchenne smiles videos (each lasting approximately 4seconds) one at a time. The 
videos depicted an individual shifting from an initially neutral facial expression to a 
smiling facial expression that then returns to a neutral facial expression (Bernstein, 
Sacco, Brown, Young, & Claypool, 2010; Bernstein, Young, Brown, Sacco, & 
Claypool, 2008). Presentation order was counterbalanced such that participants were 
presented with one of two possible stimuli orders.  
Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed the entire 
experiment in individual cubicles. Participants were told that the current experiment 
was ostensibly designed to investigate the factors underlying the varying success that 
differed according to the departments UCL students graduated from. Participants were 
asked to carefully read the status manipulation article so as to get a better understanding 
of the background of the current experiment. Once participants completed the 
manipulation check questions, they were told that they would watch a series of videos 
of individuals. Participants were asked to imagine that the person in each video as a 
potential partner for a project they will be working on. Participants’ task was to indicate 
on a 7 point Likert-scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) how much they would like to 
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work with each person for all 20 videos. Upon completion, participants were probed for 
suspicion, thanked and thoroughly debriefed.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. The manipulation check scores were subjected to an 
independent-samples t-test. Participants in the high-status condition reported 
significantly greater perceived status (M = 7.15, SD = 1.12) compared to participants in 
the low-status condition (M = 5.35, SD = 1.27), t (51) = 5.45, p < .001, d = 1.53. This 
indicates that manipulation of status was successful. 
Preference scores. The current study aimed to investigate whether status 
influenced the desire to work with targets exhibiting Duchenne and non-Duchenne 
smiles. Two separate preference scores for targets with true smiles and those with fake 
smiles (averaged across each smile type) were computed for each participant. These 
averaged scores were subjected to a 2 (Status: high status, low status) x 2 (Smile: 
Duchenne, non-Duchenne) mixed-modal ANOVA with status as the between-subjects 
factor. 
There was no main effect of status (p = .133), and smile type (p = .262). As 
predicted, there was a significant interaction between status and smile type, F(1,51) = 
4.99, p < .05, ηp2 = .09. (See Figure 4.1). Participants in the low status condition 
showed significantly less desire to work with targets exhibiting non-Duchenne smiles 
(M = 4.176 , SD = .691) versus Duchenne smiles (M = 4.47, SD = .75), t(28) = 2.32, p 
< .05, d = -.413. High status participants, however, showed no significant difference in 
their preference to work with targets exhibiting non-Duchenne smiles (M = 4.69, SD 
=.79) versus Duchenne smiles (M = 4.59 , SD =1.01).  
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Figure 4.1. Preference score on desire to work with targets exhibiting real and fake smiles as a 
function of status condition; error bars representing the standard error of the mean. 
 
Non-Duchenne (fake) smiles primarily function to mask some unknown intent 
by feigning positive affect. Therefore, individuals displaying non-Duchenne smiles 
may be perceived as threatening as they exhibit signals of unreliable and untrustworthy 
affiliation intent. Based on the previous findings in the current research that low-status 
individuals are highly sensitive towards signals of social threat, I predicted that they 
should show greater desire to avoid targets displaying non-Duchenne smiles. The 
current findings supported this hypothesis as it demonstrated that low-status 
participants have a lesser desire to work with targets displaying fake smiles, compared 
to high-status participants. Crucially, participants’ attention was not drawn to the fact 
that the smiles varied in its veracity. Therefore, the results show that low-status 
participants spontaneously and implicitly made judgements disfavouring non-Duchenne 
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smile targets. In other words, non-Duchenne targets elicit an avoidance motivation in 
low-status individuals.  
In this study, participants were asked to imagine the target as a potential partner 
on a project. This was intended to create a context that was social in nature. As Babbit 
and Sommers (2011) demonstrated the significant role of context in interracial 
interaction, such that interracial interaction differs as a function of whether the 
interaction took place in the social context or a task context. The purpose of the next 
study is twofold. Firstly, Study 9 aimed to examine whether the observed avoidance of 
non-Duchenne smiles target by low-status individuals was driven by an explicit ability 
to discriminate between the two variants of smiles. Secondly, it also aimed to 
investigate this explicit ability in a task focus context.  
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4.4 Study 9 
Past studies have shown that some evidence that Duchenne smiles can reliably 
be distinguished from non-Duchenne smiles. For example, targets displaying Duchenne 
smiles tend to be rated more positively across various social dimensions such as 
extraversion, likeability, and trustworthiness (Frank. Ekman, & Friesen, 1993; 
Johnston, Miles & Macrae, 2010).  Extending from that, the current study aimed to 
investigate whether status influences explicit ability to distinguish between the two 
variants of smiles. More specifically, it hypothesised that low-status individuals would 
be more sensitive to subtle differences between Duchenne and non-Duchenne smiles. 
This would be reflected in their increased ability to explicitly discriminate between the 
two smile types.  
 
Methods 
Participants and design. Forty-seven Psychology undergraduate students from 
UCL (females = 38, males = 9, Mage = 21.51) were recruited through opportunity 
sampling method. Participants were randomly assigned to either a high-status (n = 15),  
low-status (n = 17) or control (n = 15)  condition. The study employed 3 (Status: high 
status, low status, control) x 2 (Smile: Duchenne, non-Duchenne) mixed-model design 
with repeated measures on the last factor. There were no effects of target or participant 
gender, which are not discussed further. 
Materials and Procedure.  The stimuli and procedure used in the current study 
were similar to that of Study 8. However, instead of indicating preference to work with 
the targets, participants’ task was to indicate, on a response sheet in front of the 
  172
computer, whether the smile was “genuine” or “fake”. Upon completion, participants 
were probed for suspicion, thanked and thoroughly debriefed.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. The manipulation check scores were subjected to an 
independent-samples t-test. Participants in the high-status condition reported 
significantly greater perceived status (M = 7.14, SD = 1.00) compared to participants in 
the low-status condition (M = 4.80, SD = 1.91), t(51) = 5.45, p < .001, d = 1.53. This 
indicates that manipulation of status was successful. 
Discrimination scores. The current study aimed to investigate whether status 
influences the explicit ability to discriminate between Duchenne and non-Duchenne 
smiles. A signal detection measure, d’ (Green & Swets, 1966) was calculated to 
examine this discrimination ability. This measure takes into account both hits (correctly 
identifying a non-Duchenne smile as fake), and false alarms (incorrectly identifying a 
Duchenne smile as fake) in the calculation.  
The resulting d’ scores were subjected to a one-way ANOVA with status as the 
between-subject factor. There was no main effect of status, F (2,44) = .633, p  = .536. 
Low-status participants and high-status participants did not differ significantly in terms 
of their explicit ability to discriminate between true and fake smiles. 
The current findings revealed that low-status participants did not have the 
enhanced explicit ability to determine whether the target’s smiling facial expression 
was genuine (reliable indicator of affiliative opportunity) or fake (untrustworthy display 
of positive affect and affiliative intent). The current findings suggest that loss of social 
status did not increase participants’ ability to explicitly identify subtle signals of social 
threat. However, given the previous findings in the current research which showed 
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processing and attentional bias towards social threat cues, it remains possible that low-
status individuals are simply not aware of this sensitivity at a higher-order level such as 
the explicit discrimination measure used in the current study.  
Furthermore, unlike Study 8, which has a social context, Study 9 had a task-
focused context. It is possible that the social nature of the task triggers the motivation to 
detect subtle cues of untrustworthiness. Without the social context, high- and low-status 
individuals may not be motivated enough to discriminate between both types of smiles. 
It is also possible that high- and low- status individuals are equally able to discriminate 
between the two variants of smiles. Such a finding would not be surprising given that 
past studies have shown that even children age 9-10 show some form of discrimination 
ability such that they attribute more happiness to Duchenne compared to non-Duchenne 
smiles (Gosselin, Perron, Legault, & Campanella, 2002). 
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4.5 Summary and Conclusions  
The functionality of facial expressions in social interactions is well documented 
(Andrew, 1963; van Hooff, 1972; Waller & Dunbar, 2005). It has also been suggested 
that the variety and flexibility of facial expressions evolved as a result of the ever-
increasing pressures of social complexities (Preuschoft & van Hooff, 1997). This would 
imply that the expression and perception of facial expressions may be used to negotiate 
various aspects of social interactions in a given situation (see also Hinde, 1985; 
Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). 
Study 8 showed that low-status individuals were implicitly able to discriminate 
between targets displaying Duchenne compared to non-Duchenne smiles. In particular, 
low-status individuals showed an avoidance motivation such that they did not want to 
work with those displaying non-Duchenne smiles on a project. However, this implicit 
ability was not evident when participants’ attention was drawn to the veracity of the 
smiles and they were simply asked to indicate if each target displayed a true or fake 
smile. Taken together, there are two possible ways to reconcile these findings. Firstly, it 
is possible that the enhanced motivation to detect untrustworthy and unreliable 
indicators of affiliation (subtle social threat) is only triggered under a social context for 
low-status individuals. Therefore, when the context was task-focus in Study 9, high- 
and low- status individuals did not differ in their ability to explicit discriminate 
between the two types of smiles. Secondly, it is also possible that both high- and low-
status individuals are equally able to discriminate between both variants of smiles. 
However, high-status individuals are not motivated to avoid those who are displaying 
false indicators of positive affect and affiliation because they have sufficient social 
resources to cope with such targets.  
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Chapter 5  General Discussion  
 
In this chapter, I will first provide an overview of all the main findings. I will 
subsequently discuss and interpret the findings according to several broad themes. 
Additionally, some suggestions for future studies will also be briefly discussed where 
appropriate in these sections. Specifically, in Chapter 5.2, I will interpret the current 
findings in light of one of the overarching aims of the current research, which is how 
status influences the selective attention to angry faces. Then, I will take a broader 
perspective in further interpreting how the current findings fit into the existing literature 
by discussing them in the context of an adaptive threat regulation system in Chapter 
5.3, and with reference to trustworthiness in Chapter 5.4. In Chapter 5.5, I will review 
the possible limitations of the current research and suggest how future studies could 
rectify them. Finally, Chapter 5.6 and 5.7 will describe the theoretical contribution and 
practical implications of the present research and discuss future directions for this line 
of work.  
5.1 Overview of findings  
The overarching hypothesis in the current research was that one’s subjective 
sense of status triggers functionally distinct social motives such that loss of social status 
leads to attentional vigilance and enhanced processing of both overt- and subtle threat 
related cues in facial expressions. Angry faces signalled overt threat, whereas the 
untrustworthy indicators of affiliative intent in non-Duchenne smiles signalled subtle 
threat.  
Chapter 2 presented two studies aimed at providing novel evidence that loss of 
status in the domains of prestige and respect heightens the accessibility of social threat 
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and improves memory for targets associated with social threat. Using the lexical 
decision task in which paricipants were presented with social-threat words, non-social 
threat words, and neutral control words, Study 1 tested the hypothesis that status 
triggers differential motivations, which then heightens the accessibility of 
motivationally relevant concepts. Specifically, it predicted that loss of social status 
triggers the motivation to process social-threat. Therefore compared to high-status 
individuals, low-status individuals should show heightened accessibility of social-threat 
words. The results revealed that low-status participants showed heightened accessibility 
for social threat words compared to neutral words, and this pattern was not evident in 
high-status participants and the control group. Study 2 sought to extend the findings 
from Study 1 in investigating whether the motivation to process social threat as a result 
of loss of status also extends to face memory. In this study, neutral expression target 
faces was presented alongside a description that was created either a social-threat 
context or a general negative valence context. Utilising a surprise face recognition task, 
low-status participants showed better memory for targets that were presented in a 
social-threat context, compared to high-status participants. In addition, no memory 
difference was found between status conditions for targets associated with general 
negative events. This suggests that low-status triggers heightened selective processing 
of social-threat related information, and this effect was not due to a general negative 
valence priming effect.  
Chapter 3 presented five studies that tested the notion that low-status 
individuals should show heightened processing and attentional biases towards angry 
faces. I hypothesised that angry faces would cause greater interference to the 
performance of the focal task for low-status individuals compared to high-status 
individuals. Low-status individuals should also be motivated to allocate more 
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attentional resources to the processing of angry faces. Moreover, low-status individuals 
should be more ready to direct their attention towards angry faces compared to 
individuals not in a low-status position. The attentional bias to angry faces should be 
driven by enhanced engagement rather an inability to disengage from threat-related 
cues that occurred at a more strategic level of attentional processing. Finally, low-status 
individuals should also demonstrate biased perception of threat-related cues such that 
they take longer to detect angry emotion offset (point at which they no longer saw the 
angry face) on ambiguous faces.  I expected that these effects would be specific to 
angry faces and not to other negative emotions such as sadness and fear.   
The five studies presented in Chapter 3 supported my hypotheses. Study 3 
investigated participants ability to ignore distractor emotional faces (i.e., angry, 
sadness, fear, and happy) while performing a focal task of categorising words. Low-
status participants suffered greater interference on the focal task when they were 
presented with an irrelevant angry face in the background. High-status participants did 
not show this selective interference effect. Furthermore, this effect was specific to 
angry faces and was no observed for other negative expressions such as sadness and 
fear. Extending from Study 3, Study 4 aimed to obtain stronger evidence for an 
effortful, motivational component for the biased processing of angry faces in low-status 
individuals. A face-inversion paradigm was used to investigate emotion identification 
accuracy. Results revealed that compared to high-status participants, low-status 
participants compensated for the increased difficulty in identifying inverted angry by 
utilising the processing resources afforded by the additional encoding time.  That is, 
low-status participants were motivated to allocate the additional processing resources to 
accurately identifying angry faces. Similar to Study 3, this effect was specific for angry 
faces and was not evident for other negative facial expression, sadness and fear.  
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While Studies 3 and 4 provided evidence to support the hypothesis that low-
status individuals have a processing bias for angry faces, in both these studies, the faces 
were presented in the centre of the screen. Therefore, both these studies did not provide 
a robust account of selective attentional bias as the angry faces did not compete with 
other stimuli for attentional resources. Therefore, Studies 5 and 6 utilised one of the 
most commonly used selective attention measure, dot-probe task to investigate the type 
and direction of attentional biases to angry and happy faces. In addition, Studies 5 and 
6 also aimed to investigate whether the observed attentional biases occurred in the early 
and/or late stages of attentional processing. To that end, the presentation duration of the 
facial stimuli was varied (100ms, 500ms, and 1250ms). As predicted based on the 
proposed motivational account of the effects of status, both studies showed that low-
status participants had late-stage attentional vigilance (1250ms, but not 100ms or 
500ms) to angry faces, as a result of a strategic top-down control of attention. Study 6 
revealed that this heightened vigilance towards angry faces was due to enhanced 
engagement processes rather than an inability to disengage attention from angry faces. 
Finally, Study 7 aimed to further explore the extent to which processing bias for static 
angry faces shown in the previous studies extended to dynamic emotional expression 
(facial expressions that changed from one emotional state to another). Study 7 was also 
interested in investigating the role of social interaction. Specifically, this study 
manipulated the relationship the targets had with the participants such that the targets 
were either described as someone the participant was going to interact with, or a 
stranger they were not going to interact with. Study 7 used an emotion change detection 
task to test the hypothesis that status would affect the amount of time taken to detect 
anger emotion change in target faces. This study hypothesised that low-status 
individuals would take longer to detect anger emotion interaction partners but not with 
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strangers whom they do not intend to interact with. Results supported the hypothesis 
such that low-status participants tended to perceive angry cues as persisting longer in 
targets they expected an interaction with compared to targets they did not expect to 
interact with. This pattern was not observed among high-status participants. In sum, the 
studies in this chapter demonstrated the increased motivation to mobilise attentional 
and processing effort in the presence of angry faces. Low-status individuals’ vigilance 
towards angry faces is not due to an automatic orientation towards cues of overt threat. 
Instead, the results suggested the possibility that due to prior experiences with 
aggressive targets, low-status individuals strategically focus their attention towards 
cues of social hostility, presumably to better protect themselves from further social 
devaluation, especially from interaction partners.  
Lastly, Chapter 4 presented two studies, which aimed to complement the 
findings from the previous chapters by providing novel empirical evidence on how 
status influences processing of facial expressions indicative of subtle social threat cues 
and the subsequent effects on the social evaluative judgements of these faces. 
Additionally, building specifically from Study 7, which highlighted the role of social 
interaction, I aimed to further investigate how the expectation of social interaction 
influences threat vigilance in low-status individuals. To address these research 
questions, Studies 8 and 9 measured participants’ ability to implicitly and explicitly 
discriminate between Duchenne and non-Duchenne smiles respectively. In both studies, 
participants were presented with videos of targets that were either displaying a 
Duchenne smile or a non-Duchenne smile. Both studies hypothesised that low-status 
participants would be able to detect untrustworthy indicators of affiliation intent and 
positive affect in non-Duchenne smiles. Study 8 measured implicit discrimination 
ability by asking participants to state their preference to work with each of the targets 
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on a project. Study 9 measured explicit discrimination ability by asking participants to 
simply indicate if the smiles were genuine or fake. Results revealed low-status 
participants expressed a decrease in desire to work with targets displaying non-
Duchenne smiles compared to targets displaying Duchenne smiles. However, this 
tendency to avoid potentially threatening targets could not be attributed to an enhanced 
explicit ability as high- and low- status individuals did not in terms of their explicit 
ability to differentiate between the two variants of smiles. Put together, this result 
suggests that the attentional vigilance towards social threat facial cues observed in the 
previous studies may have contributed to an implicit ability that could be driven by an 
avoidance motivation for potentially threatening targets, rather than a superior explicit 
ability to detect subtle facial cues of untrustworthiness compared to high-status 
individuals.  
In sum, across Chapters 2, 3, and 4, the present results show that the effects of 
status are not limited to social inference but can also be observed in non-social domains 
such as visual perception. It also sheds some light as to why low-status individuals have 
heightened accessibility for social threat, are more motivated, and have strategic 
vigilance towards angry faces. Low-status individuals are in a perilous position where 
they lack the buffer necessary should they encounter someone threatening. Therefore, 
this enhanced awareness of potential sources of social threat is beneficial for them. This 
is because it allows them to be better prepared to avoid these targets. Importantly, the 
motivation to avoid potentially threatening targets may have a top-down influence on 
more low-level processes such as selective attention rather than the higher-level 
processes involved in explicit ability.  
An important strength of this research is that different types of dependent 
measures converged in showing how the psychological construct of one’s subjective 
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perception of their own status, can influence social information processing and face 
perception independent of pre-existing objective measures of status. By including these 
varied dependent measures, the current research was able to demonstrate that status 
influences selective attention, motivated processing, and social evaluative judgements 
on facial expressions indicative of overt and subtle cues of threat. Furthermore, this 
research provided evidence for an adaptive system that may have evolved according to 
one’s position in the social hierarchy. Specifically, the enhanced sensitivity towards 
social threat demonstrated by low-status participants supports the notion that social-
cognitive processes are adaptive to the perceiver’s situationally activated social goals 
(Smith & Semin, 2007), and that these social goals vary as a function of one’s social 
status. This notion will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5.3.  
In short, the current research suggests that the hypervigilance towards 
threatening social cues may be specialised (in the sense that it is differentiated between 
high and low status groups) and functional such that it is in service of motivations that 
stem from ones’ perceived status. For the remainder of this section, I will discuss the 
general finding that low-status individuals have selective attention towards angry faces 
with reference to the psychological experience of uncontrollability and hostile 
attribution bias. On the broader perspective, I will also explore the notion of an 
adaptive threat regulation system, with reference to the self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Following that, the current findings will also be applied to the theoretical framework of 
trustworthiness.  Finally, I will highlight the limitations of the current research and 
conclude with the implications of the current research and further studies. 
 
  182
5.2 Selective attention toward angry faces 
It has been demonstrated that status affects social attention. Low-status humans 
and nonhumans pay more attention to their superiors, and are more attentive to their 
surroundings (Fiske, 2010). For example, low-status individuals develop more diverse 
and complex perceptions of high-status individuals than of similar group members 
(Guinote, 2001; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993). However, research has so far not identified 
which aspects of social information receive priority in processing. In Studies 3,4,5,6, 
and 7, I showed, for the first time, that loss of social status in the domains of prestige 
and respect is capable of differentially directing attention to non-verbal signals of social 
aggression as displayed on angry faces.  
One of the underlying rationales for the current research’s hypothesis was that 
low-status individuals are often targets of unprovoked aggression and these repeated 
experiences may lead to the expectations of hostility and hence a hypervigilance for 
cues signalling social threat, such as those present in angry expressions. However, it 
should be noted that people tend to expect high-status individuals to experience more 
anger than low-status individuals (Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & 
Pietrzak, 2002; Page-Gould et al., 2008; Panksepp, Herman, Conner, Bishop, & Scott, 
1978; Tiedens et al., 2000; Williams, 2007). For example, participants perceived anger 
to persist longer and appear sooner on faces of high-status compared to low-status 
targets across a series of studies (Ratcliff et al., 2012). In other studies, participants 
assigned a job candidate to a higher status position and a higher salary if the candidate 
described him or herself as angry as opposed to sad (Tiedens, 2001). Furthermore, it 
has also been proposed that low-status individuals pay closer attention to their superiors 
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and develop more complex social representations than their high-status counterparts 
(Fiske, 2010; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993). 
Therefore, an alternative explanation as to why low-status individuals are 
vigilant towards angry faces is the possibility that angry faces are perceived as high-
status targets. Past evidence suggest that the expression of anger is overtly expressed 
down the status hierarchy ladder and suppressed upward (Allan & Gilbert, 2002).  
Individuals may have a higher tendency for approaching (anger-out related behaviour) 
a lower-status target, whereas low-status individuals may display higher levels of 
anger-in and avoidance related behaviour towards a higher-status target. In other words, 
people are generally more likely to display overt angry behaviour towards a low-status 
target (Carlson, Marcus-Newhall, & Miller, 1990), whereas suppress an aggressive 
response when the target is of higher status (Fitness, 2000). Furthermore, empirical 
research by Maner, DeWall, and Gailliot (2008) has also shown that people 
preferentially attend to dominant individuals (especially powerful men) in early-stage 
cognition (see also DeWall & Maner, 2008).  
In addition, evidence suggests that individuals may react aggressively towards 
those who have rejected them (Buckley, Winkel, & Leary, 2004). This is not surprising 
as a rejected individual is likely to view the ‘cause’ of their exclusion as unreliable 
sources of positive social contact. Furthermore, the psychological pain that they may 
have experienced from being rejected may serve as an intense form of punishment. 
Therefore, rejected individuals are more likely to perceive those that have rejected them 
in a hostile light, and may desire to avoid them.  Given that anger has been associated 
with high-status individuals, it is possible that low-status individuals may perceive 
angry facial expressions as representing high-status individuals (Ratcliff et al., 2012; 
Tiedens, 2001). By social comparison, an individual only experiences being in a low-
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status position when there are others occupying the higher status positions. Therefore 
the current findings in which low-status individuals showed selective bias towards 
anger cues may simply reflect an effort by low-status individuals to be vigilant towards 
to high-status individuals even at an early-stage attentional level. This is because, high-
status individuals may be perceived as the ‘cause’ of their unfavourable status 
comparison, which also results in negative judgements of relative rank.  
Whilst the findings obtained in Chapter 3 provided evidence for biased 
processing and perception of cues related to social threat in facial expressions in low-
status individuals, it did not investigate the emotional and behavioural reaction low-
status individuals experienced upon encountering these angry facial expressions. 
Kuppens, Van Mechelen, and Meulders (2004) investigated how and which situational 
characteristics influenced the occurrence of the different types of behavioural response 
to anger. Anger is generally viewed as an interpersonal emotion (Averill, 1983; Fehr, 
Baldwin, Collins, Patterson, & Benditt, 1999; Siegel, 1986; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). In 
other words, the experience and reaction of anger is largely dependent upon the 
relationship between the expresser and the target of the anger. To that end, Kuppens 
and colleagues applied the interpersonal framework that is based on perceived status 
and liking of the other person to investigate how these characteristics may influence 
anger behaviour. The authors found that anger does not necessarily always lead to 
aggression. More specifically, anger may motivate prosocial behaviour depending on 
the individual and the type of relation (on the liking and status dimension) the 
individual has with the target of anger. Therefore, taking the current findings into 
consideration, future research should consider the possibility the heightened vigilance 
to angry faces displayed by low-status individuals might necessarily influence their 
subsequent anger behaviour.  
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Additionally, while aggression is often studied as the behavioural consequences 
of anger (Baron & Richardson, 1994; Berkowitz, 1993; Huesmann, 1994), past studies 
have shown that overt aggressive behaviour only occurs in a small proportion of anger 
incidents Kassinove, Sukhodolsky, Tsytsarev, & Solovyova, 1997). Covert aggressive 
impulses are often suppressed and expressed through more socially adapted actions 
(Berkowitz, 1993; Dodge, 1993; Harris, 1976; Lemerise &Dodge, 2000). Given that it 
is often the case that society dictates the social norms for ones’ behaviour such that the 
society may have certain expectations of how others should behave based on factors 
such as social status, it is possible that low-status individuals are chronically 
suppressing their aggressive impulses. To elaborate further, it is possible that the social 
threat vigilance demonstrated by low-status individuals may lead to aggressive 
tendencies. However, instead of displaying overt aggressive behaviours, they may 
express it in more socially defined status-appropriate manner.  
In relation to that, individuals from low SES backgrounds often have to deal 
with increased stress in their close relationships (Gallo et al., 2005) and violence in 
their homes (Staggs, Long, mason, Krishnan, & Riger, 2007). Being chronically 
subjected to such challenging environments, it may be quite intuitive to expect low-
status individuals to focus on their individual needs over the welfare of others. 
However, emerging evidence suggests that this is not always the case. That is, while 
low-status individuals may experience more life stressors than their high-status 
counterparts, they are still more dependent on others to achieve their desired goals 
(Domhoff, 1998). As a result, they may be beneficial for them prioritise the needs of 
others too (Kraus & Keltner, 2009; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009). For instance, a recent 
study by Kraus et al. (2010) demonstrated across three studies using measures of 
objective and subjective SES, that low social class individuals scored higher on 
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standardised questionnaire measures of empathy and judged emotions of a stranger 
more accurately. The observed association between emphatic accuracy and social class 
was due to a contextual-orientation.  
Having shown that compared to high-status individuals, low-status individuals 
appear to be able to implicitly discriminate between subtle cues of social threat in faces 
(Study 8), the current findings partially complements the results obtained by Kraus et 
al. However, the main finding across Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6 that low-status individuals 
are more motivated to process and identify angry faces specifically does not support 
Kraus et al’s finding that low status individuals are more emphatically accurate in 
judging emotions of other people. That is, low-status individuals have higher emphatic 
accuracy that is not specific to emotions related to anger or threat compared to high-
status individuals. Having said that, it should be noted that Kraus et al. (2010), 
considered a much wider range of secondary emotions such as amusements, 
compassion, and hope. Importantly, a composite score was obtained collapsing across 
these different positive and negative emotions. The current research only looked at 
basic emotional expression such as angry, fear, sadness, and happiness; each of these 
emotional expressions were looked at individually. Therefore, I would argue that while 
low-status individuals are generally more emphatically accurate, they are 
motivationally biased to process angry faces more extensively.  
Findings from Studies 5 and 6 have shown that low-status individuals are 
motivated to maintain enhanced vigilance towards social threat cues. This state of 
enhanced vigilance could have contributed to a bias in perceiving social threat cues in 
ambiguous interaction partners (Study 7) and also led to the tendency to avoid targets 
displaying subtle cues of threat, such as untrustworthiness (Study 8). Considering the 
findings from the perspective of selective attention to social threat and biased 
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perception of threatening cues may explain low-status individuals’ risk-adverse 
approach in avoiding targets displaying non-Duchenne smiles. It is possible that these 
processes may explain the general finding in natural settings that low-status individuals 
favour smaller, more close-knit social networks. Indeed, a recent study by Piff et al, 
(2010) supports this idea. They found that lower SES individuals tend to prioritise the 
needs of others. Importantly, they suggested that this prosocial behaviour in the form of 
generosity, charitable giving, being trusting and helpful acts as a means to adapt to their 
more hostile environments (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). 
Finally, the current findings shed some light on the on-going debate about the 
functions of emotional facial expressions. On the one hand, Fridlund’s (1994) and 
Frijda’s (1995) theory argues that facial expressions have evolved primarily to signal 
behavioural intent. Drawing from Darwin’s (1872) seminal writings, this theory states 
that facial expressions evolved specifically to forecast the behavioural intentions and 
consequences of the expresser’s emotion to others. For example, anger conveys to an 
observer a readiness to attack another. In other words, this view suggests that facial 
expressions fundamentally have a socio-communicative signal value and need not be 
directly associated with underlying emotions. On the other hand, the alternative theory 
put forward by Ekman (1972) proposed that facial expressions are a direct result of felt 
emotion and hence primarily functions to express emotions, and not necessarily to 
communicate intentions. The current research found that low-status individuals were 
motivated to selectively direct their attention towards threatening targets. Moreover, 
instead of the desire to approach promising targets that displayed trustworthy social 
cues, low-status individuals expressed the desire to avoid untrustworthy targets that 
displayed unreliable indicators of positive affect and affiliation intent. Put together, this 
would suggest that low-status individuals are more sensitive towards the socio-
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communicative value of potentially hostile behavioural intent as signalled by social 
threat cues in facial expressions, rather than simply the underlying anger emotion 
conveyed by the expresser’s facial expression. Hence, offering support for the theory 
proposed by Fridlund  (1991a,b, 1992) that facial expressions are used in social 
communications to inform intentions and possible future actions.  
I have argued that fundamental attentional processes involved in the perception 
of social threat from angry faces vary as a function of one’s subjective sense of status. 
Specifically, I proposed that the loss of status in the specific domains of prestige and 
respect represents a significant form of threat to the social self. Furthermore, given the 
increased exposure to hostility and aggression, low-status individuals should show 
heightened vigilance towards social threat cues, such as those present in angry faces. I 
examined the role of attention in angry face perception and provided support for my 
hypotheses. However, notwithstanding the possible attentional mechanisms suggested 
by the current findings, there are at least 2 other possible underlying cognitive 
mechanisms that may account for why low-status individuals are biased in their 
perception of angry faces. Specifically, the notion of uncontrollability and hostile 
attribution bias. These factors were briefly reviewed in Chapter 1, however, in light of 
the findings obtained, they warrant further discussion. Therefore, for the remainder of 
this subsection, I will discuss the possible role of uncontrollability and hostile 
attribution bias in explaining the current findings.  
5.2.1 Uncontrollability  
Uncontrollability could impede one’s efforts in improving social status 
(Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). This is because in an uncontrollable situation, it is 
uncertain whether a behavioural response would lead to a favourable outcome (Averill, 
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1973; Levine & Ursin, 1991; Thompson, 1981; Weiner, 1992). It is possible that 
confrontation with a threatening target triggers a sense of uncontrollability in low-status 
individuals due to the lack of social resources to buffer against potential harms. As a 
result, the perception that the situation is uncontrollable creates a condition in which 
people are unable to achieve positive end-states, despite their best efforts. In other 
words, because little can be done to avoid a negative outcome, uncontrollability greatly 
amplifies the perception of the severity of the source of social threat. This then feeds 
back into a vicious cycle of being biased to perceiving threat even when the situation is 
ambiguous. This notion was supported in Studies 7 and 9. Low-status individuals 
showed delayed anger emotion offset detection when the target was described as 
someone they would interact with. Additionally, they also showed decreased preference 
to work alongside targets with non-Duchenne smiles compared to Duchenne smiles 
despite not having a superior explicit ability of discriminating between the two variants 
of smiles.  
Moreover, it has been proposed that when an individual loses social support and 
respect from others, they are likely to experience anxiety and fear (Mackie et al., 2000). 
Given that Studies 7 and 9 involved a social context in which the target was a 
interaction partner, it is possible expecting an interaction with an individual creates a 
greater sense of uncontrollability compared to individuals whom no interaction is 
expected because the latter can be avoided. However, if low-status individuals perceive 
that they are in a situation where social interaction cannot be avoided, they may be 
biased to overly ruminate on their relative lower social standing compared to their 
interaction partner and therefore generates expectations of hostile intent.  This would 
further intensify feelings of anxiety and fear in low-status individuals. Indeed, past 
studies (e.g, Kollack-Walker et al., 1997; Shively et al., 1997) have shown that acute or 
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chronic threats to one’s social status leads to an increase in cortisol activity, 
importantly, these effects are augmented when conditions are perceived as 
uncontrollable.  
5.2.2 Hostile Attribution Bias  
The ability to accurately perceive others’ feelings and to respond accordingly is 
critical to ensure optimal social functioning. In general, angry facial expressions may 
serve as a warning or social punishment that is capable of prohibiting the observer from 
his/her current desired end state (Blair, 2003; Fairchild, Stobbe, Van Goozen, Calder & 
Goodyer, 2010). Low-status individuals may be predisposed to chronically perceive 
such cues of direct social threat. This may contribute to a vicious cycle of maladaptive 
social interaction in which low-status individuals develop a lack of trust towards others 
and greater cynicism. Constantly perceiving others as having hostile intentions towards 
them may also explain the higher occurrences of aggressive and violent behaviour 
among those from low SES backgrounds.    
As mentioned in the Chapter 1, hostile attribution bias refers to the tendency to 
attribute hostile intent to other’s behaviour when their true intentions are ambiguous 
(Dodge, 1980). Hostile attribution of intent has been shown to correlate with reactive 
aggression. Importantly, this pattern most clearly presents in low status groups (ethic 
minorities; low SES). Based on the current findings, it is possible that low-status 
individuals preferentially attend to hostile cues during the encoding and representation 
phase while high-status individuals encode benign and hostile cues equally. 
Importantly, if the observed hypervigilance to social threat is due to previous 
experiences and memory structures, then greater effort needs to be put into addressing 
these as the current results show that the chronic experience of hostility may affect 
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information processing even at attentional level. This bias to perceive social threat cues 
even when the situation is ambiguous could have far reaching consequences that may 
ultimately jeopardise low-status individual’s chances at improving their social position.  
Emotional facial expressions are often useful as an indicator of the affective 
disposition of others. However, what cannot be determined from others’ facial 
expressions is the underlying intent behind the particular emotional expression. 
Emerging evidence suggests that early-stages of face perception can already be 
influenced by implicit attributions made by the perceiver about the target’s intentions. 
Applying this notion to the findings in the current research, it is possible that low-status 
individuals selective vigilance towards angry faces may be due to implicit attributions 
made about the target’s intentions. In particular, it is possible that low-status 
individuals may have a hostile attribution bias towards others’ because of their prior 
experiences with threatening targets. Importantly, the selective vigilance towards angry 
faces observed in Studies 5 and 6 occurred at a strategic level of attentional control. 
This demonstrates the motivational component of the selective attention process. 
Furthermore, in Study 3, low-status individuals did not display the typical inversion 
effect (disruption in recognition performance caused by the inversion of faces) for 
angry faces when they were provided with sufficient processing resources. This further 
highlights that low-status individuals are motivated to extensively process and 
accurately recognise angry faces.  
Drawing parallels with the existing evidence that biased processing of 
information in the environment may be responsible for the maintenance of social-
related disorders such as social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995) and social anxiety; the 
current research suggests the possibility that biased processing of social threat related 
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cues in faces may impede low-status individuals’ efforts at regaining a positive sense of 
social prestige and respect.  
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5.3 Adaptive threat regulation 
It is well established that threatening stimuli such as snakes, spiders and angry 
faces hold a special status in human perception such that biased rapid detection of these 
threats remain consistent from early childhood into adulthood (LoBue & Rakison, 
2013). However, it has been suggested that these privileged biases do not work in the 
absence of other contributing factors that might amplify or downplay the threat value 
and personal significance of these proposed evolutionary threat. The current research 
provided convincing evidence that the loss of status could be one of the contributing 
factors, which moderates the privileged processing of evolutionary threats such as 
angry faces.  
In addition to that, despite the abundance of evidence suggesting that humans 
and even non-humans primates have an innate perceptual bias for the rapid detection of 
evolutionary threats, the exact mechanism that drives this phenomenon remains 
unclear. Some researchers have suggested that it is the threat-relevance that captures 
attention (Calvo & Esteves, 2005; Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003). For example, 
some studies have shown a direct relationship between how negatively adults rated 
threatening stimuli and their speed of detecting it (Beaver, Mogg, & Bradley, 2005). 
Other studies have shown the search advantage for threatening faces is significantly 
reduced when the simple features on the threatening faces are scrambled or when they 
are presented in a non-face-like context (Schubo, Gendolla, Meinecke, & Abele, 2006; 
Tipples, Atkinson, & Young, 2002).  
The current findings offer support for the notion that it is the personal threat-
relevance that drives selective attention. More specifically, given the more frequent 
exposure to hostility and daily stressors, angry faces may be of particular relevance to 
low-status individuals. Therefore, low-status individuals were more motivated to 
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process and identify targets with angry faces. The alternative proposition mentioned in 
the earlier paragraphs on the possibility that angry targets are often perceived to be 
high-status targets would also suggest that it is the personal relevance of angry faces to 
low-status individuals that is likely to be responsible for the results. This general 
pattern of findings was shown across the studies presented in Chapter 3.  
The present results are also consistent with extant literature on the social 
determinants of threat sensitivity. It has been proposed that humans have evolved a 
threat detection system that can be triggered by physical and social threat. When this 
adaptive system is activated, for example, by social exclusion, it triggers cognitive 
processes (for a review, see MacDonald & Leary, 2005), in particular attentional 
vigilance, that increases the likelihood of detecting threat in ambiguous situations 
(Pickett & Gardner, 2005). Here, I demonstrated that the social threat detection system 
could also be activated by loss of social prestige and respect.  
It is traditionally assumed that activation of the threat detection system 
generates fight-or-flight responses. Past evidence has shown that when subjected to 
threat, aggressive individuals often chose to fight, whereas anxious individuals tend to 
flee. Nonetheless, it has also been proposed that despite the different behavioural 
responses, both aggressive and anxious individuals share a common attentional bias 
towards threat-related social information (Lake, Baskin-Sommers, Li, Curtin, & 
Newman, 2011).  
The current research suggests that low-status individuals share the similar 
attentional bias toward facial cues signalling social threat. The activation of a social 
threat detection system in low-status individuals could be derived from repeated 
learning of associations between lack of social respect and experiences of social 
hostility. Over the course of their lives individuals learn associations of events that have 
  195
an adaptive value (Schaller et al., 2007). These associations are archived in long-term 
memory, and can be selectively accessed in order to solve social problems. They 
provide fitness-optimising solutions to recurrent problems that individuals encounter in 
social life, functioning as cognitive algorithms (Schaller et al., 2007). Based on the 
findings obtained in the current study, I argue that individuals may have well-learnt 
structures of the social implications of status differentials. That is, they may anticipate 
status specific social problems and automatically adopt attentional strategies that could 
help them prevent and cope with these problems. In the case of low-status individuals, 
increased awareness and focus of attention towards social threat cues may serve as an 
adaptive means to manage the actual threats they perceive in their social environment. 
It could also serve as means to regulate their biased expectation of being exposed to 
threats due to the prior experiences.  
For the remainder of this section, I will discuss how the self-fulfilling prophecy 
could potentially contribute to low-status individuals’ biased expectations for social 
threat and hence, account for why low-status individuals have heightened motivation to 
allocate attentional resources to social threat cues.  
5.3.1 Self-fulfilling prophecy  
Being social animals, our well-being and survival are highly dependent on 
others. However, despite our best efforts to seek approval from others, we are at risk of 
rejection, which may have aversive consequences. Past research has shown that the 
perceived social threat from the prospect of rejection alone is enough to shape our 
social behaviour (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 
2003; Panksepp, 1998; Seymour, Singer, & Dolan, 2007). However, there is a great 
amount of variability between individuals as to which cues are identified as socially 
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threatening and in how they respond to them (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Mogg, 
Philippot, & Bradley, 2004).  
The current findings demonstrate that individual differences in terms of 
subjective sense of status may be one possible explanation underlying this variability in 
which cues are perceived as socially threatening. In Study 1, I compared the 
accessibility between social threat and non-social threat. Low-status individuals showed 
heightened accessibility for social threat words compared to neutral words, whereas the 
accessibility for non-social threat words did not differ from the neutral control words. 
This pattern was not evident in the high-status group. In Study 2, I compared memory 
for targets associated with a social threat context or a general negative valence context. 
Face memory was used as an indication of the amount of processing directed to the 
targets during the encoding stage. Results revealed that compared to high-status 
individuals, low-status individuals remember the targets associated to the social threat 
context better than the targets that were associated with the negative valence. Studies 3 
and 4 investigated readiness and motivation to direct attentional and processing 
resources towards angry faces compared to sad, fearful and happy faces. Including 
fearful faces was of particular interest and importance to the current research because 
fearful faces and angry faces are commonly categorised as threatening stimuli in other 
studies (e.g., Fitzgerald et al., 2006; Marsh et al., 2005). However, fearful faces are 
related to undetermined source of potential danger in the environment (Adams et al., 
2003); whereas angry faces signal overt and direct threat, which is often used in face-
to-face encounters to exert dominance (Blanchard & Blanchard, 2003). Moreover, 
angry faces are also more relevant to social interactions (Ewbank et al., 2009). 
Therefore, given the rationale outlined in  Chapter 1 that low-status individuals might 
be biased to social threat related cues due to their increased exposure to aggression and 
  197
hostility, I proposed that low-status individuals would be motivated to process angry 
faces and not fearful faces. As predicted, results showed that low-status individuals 
suffered greater interference on a focal task when an angry face was present as a 
background (Study 3). Low-status individuals were also more motivated to redirect 
additional processing resources to accurately identify inverted angry faces (Study 4). 
These effects were not observed with fearful and sad faces and were not present in the 
high-status group. Taken together, these findings denote that low-status individuals do 
not have a generalised sensitivity to negative social information, or non-social threat 
information. In addition, it also suggests that enhanced sensitivity to social threat 
pertains only to direct and overt threat cues such as those present in angry faces.  
It has also been shown that resistance to extinguish conditioned responses to 
threatening stimuli such as snakes, spiders, and angry faces, is associated with 
maladaptive emotional responses including anxiety and phobia (Carlsson et al., 2004; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Milad, Rauch, Pitman, & Quirk, 2006; Myers & Davis, 2002). 
Extending from that line of research, it is possible that low-status individuals are faced 
with similar difficulties in updating and adjusting their conditioned response. That is, 
their frequent exposure to unprovoked hostility may cause them to not expect any 
changes in the contingency between social threat cues and feared outcomes. Low-status 
individuals may be stuck in the vicious cycle of the self fulfilling prophecy where they 
are predisposed to expect signs of social threats in others, this then increases their 
readiness to perceive it, and when the signs of social threat is detected, they react in 
ways that will only confirm and reinforce their expectations. In other words, the social 
threat vigilance observed in the current research could be due to actual experiences of 
unprovoked hostility and aggression. However, the adversity towards it may be 
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partially maintained through this self-fulfilling prophecy, adhering to the saying ‘once 
bitten, twice shy’.  
Such a pattern of self-fulfilling cognitive mechanism has also been proposed to 
account for individual differences in rejection sensitivity (RS). Given the robust link 
between RS and relationship difficulties, great amount of effort has been put into 
understanding the development and maintenance of RS. To that end, it has been 
proposed that RS operates according to the abovementioned self-fulfilling prophecy 
with individuals high on RS having greater expectations of rejections which creates an 
anxious readiness to perceive it and to react to it in ways that will only increase the 
likelihood of them experiencing the feared rejection. This then confirms and reinforces 
the initial rejection expectation (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998). With 
reference to learning mechanisms involved in conditioning, Olsson and colleagues 
found that individuals high in RS demonstrated a resistance to extinction of the 
conditioned response to angry faces, but not to neutral faces or non-social stimuli in a 
classical fear-conditioning task. The authors highlighted the role of the self fulfilling 
prophecy in biasing the flexible updated of acquired expectations for threat (Olsson, 
Carmona, Downey, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2013).  
Of interest, members of low-status groups are generally aware of the society’s 
low regard for them and of the negative stereotypes associated with their group 
(Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl, & Hull, 2000). Such 
awareness has also been proposed to contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy (Steele & 
Aronson, 1995). Inzlicht, Kaiser and Major (2008) showed that individuals who 
chronically expect to be treated prejudicially are biased toward perceiving rejecting 
emotions in faces of outgroup others. Targets of prejudice are aware of their group’s 
stigmatized social identity, including the awareness that their group has a lower status 
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(Frey & Tropp, 2006). For example, many African Americans recognise that others 
hold negative beliefs about their group’s academic ability and penchant for aggressive 
behaviour (Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002). This awareness can lead to the expectation 
of being the target of prejudice and discrimination. When operating with a prejudice 
expectation, people survey their surroundings to determine whether they are in a 
potentially threatening environment (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000) and become sensitive 
to cues communicating that their group’s stigmatised social status may be rejected 
(Kaiser et al., 2006).  
In the context of the current research, the findings obtained fit into the greater 
body of research on the mechanisms of social threat detection. Specifically, I argue the 
possibility that low-status individuals are faced with the same self-fulfilling prophecy 
with respect to their perception of social threat. Furthermore, the current findings 
contribute to the broader research area of consequences of social threats. In particular, 
it suggests that loss of social status in the domains of respect and prestige may threaten 
the social self in a similar manner as rejection sensitivity and anxiety. Of interest, given 
that the findings in the current studies were not explained or moderated by rejection 
sensitivity or affective/mood states (Chapter 3), it is possible that the underlying 
mechanism for each of these social threats may be functionally distinct and this 
warrants further research.  
In sum, the present findings indirectly support the growing evidence of deep-
rooted links between status and aggression in humans (see Mackie et al., 2000; Tiedens, 
2001). Across social species, those at the top of the hierarchy are more likely to 
aggress, while those at the bottom are more often the targets of hostile acts, and have 
fewer outlets to displace aggression. At the same time, humans have evolved a need to 
be valued by others (Sedikides et al., 2006), and generally attempt upward social 
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mobility to achieve higher status (see Boehm & Flack, 2010; Ellemers, van 
Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The motivation to attain higher 
status could derive, in part, from a desire to avoid the perils of being in a low-status 
position.  
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5.4 Trustworthiness  
We often face a choice of whether to pursue short-term interest (working 
individually), or to rely on others (trusting others) to maximise collective interests. 
There are definitely potential gains if mutual cooperation is achieved. However, there 
are also risks that those who take advantage of our trust may exploit us. Indeed, trust 
has been shown to be vital in the development of cooperation (Ross & LaCroix, 1996). 
We are made vulnerable to others when we make the risky decision to trust others. That 
is, by not granting this initial trust, we eliminate the risk of being exploited, however 
we also forgo the possibility of creating a rewarding relationship. This highlights the 
importance of understanding how and which social signals are reliable indicators of 
trust and consequently genuine cooperative behaviour.  
In trust related contexts, facial expressions have been shown to provide reliable 
behavioural and situational information especially in terms of signalling emotional 
states (Ekman, 1982) and to communicate our intentions to others (Keltner & Haidt, 
1999). In theory, the two-way function of facial expressions would ensure successful 
social exchanges. However, not all facial expressions are genuine signals of underlying 
emotions and intentions (Ekman, 1985). A smile can be put on to appear trustworthy 
for the purposes of being granted access to resources that would otherwise be denied 
(Krumhuber et al., 2007). Discrimination between genuine and fake smiles is especially 
important in the identification of cooperative partners because it would reduce the 
likelihood of being exploited by individuals skilled in social deception (Brown & 
Moore, 2002).  
The perceptual skill to spot people who are likely to be cheaters is especially 
valuable for those in the low-status position because there’s a bigger cost to misjudging 
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an untrustworthy person, as opposed to misjudging a trustworthy person (Hamamura, 
2012). Study 8 and 9 investigated how status influenced the implicit and explicit ability 
to detect subtle cues of untrustworthiness in non-Duchenne smiles, which signals 
unreliable affiliation intent and positive affect compared to Duchenne smiles, which has 
been proposed to reflect genuine felt happiness by the expresser. The results revealed 
that low-status individuals were motivated to avoid targets displaying non-Duchenne 
smiles as indicated by their decrease in preference to work with targets displaying non-
Duchenne smiles compared to Duchenne smiles. High-status individuals did not show 
this avoidance motivation for non-Duchenne targets (Study 8). However, both high- 
and low- status individuals did not differ in their explicit ability to discriminate 
between both types of smiles (Study 9). Intrepretation of these results needs to be 
considered with caution as there are two possibilities as to why low-status individuals 
appear to have an implicit ability to discriminate between Duchenne and non-Duchenne 
smiles, yet they do not show superior explicit discrimination ability compared to high-
status individuals.  
Having said that, trustworthiness may be especially adaptive under conditions in 
which individuals experience decreased capacity resources (negative life events), when 
they are unable to effectively advertise these qualities to others, and when reliable 
social support is most essential. Low-status individuals may prefer forming small social 
network, as this would justify their allocation of genuine investment behaviours 
(requiring time and empathy) in building reliable relationships (Geary, Byrd-Craven, 
Hoard, Vigil, & Numtee, 2003). In contrast, high-status individuals may have evolved 
the tendency to express higher levels of aggressive behaviours in order to attract the 
affiliation of potential coalition members and avoid interactions with potentially 
dangerous adversaries. In addition, aggression may cause others to distance themselves 
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and thus enabling them to demonstrate the ability to protect themselves in times of 
stress. The current findings seem to suggest that subtle detection and selective response 
to threat may be specialised and functional for facilitating the formation of strategic 
relationships in humans. Specifically, low-status individuals’ heightened sensitivity to 
social threat may be due to the underlying motivation of creating fewer, but reliable 
relationships.  
The current findings are in some ways in line with the boundary conditions 
proposed in the social reconnection hypothesis (Maner et al., 2007). In particular, while 
the threat of being socially excluded may motivate social reconnection, the theory also 
states that excluded individuals would tend to respond favourably only to those who are 
perceived as reliable sources of social reconnection. In Studies 3, 4, 5 and 6, I included 
happy faces as they represent one of the most socially rewarding stimuli (Guastella, 
Mitchell, & Matthews, 2008) and a common nonverbal signal of affiliation (Hess, 
Adams, & Kleck, 2009). The happy/smiling face stimuli were included to explore the 
possibility that status may differentially trigger heightened sensitivity to both threat-
related and affiliation-related cues. This was of special interest since threat and 
affiliation represents the spectrum along which the failure and success of building 
social relations lie. In Study 3, both high and low status individuals showed the greatest 
interference effect when presented with a happy face background compared to the other 
emotional expressions. However, past studies have shown that the visibility of the teeth 
is a distinctive feature of happy facial expressions and it captures attention in a bottom 
up manner (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2011). Therefore, this result was treated with 
caution, as I was unable to determine whether the observed interference effect was due 
to top-down effects of status, or bottom-up effects from the happy faces. Therefore in 
the subsequent studies that used happy faces, the selection of stimuli was done more 
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carefully to control for the saliency of the smiles. As predicted, loss of social status led 
to strategic enhanced attentional awareness of angry faces, but not happy faces. This 
effect was not observed in high-status or control group.  
 
Based on these findings, I argue that while threats to the social self might 
heighten the need to reconnect with others, low-status individuals are more concerned 
with detecting targets that may be threatening. In other words, threats to the social self 
in the domains of prestige and respect may lead to an avoidance motivation of 
threatening targets, instead of a approach motivation for potential affiliation partners 
because it prevents them from wrongfully allocating their limited social resources on 
those who are likely to be threatening.  
Finally, some evidence also suggest that social exclusion may lead individuals 
to behave aggressively towards individuals whom they do not expect to have face-to-
face interaction with (e.g., Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001; Twenge & 
Campbell, 2003). In Study 7, it was found that low-status individuals tended to perceive 
hostile cues in ambiguous faces longer when they expected to interact with the target, 
as compared to when the target was a stranger whom they had no interaction with. This 
appears counterintuitive, as one would expect low-status individuals to be vigilant 
towards individuals they are not familiar with, and to respond with more positive and 
optimistic attitude when interacting with individuals they are familiar with. Indeed, it 
has been shown that there are individual differences in the tendency to perceive others 
from a positive or negative light. For example, those who chronically fear the 
psychological pain from being negatively evaluated tend to be more hesitant and 
hypervigilant to the potential of further social harm (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 
1985). People who are generally worried that others will evaluate them negatively 
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develop the biased expectation that even novel social interactions may do more harm 
than good (e.g., Maddux, Norton, & Leary, 1988). Low-status individuals are generally 
more conscious about their relative low social standing compared to others in their 
daily social interactions that they may develop the same negative expectations to 
perceive interaction partners as sources of further social devaluation rather than 
opportunities for promising affiliations.  
5.4.1 Generalised trust  
Generalised trust is risky because it exposes one to the possibility that the 
trustee has harmful intentions. There are two theories on the relationship between status 
and trust. The first theory suggests that the risk of trusting a stranger is greater for low-
status individuals because they are more concerned about meeting basic living needs. 
Therefore even a single interaction with a cheater would be devastating. In contrast, 
higher social status individuals are embedded in a more secure environment (more 
savings, extensive social security and insurances) that buffers the risks of generalised 
trust. Therefore, an interaction with a cheater would still be painful, but it would not be 
devastating. The current findings are in agreement with this theory in so far as high-
status individuals did not show any selective biases for a particular emotional 
expression, angry faces or other negative facial expressions such as sad and fear, 
included in Study 3 and 4.  
The second theory suggests that people tend to form social relationships with 
others of a similar social standing (Putnam, 2000). This pattern of social relationship 
formation may not be beneficial for low-status individuals as interactions within a small 
social network tends to involve a larger degree of overlap in information and resources 
known to each member. Crucially, when low-status individuals befriend others from 
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their status group, they are likely to have similar distrusting beliefs about others. 
Therefore, this repeated contact would only further strengthen their lack of generalised 
trust. In contrast, in a wider social network, due to less frequent social encounters and 
interaction, there tends to be less overlap in resources and information shared among 
the members. As a result, members that are part of wider social networks are more 
exposed to novel resources and information (Granovetter, 1973). Presumably this 
exposure would be beneficial in one’s quest to gain or maintain social standing. In 
other words, low-status individuals may fuel each other’s lack of trust of outside their 
social group. This may be maladaptive because interaction with strangers exposes one 
to novel information and resources that are not available within close relationships. 
This exposure may bring about opportunities that could improve social standing. There 
is evidence suggesting that individuals with higher levels of trust tend to be wealthier, 
better educated and happier compared to those with lower levels of trust (Delhey & 
Newton, 2003). The current findings contributes to the second theory such that it 
demonstrates that while it may be useful for low-status individuals to expand their 
social network, they may refrain from doing so because of their strategic vigilance 
towards social threat signals, and hence leading them to perceive targets as unreliable 
sources of affiliation.  
In conclusion, it is possible that differential sensitivity towards trustworthiness 
and threat regulation between status groups underlie our ability to successfully navigate 
hierarchical social interactions and thereby supporting the emergence and maintenance 
of social hierarchies. That is, the current findings suggests that the attentional processes 
involved in the processing of facial expressions of threat may play a contributing role to 
the pervasiveness of status hierarchy. 
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5.5 Limitations and future studies 
Given that all the empirical studies conducted in the current research involved 
manipulated status, I interpreted the effects obtained as a result of loss of subjective 
sense of status in the domains of respect and prestige. However, despite including self-
report manipulation check questions as an indicator of whether the manipulation 
successfully shifted participants’ subjective sense of status temporarily, I did not 
implicitly measure if the loss of status was the only underlying motivation that 
triggered the effects I observed. For future studies, it would be good to include an 
implicit measure of status, for example by using a social evaluation IAT in the domain 
of respect and prestige. Such a task could potentially capture and pinpoint the relevant 
underlying processes and would allow us to rule out other possible mediating variables.  
Additionally, in the current research social status was defined solely from the 
perspective of the relative degree of social prestige and respect. However, the 
Dominance-Prestige account of hierarchy differentiation (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, 
Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013) highlights the evolutionary duality of our species in 
relying both on coercive dominance and also shared knowledge and cultural learning in 
attaining social rank in human societies. Therefore, further research should take both 
accounts of status differentiation into consideration. In particular, it would be of great 
value to investigate if status concerns in domain of dominance would elicit the same 
top-down influences on the processing of emotional faces as status concerns in the 
domain of prestige 
The overarching aim of the current research was to consider the role of attention 
in the processing of threatening faces, and how this varies as a function of one’s 
subjective sense of status. The most robust evidence for an attentional bias was 
  208
demonstrated in Studies 5 and 6, in which low-status individuals were strategically 
vigilant towards angry faces. In those two studies, a dot-probe task was used to measure 
attention. However, it should be noted that it has been claimed that different attentional 
paradigms measure different ‘types’ of attention. (VanRullen, Reddy, & Koch, 2004). 
In other words, different attentional requirements from different paradigms are likely to 
result in different effects. For example, it has been shown that some stimuli that “pop-
out” in visual search task are not discriminated in dual task paradigms (e.g., the 
paradigm used in Study 3). On the other hand, some stimuli that can be discriminated in 
dual task paradigms do not “pop-out”. Therefore, a greater understanding of the exact 
nature of attentional resources allocation and the specific conditions which they operate 
is needed before any conclusions can be drawn with regards to the underlying 
mechanism responsible for the enhanced processing of threatening faces in low-status 
individuals.  
In addition, all the morphing videos used in the Study 7 displayed a target’s 
expression morphing from an angry facial expression to a neutral facial expression. 
These videos were created, in that order, because I was interested in whether the 
hypervigilance to threat cues demonstrated by low-status participants in the previous 
studies, would lead to a bias to perceive threat-related cues in ambiguous faces for 
longer than high-status participants. While I did find support for my hypotheses, the 
narrow range of stimuli used that did not incorporate different emotions may limit the 
generalisability of my findings. This is because, the likelihood of encountering an 
individual whose dynamic expression changes from angry to neutral, is equally likely 
as the expression changing from neutral to angry in our daily lives. The nature of the 
way the emotional expression changes across time carries contrasting meaning and 
therefore future studies should investigate if low-status participants are more likely to 
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perceive threat-related cues sooner than high-status participants when watching a 
neutral expression change to an angry one. Furthermore, in everyday experiences, facial 
expressions almost always appear within a rich contextual environment and depending 
on the context, facial expressions may signal different social-emotional information. 
Therefore, further studies should incorporate a wider range of stimuli, specifically those 
that morph from neutral expression to other emotional states, and the context in which 
these stimuli are presented could also be manipulated.   
In the current research, low-status individuals consistently showed attentional 
and processing biases towards social threat signals, in the form of angry faces and 
untrustworthy faces. I deduced that this is driven by psychologically stressful position 
low-status individuals are in as a result of their chronic experiences of social 
discrimination and hostility. Additionally, the current findings provided evidence that 
low-status individuals tend to avoid targets displaying unreliable indicators of social 
affiliation (such as those signalled by non-Duchenne smiles). Put together, these 
findings gives reason to propose that the initial attentional bias towards social threat 
cues contributed to the motivation to avoid targets displaying subtle cues of 
untrustworthiness, rather than that of genuine affiliative opportunity. Furthermore, 
given that low-status individuals did not show a superior explicit ability to differentiate 
between the Duchenne and non-Duchenne smile, it is possible that the avoidance 
motivation was driven by the lower-level selective attentional processes. However, in 
order to establish the causal role of selective attention in guiding later-stage decision 
making, future studies would need to incorporate measures of basic social perceptual 
processes and higher-order cognition sequentially within a single study.   
Finally, the primary function of perceptual input is to guide motor behaviour to 
navigate the social environment, manipulate external objects and interact with others. 
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However, the bulk of the studies in the current research has looked at attentional and 
early-stage perceptual processes and did not incorporate suitable measures of motor 
behaviour to investigate how the biased processing of angry faces influenced 
subsequent motor behaviour.  
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5.6 Implications  
The current findings shed light on the underpinnings of social status as a 
psychological factor rather than purely a social structure that organises humans in the 
social hierarchy. It has a range of implications potentially relevant to the health, clinical 
and organisational domains. In addition, the current findings also reveal potential 
determinants as to why status hierarchies are pervasive. Finally, it also sheds light on 
the conundrum of why low-status individuals are both the victim of unprovoked 
hostility and the perpetrator of violence.  
It has been proposed that within a social hierarchy, there are multiple valued 
dimensions along which people are rank ordered such that individuals or groups 
possessing more of the valued dimensions are ranked higher than those who are lacking 
in these dimensions. Importantly, more than one of valued dimension can be in play at 
any given time, and the context will determine which dimension is most relevant for 
hierarchical differentiation during that time (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In other words, 
an individual may experience a loss in social respect and prestige at any given moment, 
and that this sense of perceived status is a transient one. The findings obtained in the 
current research is in agreement with the notion as findings demonstrated that 
temporary activation of loss of social prestige and respect can lead to effects in the 
information processing, attentional, and social evaluation domains.   
The current research highlights the vital role selective attentional processes have 
in influencing subsequent behavioural responses in social interactions. Attentional bias 
towards social threat cues in low-status individuals was associated with perceiving 
anger cues for a longer time on ambiguous faces of interaction partners and the 
subsequent avoidance of targets displaying non-Duchene smiles. Therefore, one 
  212
potentially useful means of addressing this issue of greater conflict in relationships 
among individuals from low SES backgrounds could be to resolve early-stage 
attentional and processing biases. For example. the repetitive training attentional task, a 
simple task that involves continuously searching for affiliation while ignoring social 
threat, has been shown to successfully reduce the hypervigilance to social threat. It has 
been shown that this method successfully reduced student’s stress and anxiety about 
their final exam. Furthermore, the students also feel more competent in their school 
ability. In a workplace context, this training method has also been shown to result in 
improvement in work performance, higher self-esteem and self-confidence, and lower 
self-reported stress and cortisol (Dandeneau et al., 2007).  
The idea that attentional biases can be experimentally manipulated has been 
explored in a few studies. For example, low self-esteem participants that were asked to 
perform a repetitive task involving locating a single smiling face amongst other 
frowning later showed reduced attentional bias towards rejection words (Dandeneau & 
Baldwin, 2004). Other studies have also shown that experimentally manipulated 
processing biases can influence emotional vulnerability (MacLeod, Rutherford, 
Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; see also Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Wilson, 
MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). In particular, MacLeod et al. (2002) used a 
modified visual probe task to induce attentional bias away from threatening information 
(toward neutral information). The basic principles of this task is similar to the dot-probe 
task used in Studies 5 and 6, in which participants are presented with a pair of simuli 
and their task is to identify the probe that replaces one of the two stimuli. Crucially, in 
the attend-neutral training condition, the probe always replaced the neutral stimuli (e.g., 
thereby) instead of the threatening stimuli (e.g., violent). The authors compared the 
attentional biases produced by participants in the attend-neutral and attend-threat 
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training conditions and found that there was a significant difference between the two 
groups. More interestingly, all participants also completed a very difficult anagram task 
as a measure of emotion reactivity at the end of the visual probe task. Participants in the 
attend-neutral condition reported significantly lower levels of negative mood, and there 
was a significant correlation between the differences in attentional biases and emotional 
reactivity to the stress induced by the anagram task. This line of work is promising as it 
shows that not only can attentional biases be modified, its modification could also have 
direct causal effects on emotional reactivity. In the context of low-status individuals, 
such attentional modification may enhance their possibility of forging genuine 
relationships with others. That is, it is possible that the hypervigilance towards social 
threat is costing low-status individuals the flexibility of spotting promising affiliative 
opportunities. Furthermore, their high emotional reactivity and cynicism may further 
reduce their willingness to prioritise the possibilities of new relationships. In other 
words, this line of work could modify low-status individual’s maladaptive attentional 
patterns to social threat and could improve the chances of low-status individuals 
identifying targets who could provide valuable social resources they lack. 
In a meta-analysis that reviewed 208 laboratory studies of psychological 
stressors, Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) highlighted the stressful effects of social-
evaluative threats. Specifically, how these threats influence critical evaluation, 
interpersonal conflict, and dominance hierarchy that negatively affect employee morale 
in the modern workplace. Notably, different individuals experience social threats in 
different ways, and their subsequent coping response depends on the initial cognitive 
appraisal of the social situation (Dandeneau et al., 2007). This cognitive appraisal 
process involves two levels. The primary appraisal involves a careful consideration of 
what is at stake in the particular social exchange, whereas the secondary appraisal 
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involves the assessment of what can be done to cope with the social exchange (Lazarus 
& Folkman, 1984). The current findings suggest that perception of threat could be 
modified in the primary appraisal stage before the stress induced flight or flight 
response is triggered (Gross, 2002). Indeed, much of the work of the effects of 
psychological stressors has looked at how it negatively impacts individuals on myriad 
domains of their personal and professional lives. However, the most effective means of 
addressing this issue is still largely debatable. The current findings suggest that efforts 
to reduce the stressful impacts of social-threats may benefit from considering the initial 
cognitive appraisal of the social situation. For example, attentional modification of how 
angry facial expressions are perceived may potentially be useful for tackling issues of 
increased interpersonal conflicts in low SES communities.  
The significant influence of hierarchical rank on social interactions (Cummins, 
2000) suggests that neural mechanisms exist to process social information, which in 
turn reinforces the status hierarchy. Indeed, a central question in the field of social 
neuroscience is to determine adaptive neurobiological systems in the human brain 
responsible for the maintenance of hierarchical social interactions (Chiao et al., 2009). 
The current research opens up the possibility of the involvement of a system that is 
sensitive to social-threat. Indeed, a limbic system sensitised to threat has been theorised 
to be responsible for hypervigilance (Compton, 2003) across different types of 
threatening stimuli, including visual images and words (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & 
Hamilton, 1998; Ellenbogen, Schwartzman, Stewart, & Walker, 2006; MacLeod et al., 
1986). Furthermore, this hypervigilance to threat has been suggested to stem from brain 
structures in the right hemisphere, including the amygdala. This finding that the right 
hemisphere plays an important role in the processing and interpretation of threat has 
been supported by a wide range of studies such as dichotic listening and functional 
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magnetic resonance (Compton, 2003; Compton, Wilson, & Wolf, 2004; Fox, 2002; 
Gruzelier & Phelan, 1991; Nitschke, Heller, & Miller, 2000; Van Strien & Heijt, 1995). 
Following this line of work, it is possible that low-status individuals may have an 
overactive limbic system which is at least, in part responsible for the well-documented 
link between reported criminal violence and low-income neighbourhoods.  
Building from the hypothesis that expectancy may modulate subjective 
perception and neutral processing of aversive stimuli (e.g., Sarinopoulos, Dixon, Short, 
Davidson, Nitschke, 2006; Wager et al., 2004). Diekhof et al., (2011) conducted an 
fMRI study to explore how emotional perception is modulated by stimulus-specific 
anticipatory imagery. In particular, the researchers examined how anticipatory mental 
imagery of a mildly fearful face biased the perception of highly fearful faces and 
generated a false sense of reduced fearfulness. Results from this study highlighted the 
critical role expectancies play in the interpretation of sensory input. Specifically, how 
the heightened sensitivity towards social threat may be in part due to the underlying 
expectation of being confronted with threatening targets. Furthermore, it is also in line 
with the idea that mental imagery serves an ‘emotional amplifier’ (Holmes, Geddes, 
Colom, & Goodwin, 2008). Mental imagery has also been put forward as one of the 
underlying factors leading to the maintenance of anxiety in individuals suffering from 
posttraumatic stress disorder and social phobia (Hirsch & Holmes, 2007). Incorporating 
that line of reasoning to the findings from the current research, encouraging the right 
types of imagery may help in modulating the attentional bias to social threat 
demonstrated by low-status individuals. This may in turn help reduce the social anxiety 
and stress faced by low-status individuals as a result of their preconceived expectation 
of encountering threat.  On a broader perspective, in order to effectively navigate our 
dynamic social life, people need a regulatory system that negotiates the conflicting 
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goals of connectedness goals and self-protection goals (Murray, Holmes, & Collins, 
2006). Through the selective vigilance towards social threat cues, and the avoidance of 
untrustworthy targets, the current research provides evidence that low-status individuals 
prioritise the goal of self-protection as opposed to satisfying connected needs. 
However, the current research did not look at actual behavioural consequences of loss 
of social status. Past research has shown that people adjust the display of affect 
behaviours in relation to social situational factors, such as the perceived social status, 
group size, and familiarity (Fridlund, 1991; Kraut & Johnston, 1979). When individuals 
experience events, such as wealth accumulation, that increase their capacity, they are 
hypothesised to exaggerate dominant behaviours that advertise this added capacity. On 
the other hand, when individuals experience social and material losses that decrease 
their capacity resources, they are less able to display capacity. Thus, they are motivated 
to exaggerate the presentation of submissive and trustworthy behaviours such as 
expressed vulnerability (Marsh et al., 2005). Research on mating preferences shows 
that people appraise each other’s capacity cues in anticipation of immediate or short-
term relationships, and appraises each others’ trustworthiness cues in anticipation of 
long-term relationships (Cottrell, Neruberg, & Li, 2007). In other words, individuals 
may strategically display capacity and trustworthiness cues selectively, in order to 
attract short term or long-term relationship partners respectively. At the social network 
level, capacity cues would be used for maintaining relationships with many, whereas 
trustworthiness cues would be used for fewer relationship partners. In contrast to 
demonstrations of capacity, trustworthiness cues (kindness, loyalty and honesty) 
require repeated interactions to be accurately assessed by others, making these 
behaviours more efficient for maintaining smaller and more intimate social networks 
that enable individuals to invest more time in individual relationships. Indeed, larger 
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social networks are more risky than intimate networks because larger social networks 
consist of a greater proportion of less familiar and less dependable relationship 
partners. Such conditions would only seem to be advantageous when individuals can 
endure the added social risk of potential devaluation.  
The current research focused on the way a perceiver’s status influenced the way 
they perceived social cues. However, given the theoretical framework outlined above, 
an investigation into how low-status individuals translate their strategic attentional 
vigilance to social threat cues to strategic behaviour merits further research. Strategic 
behaviour is conducted contingent upon the anticipated actions of others (Scharlemann, 
Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001), the current findings suggest that low-status 
individuals are biased to perceive the intention of interaction partners as hostile. It is 
therefore of interest to investigate how which strategic behavioural cues they display in 
order to create smaller, more reliable social networks. 
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5.7 Conclusions  
The dynamics of the natural responses to being in a low-status position are 
likely to be complex and multifaceted. The devalued position of low-status individuals 
represents a chronic source of social threat to achieving and maintaining a positive 
sense of psychological and social worth. Such social threat directly impacts attitudes, 
beliefs and behaviour (Henry, 2009; 2011).  
In an attempt to clarify the nature of these responses, the current research 
intended to separate these responses into some of their attentional and social evaluative 
judgement components. In nine studies, the current research utilised several 
conceptually different measures to investigate the core research question of how status 
influences face perception. The current research tested whether low social status leads 
to heightened accessibility of social threat (Study 1), better memory for targets 
embedded within a social threat context (Study 2), greater interference on performance 
on a focal task when presented with angry face distractors (Study 3), more motivated to 
allocate processing resources to identifying angry faces (Study 4), show selective 
strategic attentional vigilance towards angry faces due to enhanced engagement of 
angry cues (Studies 5 and 6), perceive hostile cues for a longer time in emotionally 
ambiguous faces of interaction partners (Study 7), and avoid targets who signal subtle 
forms of social threat (Studies 8 and 9).  
There has been a longstanding interest in social cognition in seeking to 
understand how we make sense of incoming input from the external social 
environment. The current research is in agreement with the general assumption in 
Social Psychology and Social Cognition that the influence of the external environment 
in guiding attention, perception and subsequent behaviour is limited in so far that its 
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impact is to a large extent determined by cognitive mechanisms that occur within the 
dynamic minds. Importantly, these cognitive mechanisms rarely operate in the absence 
of top-down influences of the perceiving individual.  
In conclusion, as Judith Howard aptly stated in her review on the social 
cognitive conception of social structure, “Social structures are continually negotiated 
and redefined through individual action and interaction. The individual and society are 
mutually constitutive.” (Howard, 1994, p. 210). Conceptualising our modern day social 
structure requires the understanding of how social structure is represented and sustained 
by cognitive processes of individuals, and how these individuals’ internal 
representations of their social environment shapes social processes.  Taking the 
broadest perspective on the current research, my work has shown that indeed there is a 
two-way relationship between an individual and the society that they are part of. 
Specifically, the social environment influences how we make sense of other people and 
of ourselves. At the same time, our social cognitive processes determine how we 
interact with our social environment. Importantly, these interactions are a result of our 
position in the social hierarchy, and simultaneously dictate our position within it. With 
respect to low-status individuals, being embedded in a hostile social environment and 
chronic experiences of threat to the social self may have led to a greater motivation to 
process social-threat cues more extensively. This hypervigilance for threat-related cues 
may subsequently lead to biased perception of ambiguous interaction partners, which 
may either lead to an improvement in status position, or deter possible advancements in 
the social hierarchy. Hence, referring back to what was proposed by Howard (1994), 
the current research contributed to greater understanding of the dynamic nature of our 
hierarchical social structure.  
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Appendix I 
List of social threat, non-social threat, and neutral words used in Study 1.  
Social threat Non-social threat Neutral 
outsider 
scrutiny 
blamed 
disliked 
excluded 
judged 
harsh 
awkward 
boring 
horrible 
nasty 
ashamed 
shame 
peculiar 
hostile 
cruel 
lonely 
bother 
ignored 
crazy 
dull 
unusual 
stupid 
fail 
hated 
fault 
anxious 
mistake 
nervous 
guilty 
unable 
worry 
outbreak 
symptom 
carrier 
diagnosis 
virus 
disorder 
chronic 
bacteria 
needle 
lump 
swollen 
agony 
pill 
fatal 
clinic 
exposure 
sickness 
acute 
injured 
infection 
drug 
weakness 
procedure 
fever 
patients 
emergency 
medicine 
nurse 
illness 
burning 
dying 
disease 
parameter 
designate 
voltage 
audit 
mammal 
plaintiff 
keyboard 
marbles 
hardware 
feather 
junction 
collector 
lecturer 
onions 
merchants 
candle 
implicit 
agenda 
recipe 
employee 
garment 
declare 
leapt 
adapt 
broadcast 
engineer 
panel 
ratio 
ladder 
index 
delivery 
topic 
salad 
percentage 
timber 
plates 
sculpture 
terrace 
faculty 
camera 
network 
inch 
steadily 
landscape 
farmer 
empire 
climbed 
artists 
shortly 
identity 
factory 
maintain 
library 
journey 
decade 
holiday 
branch 
newspaper 
length 
camp 
add 
adult 
kitchen 
clothes 
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Appendix II 
 
Status manipulation task (low status condition) used in Studies 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
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Recall a recent interaction you had with someone from the top of the ladder. These 
are the people who are the best off – those who are most respected in your 
community. 
 
Please describe the interaction – what happened, what you did, how you felt etc.  
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Appendix III 
List of social threat events and negative valence social events used in Study 2. 
Threat related social events Negative valence social events 
My partner totally flirted with someone else 
tonight and practically ignored me; I don’t 
know how seriously I should take it. 
My society did really terribly in the Society 
Skit Night – in fact, we probably came in 
dead last.  
My best friend blew me off; we had made 
weekend plans but I guess they just didn’t 
matter.   
I forgot all about my older sister’s birthday – 
I think I really let her down and I don’t know 
if she’ll accept my apology. 
My Irish heritage is really important to me 
but when I went to the student Irish 
association thy acted like I didn’t belong 
there, like they thought I didn’t fit in.  
I forgot to bring the music for a really 
important practice session for the Student 
Choir that I sing in (we’re going to 
competition soon) – boy was everyone mad. 
I was reading an editorial in the student paper 
– it seems that no matter how hard we try; my 
university just gets no respect in the business 
world.  
My roommate and I got into an enormous 
fight tonight over the room being such a mess 
– I don’t know if we’re ever going to stop 
fighting about the same old stuff. 
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Appendix IV 
Examples of emotional facial stimuli (left to right: happy, angry, fear, sad, neutral) 
from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) dataset used in Studies 3, 5, and 6.  
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Appendix V 
Examples of emotional facial stimuli (left to right: happy, angry, fear, sad) from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) database (Lundqvist et al., 1998) dataset 
used in Studies 4 and 7.  
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Appendix VI 
Status manipulation task (Psychology undergraduates in low status condition) used in 
Studies 8, and 9.  
 
